

# GOVERNANCE IN MYANMAR

Evaluation of the 'Building equitable and resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project

Effectiveness Review Series 2015/16



Photo credit: Hein Latt Aung/Oxfam. The women of Thazi township in Magway Region, Myanmar, process rice before selling it to the market suppliers. Through Oxfam's Dryzone Project, Oxfam has supported the women and men in the region by providing threshing machines, and by helping develop a marketing centre with accurate scales and price information, that will help farmers get a fairer price.

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It takes some courage to choose for an evaluation not only the effectiveness, but also the sustainability of an innovative governance and livelihoods project using an unconventional participatory approach in the context of Myanmar. The Effectiveness Review of the 'Building equitable and resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project (in short: the Dry Zone project or DZ project) was made possible by the audacity, patience and ongoing support of Oxfam GB and Oxfam Myanmar leadership, in particular Claire Hutchings (Head of Programme Quality), Jane Lonsdale (Director of Governance and Quality) and Subhendu Pratihari (Economic Justice Programme Manager).

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# ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community-Based Organisation
DZ	Dry Zone
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
ER	Effectiveness Review
GoM	Government of Myanmar
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
KII	Key Informant Interview
LIFT	Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organisation
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MFI	Micro-Finance Institution
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability & Learning
MO	Membership Organisation
MOC	Membership Organisation Committee
MoP	Members of Parliament
NAG	Network Activities Group
OGB	Oxfam Great Britain
Oxfam GB	Oxfam Great Britain
PIALA	Participatory Impact Assessment and Learning Approach
PVCA	Participatory Vulnerability & Capacity Assessment
R&V	Risks & Vulnerabilities
TDSC	Township Development Support Committee
TACS	Total Average Contribution Score
ToC	Theory of Change
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party
VDSC	Village Development Support Committee

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 'Building equitable and resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project (in short: the Dry Zone project, or DZ project) was selected in 2015 to be evaluated on the effectiveness and sustainability of its inclusive governance and voice model. The project aimed to build strong and viable Membership Organisations (MOs) capable of organising community members, lobbying township departments and parliament, establishing business relationships with traders and suppliers, and developing civil society networks with local NGOs and MOs of other villages, in order to create sustainable livelihood opportunities and build resilience against climate-related hazards (e.g. drought and flooding). The main proposition of the 'Building equitable and resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project was that MOs could lay the foundation for developing more sustainable livelihoods and build resilience in the communities that struggle with extreme climatological and environmental conditions. The underlying assumption was that, by building the capacity of these MOs, behavioural changes would be triggered in a set of key stakeholder relationships and mechanisms that would result in more sustainable livelihood opportunities and conditions. Successful MOs would then inspire and influence other communities to also develop MOs and motivate local governments to support them. The total budget, spent over a period of three years, was US\$2,229,040 (on average almost US\$770K per year), of which US\$2,133,586 was funded by the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) and US\$95,454 contributed by Oxfam GB. The project was coordinated by Oxfam and implemented from May 2011 until end of May 2014 by the Network Activities Group (NAG) in Minbu and Oxfam in Thazi.

## Objectives and approach

The focus of the review was on 'governance/voice' and MO effectiveness and sustainability **18–20 months after project completion**. Its objectives were as follows:

- Verify to what extent MOs still exist and function 18–20 months after project closure.
- Learn about the conditions that affect MO effectiveness and sustainability.
- Develop and employ a participatory approach to understand and support 'governance and voice' work and build local capacity in using this approach.

The project developed MOs in 64 villages, which is a medium-size population requiring a medium-n sample too large for in-depth within-case evaluation using methods such as process tracing. To meet the objectives of the review, PIALA<sup>2</sup> (Participatory Impact Assessment and Learning Approach) was employed: an approach that permits rigorous participatory impact inquiry in medium- to large-n samples. PIALA draws on five key elements: a systemic Theory of Change (ToC) approach; multi-stage random sampling of/in 'open systems'; participatory mixed-methods; participatory sense-making; and configurational counterfactual analysis. A few adjustments were made to these elements in order to meet the requirements of the Effectiveness Review – such as *purposive* (instead of *random*) proportional sampling of MOs and the use of *combined* (instead of *mixed*) methods that are a better fit for investigating the MO governance model, and a scaling down of the sense-making because of resource and time constraints. The approach is detailed in Section 2 of this report.


The sampling was done based on the results from a survey of all MOs on their effectiveness status<sup>3</sup> with a **total of 413 respondents (36% women and 64% men)**. The survey made it possible to categorise the MOs and proportionally sample 21 MO villages (12 in Thazi and 9 in Minbu) across the different categories, covering the variability in MO performance and climatological hazards and capturing the special combinations/cases of particular interest for learning. Data was then collected in these 21 villages using a standard set of participatory

methods in gender-specific focus groups that engaged a **total of about 1,302<sup>4</sup> quasi-randomly selected people (44% women and 56% men)**. Figure 1 shows how the methods were chosen to investigate the causal claim of the project's Theory of Change (presented in Section 4.1.4), and how they overlapped and complemented each other to permit cross-checking and testing of hypotheses.


Based on the evidence produced by these methods, each of the causal links in the ToC was then rated for its relative strength and consistency in each researched village, and a **Total Average Contribution (TAC) score** for each outcome area was calculated for the entire sample. Apart from the contribution scoring, MOs were also scored on their performance, generating a total MO score for each village and a **Total Average MO (TAMO) score** for the entire sample. Based on their total MO score, MOs were classified as 'fully effective', 'maturing', 'hopeful', 'struggling' or 'dysfunctional'. Figure 2 shows that no single MO was found *fully effective* or entirely *dysfunctional*, while 14% was found *maturing*, 48% middle-range *hopeful* and 38% *struggling*. Of the *hopeful* MOs, 40% are performing fairly well and can therefore be considered as *nearly maturing*. The proportion of *maturing* and *nearly maturing* MOs together made up 33% of the MOs, thus balancing out the 38% struggling MOs.

A configurational analysis of all the evidence across the sample of 21 villages finally generated the explanations for the TAC and TAMO scores, while EvalC3 software was used to conduct a search for the best predictive models of MO in/effectiveness relative to positive changes in 'relationships', 'risks and vulnerabilities (R&V) management' and 'livelihoods and resilience'.

**Figure 1**



**Figure 2**






## Contribution scores and explanations

Effective/sustained MO functioning

**TAC score 3.31 – TAMO score 3.25 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**

Evidence<sup>5</sup> from 33% of *nearly maturing* and *maturing* MOs confirms the proposition that MOs can function as an important local governance mechanism for improving livelihoods and building resilience, but by themselves are insufficient to guarantee sustainable improvements. Evidence from the 38% of struggling MOs provide a **counterfactual** showing that in the absence of such a governance mechanism, improvements are unlikely to occur.



Capacity, ownership and transparency appear to be the essential factors for the mechanism to be successful. MOs in Minbu generally performed better than those in Thazi, which may be to do with more cooperative village leadership and/or a better way of working of NAG in Minbu.

The Dry Zone project significantly contributed to enhancing **women's position** in the village power structure. Women now take leading roles in the MOC and engage in village decision-making – something that was previously unknown. But they still face challenges: their capacity to lead was openly distrusted in 13% of the villages.

Township officials positively valued the MO model and found it most successful in actively engaging the communities in development efforts and **fostering collaboration** *in* and *between* the villages and the line departments. Relationships with line departments and traders, however, have become noticeably less frequent since the project closure. Significant success in terms of building climate resilience has yet to be realised. The officials call for more collaborative effort of government, communities and NGOs (including Oxfam) to build MO capacity and MOC leadership, prepare the next MO generation, and facilitate greater sharing of successes and failures in order to sustain and strengthen the model.

Villagers value the MO model for the **voice, ownership and opportunity for learning and engaging in development**. Constraints are **lack of time and finance, dysfunction and poor management, interference of central village leadership, and migration**. Generally, MO members feel that the project ended too soon, and more coaching and supervision would be needed to sufficiently strengthen MO capacity and safeguard their sustainability. This is reasonable, given the extremely difficult environment, the limited capacity of stakeholders to deal with the problems, and the political-historical background of the country. A project engagement of three years was insufficient to safeguard the sustainability of new governance models.



Sustained/strengthened relationships


**TAC score 2.51**




Improved risk & vulnerability (R&V) management

**TAC score 2.52**

**Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**




Improvements in relationships and networks were found to be average in 19% and weak in 57% of the villages, while R&V management was found to be average in 29% and weak in 52% of the cases. Thus, only 24% of the villages showed strong performance in terms of



relationships and 19% in R&V management. The evidence<sup>6</sup> suggests that effective relationships mostly depend on MO performance in terms of **coalition-building** (in particular advocacy and networking), and on the **responsiveness of township departments and private actors**. Responsiveness of the departments responsible for water and livestock was reported as generally quite low.


Indeed, the EvalC3 analysis<sup>7</sup> proves that particularly strong MO coalition building and mandate is *sufficient* to generate improvements in relationships with township departments and NGOs/donors/MFIs and in community management of climate-related risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, strong MO coalition building was found *necessary* (though *not sufficient*) for effective relationships to occur, with township departments responsible for developing and maintaining a productive water infrastructure (including the departments of water, irrigation and rural development). Strong MO leadership was found *necessary* (but *not sufficient*) for the improvement or sustainment of relationships with the livestock departments.



Increased/sustained access

**TAC score 2.93 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**

Overall, some improvement in access to inputs, resources, services, markets and NGO/donor support was observed in all villages, yet in 66% of the cases this was found to be mediocre to weak and insufficient. Lack of access to water for production formed the main problem as it caused a decrease in farming that negatively affected relationships, this in its turn negatively affected access to agricultural inputs and services. The lack of access to water is partly attributable to **inadequate drought management**. Township authorities showed limited responsiveness and capacity for developing and maintaining appropriate productive water infrastructure and monitoring of water levels. The decrease in farming is further exaggerated by soil erosion caused by villagers' unsustainable agricultural practices. MO members have been trained in soil conservation. Reported changes in awareness and practice are attributable to the MO's key role in this, thus demonstrating its **added value**.



'Access' appears highly correlated with MO performance. In 33% of the villages 'access' was found to be strong and sufficient, with strong MO performance in terms of **coalition building** (particularly networking and civil society building). In another 33% of the villages 'access' was found to be weak and insufficient, while MO functioning overall was weak and incapable of mitigating the problems arising from water depletion and soil erosion.<sup>8</sup> Overall, strong MO coalition building seems to result in stronger capacity to address problems related to 'access' and also a stronger influence (and less dependency) on government responsiveness.






Improved/sustained livelihoods and resilience

**TAC score 2.94 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**

In 86% of the villages, improvements were made only with livestock, and in Thazi also with hair sorting for Chinese traders. Although very important to pay off debts and gain income, this proved insufficient to generate the amplifying effects observed in the 14% of villages that performed well as a result of the successful combination of farming and livestock, creating more casual labour, small business and trading opportunities. In most of the villages, this success scenario did not take place because there was a lack of access to water for production. In many of these villages, people turn to migration to strengthen their livelihoods.



A strong correlation appeared between MO/MOC performance and livelihoods and resilience status, **confirming the hypothesis** that capable and well-functioning MOs can make a difference in livelihood conditions.<sup>9</sup> Where improvements in livelihoods and resilience were found to be strong (14% of the villages), MO performance was strong and maturing towards fully effective. Where improvements in livelihoods and resilience were found to be weak (24%), MOs were generally weak and struggling (though mostly still hopeful). One case represented an exception, where the MO performed quite well, but the destructive impact of heavy rains and river flooding washed away all gains and possibilities to build resilience.

The EvalC3 analysis<sup>10</sup> shows that particularly strong **MO mandate/membership** and strong **MO coalition building** are *necessary* (but *not sufficient*) to generate improvements in farming and livestock, creating new labour, business and trading opportunities. These two dimensions of MO performance were also found *sufficient* to generate improvements in relationships with township departments and NGOs/donors/MFIs, as well as the management of climate-related risks. **Weak MO operations**, on the other hand, appear *sufficient* to result in a deterioration of farming, while strong MO operations proved *sufficient* to generate improvements in livestock breeding.

## Conclusions and recommendations

To fully appreciate the present status and influence of MO functioning, it is essential to understand the novelty of the MO model to the Burmese institutional landscape. The MO is fundamentally different from other village institutions<sup>11</sup> or traditional farmer organisations in its role of **facilitator of people's participation and voice in local governance** and its **wider scope of development efforts and community-level action focused on improving livelihoods and resilience**. As a result, MOs have generally gained **much wider village participation** compared to other local development institutions, which in itself is an important indication of their relevance and importance. Figure 3 illustrates this distinct and novel role.<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 3: Dry Zone inclusive governance triangle**



Given its novelty and the extremely difficult context and conditions, it appears that the one-third of MOs (33%) that are presently still functioning reasonably well, must be viewed as quite an achievement. Factual evidence showing strong improvements in livelihoods and resilience where MOs performed strongly (14% of the MOs), and counterfactual evidence confirming that improvements remain weak or turned negative where MOs are very weak (38%), shows the importance and necessity of the MO as a *distinct* institutional mechanism for leveraging inclusive governance and building community-level capacity for climate adaptation, thereby validating the Dry Zone project's ToC. The value attributed to the MO model by both villagers and township officials stresses this. MOs have generally proved successful in creating new livelihood opportunities and enhancing women's positions and influence in village decision-making.

Yet, given the fact that nearly half (48%) of the MOs were found to be *hopeful* but still far from *effective*, and livelihood improvements were found to be mediocre and insufficient in 62% of the villages, the question remains what can be learned and what is left to be done to ensure the impact of the Dry Zone project can and will be sustained and enlarged?

Firstly, a project engagement of only three years has proved insufficient to safeguard the effectiveness and sustainability of the MO as a new governance model. Generally, MO members feel that the project ended too soon, and more coaching and supervision would be needed to sufficiently strengthen MO capacity and safeguard their sustainability. This is reasonable, given the extremely difficult environment, the limited capacity of stakeholders to deal with the problems, and the political-historical background of the country.

Secondly, the assumption that building MO and MOC capacity would be sufficient to trigger the changes in key stakeholder relationships and mechanisms needed for generating sustainable livelihood opportunities and building resilience, clearly does not hold true in all villages. The evidence shows convincingly that MOs by themselves cannot make relationships effective or overcome the extreme climatological and environmental conditions. But the evidence does prove that MOs *can* form an effective governance mechanism, and that such a mechanism (distinct from existing institutions and traditional farmer organisations) is *necessary* for realising sustainable livelihood improvements. However, more is needed than the merely technical inputs and training so far provided by Oxfam/NAG to make this happen. The Dry Zone project has focused *too narrowly* on the MOs and MOCs.

MOC leaders experience greater difficulty in being accepted and sustaining the functioning of the MO if they are overruled or dominated by central village leadership. This was reported to be the case in 23% of the surveyed villages and also confirmed by township officials. As we may assume that in many cases it was even not reported, this raises an important red flag. On the other hand, in villages where central leadership is more appreciative and supportive of the MO's distinct role and lets the MOC independently run the development activities, the MOC appears

to gain more credibility and trust among the villagers. The latter was the case in the 33% of the villages where MO performance was found to be fairly strong and (nearly) maturing.

Another essential issue is the lack of responsiveness on the part of township officials. Lack of access to water for agricultural production constitutes the main problem, which is partly attributable to the township authorities' limited responsiveness and capacity for developing and maintaining appropriate productive water infrastructure and monitoring of water levels/availability. The successful combination of farming and livestock and other livelihood activities did not occur in 86% of the villages because of the lack of access to water for production. In many of these villages, people turn to migration, which further undermines the functioning and sustainability of the MOs. Newly created livelihood opportunities, such as hair sorting, combined with livestock in Thazi, have to some extent halted migration, yet still proved unsustainable and insufficient to build resilience.

## Recommendations

The MO model has proved to be a potentially powerful mechanism for building adaptive capacity and resilience at the community-level and developing local participatory democracy. No cost-benefit or value-for-money analysis can accurately calculate all the possible short- and long-term implications of NOT sufficiently investing in the sustainability and scaling-up of such a mechanism. As the architect of the MO, Oxfam and NAG essentially bear the responsibility for the implications of phasing out too early, before MOs could reach sufficient maturity and have the necessary conditions in place that would let them grow and survive.

More investment is needed to reach the tipping point where villages move beyond merely adoption towards adaptation and aggregation of the MO model. Resources need to be invested carefully to foster the kind of collaboration and cross-fertilisation that helps the gaining of influence, and building capacity and movement. We strongly recommend that Oxfam and NAG take a lead in this and mobilise other partners and stakeholders to leverage greater influence and resources.

Figure 4 below may serve as a source of inspiration. It summarises the performance and effects of the MOs in relation to the reported intensification of climate hazards.<sup>13</sup> Even though climate-related hazards have substantially intensified in the past two years, relatively strong improvements in people's livelihoods were reported in 14% of the cases that have reached the stage of 'adaptation' (cf. upper right cell), while relatively weak improvements with important deteriorations in agriculture were observed in 62% of the cases, indicating 'increased resilience' but still too weak to be sustainable (cf. centre right cell), and deteriorations in 24% of the cases showing 'no adaptation' and no improvement in resilience (cf. lower right cell). A renewed follow-up strategy could help in moving up the 24% to the level of 'increased resilience' and the 62% to level of full 'adaptation', while making the best performing 14% strong enough to teach the others and build movement.

**Figure 4: Climate resilience and adaptation performance matrix**

Improved livelihoods	LUCK	INCREASED RESILIENCE	<b>ADAPTATION</b> 14% of the MO villages (all maturing MOs)
Little change	<b>INCREASED VULNERABILITY</b>	VULNERABILITY UNCHANGED	<b>INCREASED RESILIENCE</b> 62% of the MO villages (mixed MO performance)
Deteriorated livelihoods	<b>MALADAPTATION</b>	<b>INCREASED VULNERABILITY</b>	<b>NO ADAPTATION</b> 24% of the MO villages (mostly weak MO performance)
	Reduced hazards	Little change	Intensified hazards

As part of a renewed strategy for further developing, strengthening, sustaining and aggregating the MO model, we recommend the following:

1. Work is undoubtedly needed to help **create the conditions** for MOs to succeed, in particular by **building the capacity of village leadership and township and regional government** to engage with the MOs and take up their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the communities in the Dry Zone to build their adaptive capacity and resilience. Important responsibilities of the township and regional government include: (a) the provision of appropriate and sustainable agricultural and veterinary extension services; and (b) the construction and maintenance of appropriate and sustainable productive water infrastructure and the monitoring of water levels.

Responsible local township departments need the support from the national government and international agencies to obtain **sufficient budget** and **access to climate funding** for delivering on these responsibilities and supporting the MO-led livelihood improvement and adaptation plans.

Arguably, Oxfam and NAG alone do not have sufficient influence and resources to make this happen. Yet, they do have the power and capacity to build coalitions and strategic partnerships with other international, national and local organisations to work on this together.

2. More coaching and supervision is also needed to sufficiently **strengthen MOC leadership and capacity** to mobilise villagers and develop positive relationships with village administration and township officials, as well as other MOs. The EvalC3 analysis suggests that **MO coalition building** and **mandate/membership** are the two most important dimensions to work on in order to generate amplifying improvements in relationships, livelihoods and resilience, and the management of climate-related risks. Without strong MOC leadership, however, this is unlikely to happen. Hence the focus should be on developing second generation MOCs that can operate at a higher strategic and more independent level and is able to prepare the subsequent generation(s).

It is crucial to move beyond merely technical training towards a **systemic learning approach** that builds on:

- a) collaborative learning and movement building – e.g. by engaging all key stakeholders in regular impact reflections and sense-making; and
- b) ‘learning by teaching and doing’ – e.g. by developing methods and approaches for *collective* impact monitoring and creating spaces for MOCs to train each other (in place of individual ‘learning by being taught’).

3. A diversified strategy for strengthening MOC leadership and capacity that is **adaptive to the different levels and conditions of MO performance** would help save valuable resources and make investments more focused and cost-effective. Helpful to this end would be to build a typology that links performance to, for instance, climate adaptation and resilience outcomes (as illustrated by Figure 4). Objectives and investments can then be tailored to the level of performance (e.g. from weak performance with 'no adaptation' up to hopefully functioning with 'increased resilience' and further up to maturing performance showing 'adaptation') and the context and conditions (e.g. local power structure and type of central village leadership, impact of climate hazards, hydro- and ecological conditions) of the different types or categories of MOs. Most important is to sufficiently invest in the 33% of MOs that were found maturing (14%)<sup>14</sup> or nearly maturing (19%)<sup>15</sup> and make them strong enough to **grow and become sustainable**.
4. Investment in the strongest MOs must aim at building capacity to **lead bigger networks, coordinate peer learning**, and **create greater visibility** of successes to inspire other communities and leverage more funding and support. An essential step forward for these MOs to become fully effective and gain influence might be official registration. According to the township officials, MOs can register if they have clear objectives and plans. It is unclear why well-performing MOs have not yet registered. This requires further investigation.

It is also important to appoint a local support NGO (for instance NAG) that has sufficient capacity to take a lead in developing the backbone structure for **collective impact M&E** and support its activities.<sup>16</sup> A framework for this is best developed at the design stage and as an integral part of a renewed strategy.

5. Last, but not least, more and continuous work is needed to develop an environment that enables both men and women to rethink their respective roles and responsibilities and engage in local participatory governance. Women still face considerable challenges in gaining credibility and trust in their ability to take up leadership roles and balance these with household and social duties. The MO can offer the space for women and men to address these gender issues and learn about the advantages of greater **gender equality** in both household and community activities.

Strategically, the focus might best be on helping the maturing and nearly maturing MOs to develop a role model that demonstrates the benefits, and ways to achieve these benefits, to other MO villages. As part of the collective impact M&E and peer learning agenda, for instance, they could lead the piloting of a participatory gender and adaptation analysis approach.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

As part of Oxfam GB's global evaluation framework, mature projects are randomly selected each year to be rigorously evaluated on their effectiveness. Called 'Effectiveness Reviews', these serve to evaluate the impact of OGB's work in its six thematic outcome areas: *humanitarian assistance, adaptation and risk reduction, livelihood enhancement support, women's empowerment, citizen voice, and campaigning and advocacy*. Their focus is on assessing the extent to which Oxfam globally has contributed to change in these areas, using robust and reputable methods.

The 'Building resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project (in short: the Dry Zone project, or DZ project) was selected in 2015 to be evaluated on the effectiveness and sustainability of its inclusive governance and citizen voice model. The project was initially designed to directly provide 'Livelihoods Enhancement Support' to smallholders and enhance their production and market access. However, its Theory of Change (ToC) built on the premise that sustainable livelihoods improvements and community resilience in the Dry Zone in Myanmar can best be realised through developing local inclusive governance and citizenship in the form of community-based membership organisations, which is the reason why the Dry Zone project was selected for evaluation in the area of 'citizen voice' rather than 'livelihood enhancement'.

The project aimed at building strong and viable Membership Organisations (MOs) capable of organising community members, lobbying township departments and parliament, establishing business relationships with traders and suppliers, and developing civil society networks with local NGOs and MOs of other villages, in order to create sustainable livelihood opportunities and build resilience against drought, flooding and other hazards. MOs were developed in 64 villages benefiting an estimated total of 39,000 people, of which 22,500 were from 4,500 households in Thazi township in the Mandalay region, and 16,500 were from 3,300 households in 27 villages in Minbu township in the Magway region. The total budget spent<sup>17</sup> was US\$2,229,040 of which US\$2,133,586 funded by LIFT<sup>18</sup> and US\$95,454 contributed by Oxfam GB. The project was implemented from May 2011 to the end of May 2014 by NAG<sup>19</sup> in Minbu and by Oxfam directly in Thazi. Oxfam coordinated the entire project and, when needed, provided technical and organisational support to NAG.

An end-evaluation was conducted immediately after project completion in June 2014 to assess the impacts of the DZ project on livelihoods and food security, drawing on a quantitative household survey in 29 project villages and 29 control villages and some focus group discussions (FGDs) and key-informant interviews (KIIs) in six villages. The Effectiveness Review complements this end-evaluation by focusing on the **governance/voice aspect** and assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of the MO model **18–20 months after project completion**, using a participatory methodology and configurational analysis approach to investigate and compare a medium-n sample MOs and engage key stakeholders in the inquiry. The approach built on the Participatory Impact Assessment and Learning Approach (PIALA) that was developed for IFAD<sup>20</sup>.

The next section describes the purposes and objectives of this Effectiveness Review, the design principles and challenges, and the PIALA-based approach used by the review. Section 3 describes the aspects of evaluation management, including training and supervision, and reflects on quality. Section 4 then presents the focus and frame of the evaluation (including the evaluation questions) determined on the basis of a reconstruction of the project's **Theory of Change (ToC)** together with key staff and management of Oxfam Myanmar. Section 5 presents the contribution and MO scores, the causal explanations and the more detailed findings. Section 6 concludes with a set of key lessons and recommendations. The appendices contain the sample and the tools used for data collection and analysis, as well as an inventory of the raw data, some intermediary results and final MO scores, and the EvalC3 analysis.



# 2 PARTICIPATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND LEARNING APPROACH (PIALA)

## 2.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The Effectiveness Review needed to investigate the extent to which key outcomes of the Dry Zone (DZ) project had been realised and sustained since project completion in June 2014. More specifically, it needed to investigate the level of effectiveness and sustained functioning of the 'Membership Organisations' (MOs) and their committees (MOCs) developed by the DZ project as a mechanism for community engagement in local decision-making (or inclusive governance). The essential purpose was to **learn** *how* and *under what conditions* the MOs and their MOCs can be an effective and sustainable governance model for building climate resilience and strengthening livelihoods of rural poor and vulnerable people in the Dry Zone.

Oxfam, however, also needs to analyse its impact at an aggregated level for accountability reasons. Therefore, the review also needed to assess and **report** on the effectiveness of MOs and Oxfam's relative contributions to this. Finally, Oxfam also wanted to use the review process as an opportunity to develop a participatory approach and **build capacity** for evaluating and learning about governance and voice. Table 2.1 summarises the three purposes and related objectives that underpinned the evaluation design.

**Table 2.1. Objectives and purposes of the Effectiveness Review of the DZ project**

Objectives	Users	Purposes / Uses
1. Verify to what extent MOs are still in existence and effectively functioning 18–20 months after project closure, and what Oxfam’s relative contributions were	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Senior management of Oxfam Myanmar and Oxfam GB globally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Reporting</b> for internal and external accountability</li> </ul>
2. Identify important conditions under which MOs can operate well and the mechanisms that affect its effectiveness and sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programme staff of Oxfam Myanmar and partner organisations, and the government of Myanmar (GoM)</li> <li>Participants in the review (particularly MO and MOC members)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Learning</b> how the MO inclusive governance model can be effective and sustainable, and what is required to improve its success and replicate it.</li> <li><b>Informing</b> the new LIFT initiative about the strengths and limitations and the potential for replication of the model</li> <li><b>Informing</b> the GoM about what support is needed to make local inclusive governance for building livelihoods and resilience in the Dry Zone work</li> </ul>
3. Develop and employ a participatory approach to understand and support ‘governance and voice’ work and build local capacity in using this approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M&amp;E staff of Oxfam Myanmar and partners</li> <li>Participants in the review (particularly MO and MOC members)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Engaging</b> key stakeholders (including partners, MOC and MO members, and township officials) in sense-making of the evidence produced by the evaluation to enable them to learn about the conditions and interactions affecting the effectiveness of the MOs</li> <li><b>Learning</b> how the effectiveness of inclusive governance models can be rigorously assessed using a participatory approach</li> </ul>

## 2.2 PRINCIPLES AND CHALLENGES

The approach for the Effectiveness Review of the DZ project built on the standard principles and processes of solid evaluation design.<sup>21</sup> Two principles in particular guided the design of this evaluation:

1. **Recognising the nature of the DZ project.** The DZ project is both innovative and complex, making it essential to look at how various conditions and mechanisms interact and affect the desired changes *systemically*. For this we needed an approach that would enable us to detect and investigate these at two distinct levels:
  - a) *At the operational outcome level* – the conditions and mechanisms that affect the functioning of the MO and MOCs, thus undermining or strengthening their operations;
  - b) *At the impact level* – the conditions and mechanisms that directly influence people’s access to livelihood opportunities and the inputs and support they need to strengthen and sustain their livelihoods, thus attenuating or amplifying the outcomes of MO/MOC operations.

2. **Participation of key stakeholders.** As specified in the terms of reference for the Effectiveness Review, relevant stakeholders needed to be engaged in specifying the expected outcomes of the project to be evaluated, identifying and investigating key questions, and analysing causes of and contributions to change. If undertaken well, Involving multiple stakeholder perspectives not only has an *intrinsic empowering value* and responds to Oxfam's core principles as outlined in its 'Right To Be Heard' framework,<sup>22</sup> but also enhances the *credibility and validity* of findings through triangulation and cross-validation of the different perspectives. Involvement of intended users, such as Oxfam Myanmar and its partners, government agencies and MOC/CSO leaders, moreover can *leverage learning* about MOs as an inclusive governance model for locally driven climate-resilient development.

Building on these principles, we encountered three important design challenges: (i) balancing formative and summative purposes; (ii) designing a medium-n study; and (iii) engaging stakeholders to enable voice. These are discussed in greater detail below.

## 2.2.1 Balancing formative and summative purposes

Inclusive governance models, such as the MO, have the potential to fill an important democratic gap at the local level, by creating spaces for active citizenship and building civil society. Learning how, and under which conditions, this potential can be realised is essential for future governance work. This concerns the **formative or learning purpose** of the Effectiveness Review (as indicated in the second row of Table 2.1). Insights are expected to feed into other initiatives / programmes concerned with local-level inclusive governance.

### Text box 1: Governance and voice in the Dry Zone project

Inclusive governance and citizen voice is understood as people's engagement with formal and informal power-holders to govern their local development. In the case of the Dry Zone project, the MO serves as the intermediary body that facilitates this engagement. Drawing on Oxfam's work around the 'Right To Be Heard', the project sought to develop strong MOs that are capable of taking up this important role, by:

- '*Supporting people, in particular women, to raise their voice and claim their rights*'. This implied building the capacity of MOCs and MO members (in particular women) to know and demand their individual and collective rights, which forms the basis for building civil society.
- '*Ensuring that power-holders are responsive and transparent*'. This concerns an essential task of civil society and refers to the responsibilities of MOC leaders as well as local government line agencies and other private actors vis-à-vis citizens and society affected by their decisions.
- '*Building and protecting spaces for change*.' Participation in planning and decision-making in inclusive governance spaces must be experienced as safe and offering scope for real change. This is particularly important in the case of the MOs that present a new democratic model, previously unknown in Myanmar.

In the current political context of Myanmar, small initiatives enabling participation at local levels in planning and decision-making are of great interest to government and international donors. The recent LIFT study on different types of community-based farmer organisations reflects this growing interest. The study compared the different types of farmer organisations developed by four projects funded by LIFT<sup>23</sup> and addressed questions related to effectiveness, sustainability, economic benefit, value-for-money and replicability. Given this wider scope, however, coverage and range of methods were confined,<sup>24</sup> constraining the ability to triangulate and draw generalisable conclusions with sufficient confidence.

The Effectiveness Review needed to have a more representative coverage of the Dry Zone project to be able to also draw generalisable conclusions regarding project contributions in order to meet the **summative** or **reporting purpose** (as indicated in the first row of Table 2.1). Its approach, therefore, had to combine rigorous cross-case comparison with within-case analysis to assess and explain the extent to which MOs/MOCs were doing well (or less well) and had an impact (or not) on livelihoods and resilience. Methodologically, this implied moving beyond anecdotal case studies and comparing evidence across a larger, representative sample of cases.

## 2.2.2 Selecting the methods for a medium-n study

The focus of the review was on the MO model affecting resilience and livelihoods – not on the household-level impacts of changes in livelihoods and resilience. The main unit of analysis was thus the MO; hence, no statistical household survey was required.

To meet both summative and formative purposes (as discussed above), a robust **multi-case study methodology** was required, comprising three essential components: (i) an adequate and transparent sampling protocol; (ii) a standardised set of data collection methods for investigating the project's causal claim; and (iii) a robust method for multi-case analysis.

The objective of the sampling protocol was to capture the variability in MO performance and climatological hazards across the entire project population in the two townships, as well as the special combinations/cases of particular interest for learning. The project had developed MOs in 64 villages, one MO per village. The 64 villages with MOs thus formed the principal population from which to sample. This is a medium-sized population requiring a medium-n sample, too large for in-depth within-case evaluation using methods such as process tracing (see Text box 2 for more detail). Robustness of causal inference, therefore, needed to be built through a hybrid

of within- and cross-case analysis methods applicable to a medium-n sample of MOs. The objective of using a standardised set of methods for data collection was to permit this type of hybrid analysis by collecting sufficient data for investigating the project's causal claim within each village and consistently similar data across the sample to permit cross-case comparison. The objective of the multi-case analysis method then was to enable the cross-case analysis of the within-case inquiries across a medium-sized population, and based on this, arrive at generalisable conclusions about project contributions to changes in livelihoods and resilience.

### **Text box 2: Selection of methods for inquiring causality**

If the total project population or portfolio of cases is relatively small (e.g. N = 10–30), then a small, purposive sample of cases (for instance n 4–8, including most-likely and least-likely successful cases depending contexts and conditions) is generally sufficient to assess the project's change hypothesis across different contexts and causal conjunctures in order to reach conclusions about contribution to impact valid for the entire universe. (Aus, 2005; Ragin, 2014) In such a context, process tracing is most suitable. Process tracing involves the descriptive reconstruction of the unfolding of events over time for each selected case, based on the collation of snapshot data around a series of key moments in the change process, permitting causal inference. This descriptive reconstruction process is essential in evaluations that cannot draw on large data sets or large amounts of comparable cases (such as, for instance, n = 900) to arrive at causal inference. Causal analysis in small-n evaluations draws on the strength and granularity of the explanatory evidence, requiring a great deal of in-depth research and substantial cross-checking of different sources, methods and perspectives. (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Befani & Mayne, 2014; Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Punton & Welle, 2015)

Large-n evaluations cannot achieve the same level of depth as small-n evaluations, but can draw on the analysis of frequency of associations or patterns among a large number of cases to arrive at causal inference, making them suited for quantitative econometric analysis. Context-specific nuance is often limited, though, in pure quantitative studies, making the validity of generalised observations often problematic. To overcome this limitation, in-depth qualitative inquiry of a few cases is often combined with the quantitative inquiry of distribution and frequency. There is a growing consensus in the international evaluation community that mixed-methods generally offer the best design option for evaluating complex programmes. (Bamberger, 2012; Stern et al., 2012; White, 2014)

## **2.2.3 Engaging stakeholders to enable voice**

Oxfam's governance and voice work draws on its 'Right To Be Heard' framework.<sup>25</sup> This framework requires Oxfam to uphold the principles of engaging key stakeholders and enabling people's voice not only in its programmes, but also in the evaluation of its work and the learning thereof. If Oxfam takes the principles of 'downward accountability' and 'leading by example'<sup>26</sup> seriously, then it needs to design and conduct evaluations in ways that enable voice and thus critically think of the implications of design choices or management decisions made for these principles. Choices and decisions tend to deprioritise participation and voice in monitoring and evaluation when operating under time pressure and resource constraints.

For this Effectiveness Review, these factors indicated the use of an approach that meets the **purpose of engagement and voice** (as listed in the third row in Table 2.1) and enables key stakeholders – including beneficiaries – to meaningfully participate in the evaluation processes in ways that go beyond data extraction. A major challenge was finding appropriate ways to enable voice and create sufficient space for participation not only in data collection, but also in validation and sense-making, and to do this in relatively large sample and a standardised manner.

## 2.3 OVERALL APPROACH

### 2.3.1 Participatory Impact Assessment and Learning Approach (PIALA)

The Effectiveness Review of the DZ project used a limited and adapted version of the Participatory Impact Assessment and Learning Approach (PIALA) that was recently developed for IFAD.<sup>27</sup> PIALA is designed to produce rigorous quantitative and qualitative evidence and generate solid debate around such evidence in order to influence policy, planning, targeting and management for generating greater and more sustainable impact. Its purpose is threefold: (a) to *report* on a project's or programme's contributions to impact on rural poverty; (b) to *learn* why impact occurred or not and where mechanisms need to be changed or newly created; and (c) to *debate* how impact could be enhanced and future investments could have a greater influence.<sup>28</sup>

The focus on 'impact' and 'contributions to impact' is *broader* than process or performance evaluation approaches which investigate the intended outcomes and performance against pre-set targets. Impact is viewed from a systemic perspective, as a *system* of interactions between various causes and changes, which is different from a more linear approach that looks at the direct relationship between intervention and effect. The systemic approach seeks to move beyond merely 'what works' metrics and also to answer the more difficult 'why' and 'how' questions and investigate the likely sustainability of the changes observed. It does so by looking at both the *intended* and *unintended*, *positive* and *negative*, *primary* and *secondary* effects of a project or programme relative to other influences that *directly* or *indirectly* contributed to the impact on rural poverty.

Generally, PIALA draws on five key design elements:

1. A systemic Theory of Change (ToC) approach.
2. Multi-stage random sampling of/in 'open systems'.
3. Participatory mixed-methods.
4. Participatory sense-making.
5. Configurational counterfactual analysis.

This blend of processes and methods presents an alternative for mainstream counterfactual-based evaluation in programme/project contexts where credible control groups cannot be found or are not considered useful (e.g. where institutional and policy work affects the entire population).<sup>29</sup>

To address the design challenges of the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project, a few adjustments were made to the standard PIALA elements – namely: *purposive* instead of *random* sampling, *combined* instead of *mixed-methods*, configurational analysis based on EvalC3, and scaling down the sense-making. These are further detailed in the subsections below.



## 2.3.2 Purposive instead of random sampling

In the IFAD-funded PIALA studies, the ‘open systems’ that formed the principal sample unit were market-bounded systems. In the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project, these were the MOs and their ‘catchment areas’ or villages in which they operate. Only one MO exists per village, thus the main unit to be sampled was the village. Given the decision not to conduct any household survey (see Section 2.2.2), there was no need to *randomly* sample the villages. Moreover, because of the importance of learning, *purposive* sampling was found more suitable.

Purposive sampling was done based on the results from a survey on the effectiveness status of the MOs 18–20 months after project completion. The survey was conducted in December 2015 in 62 of the 64 project villages<sup>30</sup> with a total of 413 people (36% women and 64% men). The survey inquired about six dimensions of ‘effectiveness’: (i) MO structure and functioning; (ii) MO vision/mission and mandate; (iii) level of transparency, decision-making and participation in the MO; (iv) planning and implementation of MO activities; (v) MO networking and collaboration; and (vi) MO impact and sustainability.<sup>31</sup> MO performance was scored alongside a set of questions and criteria for each of these six dimensions, defined and agreed with the Oxfam design team. Based on their total average score on these six dimensions, MOs were then divided into five categories: *seemingly effective* (average score 5); *seemingly maturing* (average score 4–4.9); *seemingly hopeful* (average score 3–3.9); *seemingly struggling* (average score 2–2.9); and *seemingly dysfunctional* (average score 1–1.9). The categories were called ‘seemingly’ at that stage, as the criteria, and thus also the MO scores, weren’t considered final but only *indicative* to serve the purpose of sampling. They needed to be verified and refined through the in-depth participatory inquiry in the second phase of the Effectiveness Review.

A total of 21 MO villages, of which 12 were in Thazi and 9 in Minbu, were sampled proportionally<sup>32</sup> from these five categories for the second phase inquiry.<sup>33</sup> The 21 MO villages were selected purposively in order to capture variability in MO performance and climatological hazards as well as special combinations/cases of particular interest for learning. Data were collected in these 21 villages using a standard set of participatory methods in gender-specific focus groups that involved a total of about<sup>34</sup> 1,302 quasi-randomly selected people (44% women and 56% men).

## 2.3.3 Combined instead of mixed-methods

Mixed-methods imply the use of both qualitative *and* quantitative methods. In the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project, however, no statistical household survey was conducted. Yet it did combine various participatory methods in the specific way it is done in PIALA.

Methods in PIALA are designed in such a way that they investigate different causal links in the ToC and thus build on each other analytically, while also partially overlapping to permit triangulation. The methods’ complementarity makes it possible to investigate cascading causes and effects (expected and unexpected, positive and negative) and different hypotheses. Triangulation helps to build a comprehensive picture and enhance our confidence in the recall data and causal observations produced by the different methods. Data collation and triangulation needs to be done almost instantly during fieldwork to allow for continuous cross-checking and probing. To make it possible to compare the data across a medium-sized population, all methods need to be employed systematically, equally and nearly simultaneously across the entire sample.

This was also done in the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project. Data were produced by a standard set of participatory methods employed systematically with equal weight in gender-specific focus groups with the same profile across the entire sample of 21 villages, thus permitting extensive triangulation and cross-case comparison needed for generalisation, while preserving the contextual nuance and responsiveness needed for obtaining credible explanations.<sup>35</sup>

## 2.3.4 Configurational analysis using EvalC3 for predictive modelling

For the configurational analysis, a similar procedure was followed and similar tools used as in the PIALA evaluation for IFAD in Ghana.<sup>36</sup> The procedure consists of four important steps combining an adapted and simplified form of process tracing with cross-case pattern analysis.

The first step concerns the data collation and quality monitoring during fieldwork in every locality for each 'open system' being investigated (in this review: the MO village). A standard matrix format is used in which all data is tabulated alongside the causal links and claims of the Theory of Change. This makes it possible to systematically cross-check the evidence and score its quality and the relative strength of the causal process and contribution it reveals. The second step involves the aggregated data collation in a standard Excel table, in which all evidence from the field collation matrices is synthesised and, again, tabulated alongside the causal links and claims of the Theory of Change. The third step then involves the clustering and comparison of the evidence across all sampled 'systems' (or MO villages) in order to surface the patterns or configurations of scores and causal attributes. The last step consists of a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences of the configurations, integrating the findings to validate (or refute) the Theory of Change, and drawing up conclusions about project contributions to outcomes and impacts.

PIALA's aggregated collation and analysis tool was adapted to accommodate the piloting of EvalC3<sup>37</sup> – novel software developed by Rick Davies. The purpose was to test whether it could serve the summative reporting and formative learning needs of the Effectiveness Review, explore its possible fit with PIALA, and provide Rick Davies, who guided and supported the piloting, with feedback for optimising the software. Apart from the quality and contribution scores (which used the rating scale presented in Section 4.3), all evidence from the village collation matrices was entered into the aggregated table in the form of positive and negative binary codes (*positive* for 'sustained improvement', *negative* for 'deterioration'). Also the MO scores were entered in the form of a binary code for each of the five categories of MO functioning ('effective', 'maturing', 'struggling', 'hopeful' and 'dysfunctional').

EvalC3 builds on the idea of 'multiple conjunctural causation', or the occurrence of different packages of causal attributes simultaneously generating the same effects, which is often the case in complex development contexts.<sup>38</sup> Using techniques from predictive analytics, it conducts a computerised cross-case comparison of qualitative data collected from a sample of cases, in order to identify the causal models and correlations that best predict the achievement of desired outcomes under certain conditions. It identifies sets of causal attributes<sup>39</sup> revealed by the evidence across the sample (entered as binary codes) that are *necessary* and/or *sufficient* for specific sets of outcome attributes (also entered as binary codes) to occur, and compares and evaluates the performance of these causal models in order to find the ones with the greatest predictive power. The quantitative cross-case comparison thus helps identify the best performing configurations or causal models. It builds on within-case analysis of the evidence as the basis for the coding prior to the computerised analysis and for the integration of findings after the computerised analysis.

## 2.3.5 Scaling down of sense-making

An evaluation using PIALA normally involves a **two-stage sense-making process** that takes place immediately after collecting the data:

1. Local sense-making workshops at the local level of the 'open systems' being investigated.
2. An aggregated sense-making workshop at the project level.

The purpose of these workshops is to engage key stakeholders (including a critical mass and minimum 30% primary stakeholders or beneficiaries) in collectively making sense of the emerging evidence before the researchers turn to final analysis and reporting. This has **instrumental** and **empowering value**. Organising participatory sense-making workshops in all researched localities, and at the project level, helps to improve and strengthen the evidence, create ownership, and enable voice.

Creating space for reflection and debate around the evidence promotes systemic learning about how changes in interactions and relationships may resolve issues of inclusiveness and sustainability, and creates a collective sense of responsibility to affect positive change. Moreover, it also helps to cross-validate evidence and fill remaining data gaps. Finally, it offers an important opportunity to enable voice and elicit downward accountability, thus making the evaluation more democratic.<sup>40</sup> This is mostly relevant in evaluations of governance and voice work in contexts such as Myanmar. The Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project in particular has raised important issues of inclusive governance for community-level climate adaptation and resilience building (including finance, management, equity and responsiveness) that cannot be addressed by Oxfam or partners alone, but require collective action and responsibility.

Critical to the success of a participatory sense-making process, however, are the time, resources and capacity to organise and facilitate the workshops well and deal with risks of power and politics. In the Effectiveness Review of the DZ project, limitations in this regard required us to downscale the ambitions and limit the sense-making to one event with a limited number of participants, which included Oxfam, partners, government officials and MO members/beneficiaries.

# 3 EVALUATION QUALITY AND MANAGEMENT

## 3.1 TRAINING, IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION

The Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project took place between August 2015 and June 2016. The time frame needed to complete the review was much longer than originally planned, owing to a series of unexpected events that caused multiple delays. The review comprised four stages: framing and design, MO survey, participatory inquiry and analysis and reporting.

### 3.1.1 Evaluation framing and design (August–September 2015)

The initial evaluation framing and design took place with a core team of Oxfam staff and was led by the first consultant, Irene Guijt. The *design paper*<sup>41</sup> produced by this team presented the first draft of the evaluative Theory of Change, the evaluation questions, the approach, budget, survey questionnaire and rubrics, and the participatory research methods.<sup>42</sup>

### 3.1.2 MO Survey (Dec 2015)

In the period between October and November 2015, the assignment was handed over to a new consultant, Adinda Van Hemelrijck (author of this report).<sup>43</sup>

The survey of 62 MO villages took place in December 2015. With limited guidance and support from the consultant, this process (including the selection of enumerators, logistics, supervision and data entry) was entirely managed by Oxfam Myanmar staff.<sup>44</sup> The consultant helped with the design of the survey and refinement of the tools, and conducted the analysis.

### 3.1.3 Participatory inquiry (January–April 2016)

Building on the earlier design work, the consultant continued working on the detailed design of the methods and tools for the participatory research (including for data collation and analysis). The management and supervision of fieldwork was entirely in hands of Oxfam Myanmar staff<sup>45</sup>.

A six-day training was organised in the first week of February, in which the Oxfam supervision team and the data collection teams learned the basics of PIALA and engaged in the field-testing and refinement of the methods and the tools. A *field manual*<sup>46</sup> was made available to the researchers, which was translated into Burmese and detailed:

- the schedule and preparations for participatory research in each village;
- the process for village entry and independent selection and mobilisation;
- the ethics and facilitation rules for participatory data collection;
- the methods for participatory data collection and guidance for employing the methods in a systematic way across the sample;
- the methods and guidance for field supervision, quality monitoring and data collation;

- an overview of the sampled MO villages; and
- standard tools/templates for note-taking.

Fieldwork was conducted by three teams of three researchers in nine villages in Minbu, and by four teams of two researchers in twelve villages in Thazi. The teams worked in parallel and spent 3–6 days in each village. Both the Minbu teams and the Thazi teams each had a supervisor and a translator coaching and supporting them in the field and processing the data.

Fieldwork started on 9–10 February 2016 and was scheduled to end on 22 February. Data collation and translation were expected to be completed 2–3 days after ending the fieldwork. In reality, fieldwork lasted until March, and the last translated ‘village collation matrix’ was sent to the consultant on 30 March.<sup>47</sup> The reasons for the delays are explained in Section 3.2.1.

### 3.1.4 Analysis and reporting (April–May 2016)

The aggregated data collation and analysis, and the write-up of the report, was done by the consultant and required about three weeks’ work in April/May 2016. An additional week was spent on the pilot-testing of the new analysis method and EvalC3 software. A first draft of the report was submitted on 5 May.

## 3.2 REFLECTIONS ON EVALUATION DESIGN, PROCESSES AND RESULTS

In participatory research, it is good practice to organise a brief reflection workshop with the research team and supervisors shortly after finishing the fieldwork to discuss and summarise field observations and reflect on the participatory processes. This creates an opportunity to subject the field notes and data collations to **peer interrogation and cross-checking**. It also elicits **learning** about the use of participatory methods and the challenges of facilitation, which is most useful when the objective is the building of capacity, such as of the Effectiveness Review in Myanmar.<sup>48</sup>

Reflections are best made shortly after finishing fieldwork when memories are still fresh. Given the tight budget, however, it was decided to wait until the sense-making workshop as organising both events at the same time would save much on travel and logistics. The sense-making was planned for the end of March (or three weeks after completing the fieldwork).<sup>49</sup> Against all odds, fieldwork and data collation took twice as much time than usual. This further delayed the analysis and time-wise made it impossible to organise the sense-making and reflection workshops any time earlier than May. At the time of report writing, a suitable date for rescheduling the events had yet to be found. Due to the ensuing time pressure, analysis and reporting had to be prioritised over sense-making and reflections.

The reflections summarised in this section, therefore, are those of the author and thus limited to her first-hand observations during training and field-testing and her reconstructions from field results and communications with Oxfam staff. They merely relate to the design decisions and evaluation processes that affected quality of participation and validity of findings:<sup>50</sup>

- **‘Validity’** is the extent to which findings are well founded, correspond with reality, and relate to the entire universe or population (from mainstream to outliers) of the project being evaluated. It refers to the robustness of the evidence the findings are based on. In the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project, given its hybrid design, this depends on both the within-case and the cross-case analysis.<sup>51</sup>

- ‘Quality of participation’, on the other hand, refers to the *legitimacy* of the ways in which people are engaged in generating the evidence, and to the level of impartiality or *inclusion* of all views and perspectives in the findings. This has intrinsic empowering value, but also contributes to the robustness and credibility of the evidence and thus to the validity of the findings.

Both ‘validity’ and ‘quality of participation’ are important for learning and reporting, but highly dependent on **research capacity and budget**, which was fairly limited in the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project.

### 3.2.1 Reflections related to ‘validity’

A decision was made early on in the design stage to work with local people in the two project townships who had been local Oxfam/NAG staff or MOC members. The assumption was that working with local people would save on research fees, make field logistics cheaper and less complicated, bring knowledge of local context and conditions, and most importantly, help build local capacity. Yet this required some thoughtful adjustments to the design in order to address the risk of bias and ensure rigorous data capture. More training and supervision and almost twice as much time was needed to complete the fieldwork and data collation. Reliance on Oxfam staff who have multiple tasks and responsibilities further complicated the delivery of the fieldwork. All together this substantially delayed the review and increased its cost, making it almost as expensive as working with professionals.

The local researchers were very eager and motivated to learn, however, both about the DZ project (e.g. ‘what is left’, ‘how MOs are doing in other villages’, ‘understand why’) and about participatory inquiry (e.g. ‘harmonised questions’, ‘engage people’). The training and field-testing were essential to build their skills and confidence and adjust the methods and tools to the level they felt comfortable using them. They went through three iterations of practising and field-testing all the methods in different groups. After each session, reflections were held with the entire team on how it had gone as the basis for collectively deciding on the adjustments to be made.

However, most of the researchers had never done any research before and thus lacked the alertness and inquisitiveness that builds from experience. Managing time and probing for detailed explanations, for instance, remained quite challenging. Important aspects or details that could have helped better explain the differences in outcomes (e.g. in the functioning and relationships of the MOs) might have been missed. The supervisors were unable to keep up with the village-level data collation during fieldwork as their time was fully taken up by the coaching of the teams, which limited their ability to cross-check and reflect on the quality and strength of the emerging evidence. This explains the sub-optimal granularity and depth of evidence observed in the village collation matrices. Unfortunately, all original raw data remained in Burmese, making it impossible for the consultant to verify the full analytical journey from raw data to collated and translated evidence.

Despite this limitation, the village-level data collation was done by the supervisors quite systematically with great care and showing a good understanding of the Theory of Change (ToC) and of the matrix tool that tabulates the data alongside the ToC. Hence we may assume that the field notes have equally been checked and cross-checked with great care and method.

The sampling protocol and combined-methods design<sup>52</sup> further compensated for the weaknesses and distinctly contributed to enhancing the validity of the findings. The design was kept relatively simple to make it possible for the local researchers to properly implement it. A great deal of effort went into adapting and simplifying the methods and providing clear guidance for employing them in a systematic manner. Methods and tools were limited to the bare minimum, yet sufficient to produce the data needed for reconstructing the causal chain of events *and* to cross-check the data for each step along the chain. The latter was essential to



help overcome potential biases or weaknesses in participants' recall of the events and in researchers' ability to probe for and capture the details. The proportional sampling of a third of the MOs for participatory inquiry, based on a classification obtained from the survey of all project villages, ensured full coverage of the different types and levels of MO performance. Cross-checking of evidence obtained from the survey with the evidence generated by the participatory inquiry (both conducted independently by different research teams) further added to the robustness of the findings on MO performance.

### 3.2.2 Reflections related to 'quality of participation'

The participatory methods and tools were employed with different and gender-specific groups, bringing in all village perspectives (including of women and men, smallholders and vulnerable households, central village leaders and MOC leaders). The participants were selected independently and quasi-randomly using a procedure that combined quasi-systematic and snowball sampling.<sup>53</sup> Quite some time was spent with the researchers during the training and field-testing to find the most appropriate and feasible way of doing this, taking into account the local customs and structure of the villages.

Also included were the perspectives of the different township officials and bankers. This was done simply through semi-structured interviews. Due to time and resource constraints, no interviews were done with traders and input suppliers. Importantly, the perspectives of Oxfam and NAG staff that had been involved in project implementation were also not included. No discussion has been held so far with former staff about the specific project inputs and activities that contributed to the development of the MOs. This discussion was planned to take place in the reflection workshop in the event of the participatory sense-making, which at the time of writing had not yet taken place. Therefore, no conclusions have been drawn about the differences in effects of project implementation and performance on MO performance.

From what was observed during the field-testing, it appeared that the local researchers were able to *symbiotically* build a high level of trust and mutual respect, which is essential for securing the legitimacy of the participatory process. They behaved like and were viewed as equals, much more than is usual with professional researchers. Often, researchers are unaware of or neglect the power relations that exist between themselves and the participants and the effects of their own implicit value judgements on the quality of participation. Typically, participants tell researchers what they think they *want* to hear (causing a political correctness bias) and often researchers hear what they *expect* to hear, or interpret it in ways that make sense to them (creating a cognitive research bias), which may reflect and also reaffirm positions of power and powerlessness.<sup>54</sup> It seems likely that this was less the case in this Effectiveness Review due to the fact that the fieldwork was conducted mostly by local villagers. During the field-testing, a noticeable difference was observed in the relationship between the lead researcher and the participants between the groups facilitated by ex-Oxfam staff on the one hand and the groups facilitated by villagers on the other. The ex-Oxfam staff were more proficient in finishing the exercise and obtaining the data within the allotted time, but gave less attention to power and process. The villagers were much slower and not always good at asking the right questions, yet they did much more active listening and were more sensitive of power and process.

### 3.2.3 To conclude

While working with local villagers appears to be more challenging and require more training, with coaching, careful design, and more time given for field supervision and quality monitoring, there is reason to believe this offers important advantages for *both* rigour and empowerment that have been largely unexplored. Critics may flag a potential lack of objectivity, yet there is equally much to say about bias when working with professional researchers. Further piloting could help test this hypothesis and further investigate what would optimise the quality and benefits while minimising the risks and costs.

What rested at the time of the writing of this report was the necessity to close the learning loop. Obviously it's pointless to turn to peer interrogation and cross-checking of field data months after finalising the analysis and reporting. Yet reflections on methodology remain useful for learning and building capacity for future evaluations. Also participatory sense-making (cf. Section 2.3.5) remains important from an ethical point of view as well as for enticing reflection and learning based on the evaluation the findings, around the value and potential of the MOs as an inclusive governance mechanism for building resilience. Participation in research risks being purely extractive and has little empowerment value if findings are not given back to the participants and there is no opportunity for them to contest and debate the findings with other stakeholders.<sup>55</sup>

#### Post-reporting note:

A two-day sensemaking workshop eventually was organised on 17-18 October 2016 in one of the MO villages in Minbu in Magway region. The workshop engaged around 50 people in discussions around the success factors of MOs and opportunities to further develop and pilot the MO model and other local inclusive governance models. People from the MO villages constituted about 30% of the participants; the others included relevant government officials and regional PMs, Oxfam and its local partner NAG, and a few other international NGOs. This was the first time that villagers openly discussed their problems, critically reflected on the findings and discussed futher options in the presence of, or rather in ddialogue with, government and donors.



Photo credit: Adinda van Hemelrijck. Project participants during the sensemaking workshop in Myanmar, November 2016.

# 4 EVALUATION FOCUS AND FRAME

## 4.1 THE DRY ZONE PROJECT

### 4.1.1 Project context<sup>56</sup>

The Dry Zone refers to the semi-arid central plains of Myanmar, which cover approximately 14% of the country's land area, and contain 27% of its population. The Dry Zone has long and unpredictable droughts, and short but intensive and erratic rainy seasons causing flash floods. These environmental factors entrap communities in a vicious circle of vulnerability and threaten people's livelihoods. Resource-poor farmers and landless households experience severe food shortages. Food stocks from smallholder harvests can feed the family for only 3–4 months per year. This situation is influenced by multiple interrelated factors, including, amongst others:

**a) Degradation of the resource base (land and water) attributable to climate change and unsustainable resource management.** The livelihood activities of the Dry Zone population place a heavy burden on the fragile natural resource base. Natural vegetation is scarce and cultivatable lands are maximally used for growing annual crops. Small forestlands are encroached for farming, livestock grazing and fuel wood. This has accelerated the process of soil degradation. Increasing drought, wind and flooding further exacerbate the problem. Residual groundwater is insufficient for winter cropping. Natural cattle food has diminished, forcing farmers to purchase fodder, thus creating an additional financial burden. Agriculture-based job opportunities for landless labourers have decreased.

**b) Limited access to affordable credit causing chronic indebtedness.** The Myanmar Agriculture Development Bank (MADB) can lend to individual farmers only 8,000 Ks/acre, up to a maximum of 80,000 Ks for 10 acre-holdings and above, while farmers need 50,000–100,000 Ks/acre for a realistic investment to sufficiently increase their productivity. Equally the loans from the Cooperative Bank are too small to help farmers to build resilience. This lack of access to sufficient finance and extension services reduces farmers' access to adequate inputs and technologies, which encourages low cost/low output production that accelerates soil degradation. Low quality inputs are purchased at a high cost on credit with high interest rates or collateral, increasing chronic indebtedness and poverty. Farmers sell their land and livestock to repay their debts, requiring them to migrate seasonally when locally available employment opportunities are scarce.<sup>57</sup>

**c) Limited capacity to organise and access markets.** Remoteness and limited physical access due to poor infrastructure seriously limit farmers' market access. The impact of low productivity is reinforced by low farm-gate prices and high transportation costs. High levels of indebtedness require farmers to pay back their debts at harvest time when prices are low. Low profitability margins lead to little or no investment. Lack of information, poor quality and low volumes, and limited organisational capacity give farmers little bargaining power. Existing community organisations generally operate informally with insufficient funds and capacity to address the problems, sustain their activities and grow their influence.

## 4.1.2 Project proposition

The main proposition of the 'Building equitable and resilient livelihoods in the Dry Zone' project was that Membership Organisations (MOs) could lay the foundation for developing more sustainable livelihoods and build resilience in the communities that struggle with extreme climatological and environmental conditions.

An MO has an elected committee (or MOC) that leads the organisation, engages its members in analysing the problems, and setting priorities for jointly addressing the problems. It identifies special inputs to support marginalised groups, builds alliances and networks to exert influence, and creates opportunities for exchange and learning. The premise was that minimal investments in building knowledge, skills, confidence and relations of MOC and MO members would trigger multiple and sustained improvements in livelihoods and resilience.

Through these MOs and their MOCs, the project sought to enhance the livelihoods and resilience of particularly vulnerable households, such as small farmers and landless households who depend directly or indirectly on agriculture, have limited capacity and resources, poor access to markets, and are more vulnerable to climate-related hazards. Most have less than five acres (or half a hectare) of poorly fertile land. Some are landless contractors who have irregular jobs and thus limited and unstable income. Soil degradation, caused by natural disasters and unsustainable agricultural practices, combined with poor markets, further limit the livelihood opportunities for these resource-poor households. Women in households that are female-headed and/or include many children are particularly vulnerable.

### Text box 3: Resilience

Oxfam's definition of resilience implies that households in rural areas should have:

- *Sufficient livelihood options* – including ownership of productive assets, diversification options (in crops and livestock production, and non-farm activities), market opportunities, access to inputs and services (e.g. grain bank).
- *Sufficient capacity to adapt and innovate* – including finance, technologies, knowledge.
- *Access to finance* – including income, savings, credit, compensations.
- *Access to natural resources* – including fertile soil, water infrastructure and desalination pumps.
- *Access to extension services* – including new crop and livestock varieties and sustainable production technologies; veterinary health care and vaccination; sustainable pest and soil management techniques and products.
- *Access to social and institutional capitals* – including confidence in institutions capable of disaster risk reduction, crises/conflict management, governance, and building of social safety nets and cohesion.

## 4.1.3 Project goal and outcomes

The goal of the Dry Zone project was as follows:

*MOs have the capacity to organise and engage community members in activities that improve the food and livelihood security in their communities, and prove that their organisation is sustainable, effective and helps the most vulnerable groups.*

To achieve this goal, the DZ project sought to realise five key outcomes:


1. **MO members have stronger livelihoods** through enhanced production quality and quantity as a result of a better access to sustainable inputs, technologies, services and seasonal markets.

2. **MO members gain access** to inputs, services and seasonal markets through the MOs.
3. **MOs help communities manage risks and vulnerabilities** to drought, flooding, fire, soil erosion and food shortage and support most vulnerable households.
4. **MOs are functional and strong enough** to address the needs and priorities of their members (including the most vulnerable households) and help them to gain access to inputs, services and seasonal markets through **building effective relationships** with local government agencies, inputs suppliers, credit and service providers, and traders.
5. **MOs influence other communities** by demonstrating their effectiveness in helping community members to strengthen their livelihoods and build resilience.

#### 4.1.4 Theory of Change (ToC)

The diagram in Figure 4.1.4 presents the Theory of Change (ToC) that was put together and used for the Effectiveness Review based on the mapping<sup>58</sup> of the assumed causal pathways and interactions between MO and MOC members and external actors. The arrows in the diagram show how Oxfam's project inputs were expected to result in the outcomes described above and eventually lead to the goal.

The **main assumption** was that, by building MO and MOC capacity, behavioural changes would be triggered in a set of key stakeholder relationships and mechanisms that would result in



the more sustainable livelihood opportunities and conditions. Successful MOs would then inspire and influence other communities to also develop MOs and motivate local governments to enhance their support.

**Figure 4.1: Theory of Change diagram of the DZ**

Improvement in livelihoods and resilience implies that social, environmental and physical capital has improved and as a result more support is available to vulnerable groups, more sustainable livelihood opportunities are created, household incomes have increased, and people can adapt, transfer risks and reinvest in their livelihoods. The project wanted to contribute to improvements in livelihoods and resilience by providing inputs that focused on building the capacity,

knowledge, skills and confidence of the MO members and MOC leaders (women equally as men) and help them to connect to traders, inputs suppliers, service providers and government line agencies.

The role and capacity of MOC leaders and MO members are distinct, with gender and power dynamics requiring careful attention. The **MOC leaders** need to be fair and transparent towards the MO members in the village, and capable of maintaining good relationships with external stakeholders. They need to be knowledgeable and reliable, self-reflective and willing to learn, aware of climatological and environmental risks, gender sensitive and respectful to all their members, and responsive to the needs of most vulnerable groups. First and foremost, they need to be able to lead, meet and interact as a committee, assess and act on members' different needs, engage their members in the planning and implementation of activities, facilitate exchanges and broker information and linkages with traders and government, negotiate commercial contracts, mobilise membership and manage the risks. Equally, **MO members** need to understand the MO's central role for governance of local development processes, be aware of the value of membership both in terms of personal interest and in terms of the collective good, be motivated and confident to engage with the opportunities offered by the MO/MOCs, and have the knowledge and skills about how local sustainable development works in order to engage in planning, implementation and reflection in an active and responsible way. Finally, they need to be respectful of the special focus on vulnerable groups and gender equity.

Although not directly targeted by the project, there are also other important stakeholders that play an important role in and influence a project's success (or failure). Line agencies, traders, suppliers and service providers need to understand MO plans, respect the focus on vulnerable groups and gender equity, connect actively and be responsive to the MO's proposals.

## 4.2 QUESTIONS AND FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

Oxfam has defined its overall indicator for the outcome area of governance and citizen voice as the *amount of citizens or members of community-based organisations* supported to engage with state institutions and other actors, and of these other actors (or duty bearers) benefiting from capacity support. In the DZ project, capacity building efforts **focused on the MOs**, and didn't involve duty bearers, such as local traders and government officials. The focus of the review, therefore, was on MO members who benefited from the capacity building of MOs.<sup>59</sup> Government line agencies' ability to respond to MO requests, however, is critical to the effect of triggering the desired changes in relationships and mechanisms affecting livelihood opportunities and resilience in the Dry Zone. Hence the review also looked at the various relationships brokered by the MOs.

Given the particular interest of the management of Oxfam Myanmar in learning about the effectiveness and sustainability of the MO model for inclusive governance of local development efforts, the review focused on MO functioning and its influence on livelihood opportunities and resilience in the **18–20-month period after project completion**. For this, it investigated the following causal links in the Theory of Change (cf. Figure 4.1):



**Table 4.2a: Causal links in the ToC inquired by the Effectiveness Review**

Causal link	Outcome area	Intended contribution/cause
2→1	1. Improved/sustained livelihoods and resilience	2. Increased/sustained access
3+4b→2	2. Increased/sustained access	4b. Sustained/strengthened relationships + 3. Improved risk & vulnerability management
4a→3+4b	4b. Strengthened/sustained relationships + 3. Improved risk & vulnerability management	4a. Effective/sustained MO functioning
Project→4a	4a. Effective/sustained MO functioning	Oxfam/NAG inputs and activities

The evaluation questions presented in Table 4.2.b served to guide the investigation of these links. These are drawn from the first design discussions held at Oxfam Myanmar in July and August 2015.<sup>60</sup> The right-hand column in the table indicates what evidence answers the questions and where it can be found in this report.

**Table 4.2b. Key evaluation questions for the Effectiveness Review**

Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs)	Evidence answering the questions and sections providing the evidence
<b>KEQ 1.</b> To what extent have MOs demonstrated being capable of functioning effectively after project completion?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Total Average Contribution (TAC) scores (Section 5.1)</li> <li>• Total Average Contribution MO (TAMO) scores (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.1)</li> <li>• % of MOs that have sufficient capacity to represent, grow, lead, function, build relations and coalition, and produce value for its members (Section 5.3.1)</li> <li>• % of MOs that have a continuing positive influence on livelihood improvements and community resilience after project completion (Section 5.3.3)</li> </ul>
<b>KEQ 2.</b> What factors explain present MO functioning? What has Oxfam contributed to this (directly or via NAG)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explanations for present livelihood &amp; resilience status 18–20 months after project completion (Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3)</li> <li>• Explanations for MOs’ ability to operate effectively and independently (Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.3)</li> </ul>
<b>KEQ 5.</b> What are the best performing configurations of MO dimensions revealed by the evidence?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Best performing MO configurations or causal models generated by the EvalC3 analysis (Section 5.3.4)</li> </ul>

## 4.3 PARTICIPATORY DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The following set of standardised participatory methods were used to investigate the different causal links in the ToC and their cascading causes and effects (expected and unexpected, positive and negative) across a proportional sample of 21 MO villages:

- A **social mapping exercise** with village leaders and a **livelihood analysis** with villagers in gender-specific focus groups (of which at least half farmers) looked at positive and negative changes in livelihoods and resilience, and the causes and impacts of these changes, that occurred or endured in the village in the 18–20 months after project closure (as compared to the five-year period of the project). Social mapping is a




typical PRA method that engages participants in a visual mapping of the village and its vulnerable areas, indicating changes in infrastructure that affect access to resources, markets and services. Livelihood analysis combines two PRA-inspired tools: (1) a livelihood change matrix collecting data on in/outflows and income and risk in/decreases of the different livelihoods that exist in the participants' village(s); and (2) a causal flow mapping that maps the causes and effects of changes in these livelihoods affecting the majority of villagers (particularly most vulnerable groups).

- A **Risk & Vulnerability (R&V) management scoring** with MO members in gender-specific focus groups (of which at least half vulnerable households participated) was triangulated with the social mapping to inquire positive and negative changes, and the causes and effects of these changes, in the ways that communities manage risks of drought, flooding and other hazards, and support and protect most vulnerable households from being hit hardest. It uses a pocket scoring matrix tool that engages the participants in a discussion and scoring of the actions undertaken by the community to respond to hazards and reduce the risks and effects on livelihoods. Again the focus was on the period after project completion compared to the five-year period of the project.
- A **relationship analysis** with the same groups as those in the R&V management scoring (but different from the other groups) was triangulated with the livelihood analysis to investigate positive and negative changes, and the causes and effects of these changes in the community's relationships with township departments, traders, suppliers and investors. The focus was on changes in importance, control and accessibility of the relationships and the effects on villagers' access to resources, markets, services and investments in the period after project completion as compared to the five-year period of the project. The relationship analysis combines two tools: a linkage diagram that maps out the relationships, and a ladder scoring matrix that involves the participants in a discussion and scoring of contributions to building and sustaining these relationships and their effects.
- An **MOC self-assessment** with a mixed group of MO members (different from the ones who participated in the other groups) and MOC leaders was triangulated with the relationship analysis to investigate the sustained functioning of MOs and their MOCs in the period after project completion, and its causes and effects on relationships and R&V management. The MOC self-assessment combined three tools: the MOC scorecard that was used for monitoring during project implementation, and the two tools of the relationship analysis.
- Lastly, **key informant interviews (KIIs)** were conducted with (available) officials at the departments of agriculture, cooperatives, rural development, and general administration as well as the agricultural bank in the two townships Minbu and Thazi in order to capture local government views and perspectives on the effectiveness and value of the MOs, their own relationship with the MOs, and the impacts on livelihoods and resilience.
- **Review of relevant secondary sources** is also part of the methods mix. To the extent possible, these were used to cross-check with the data from the primary field research in order to enhance confidence in the findings.

Figure 4.3 shows how these methods built on each other analytically while also partially overlapping to permit triangulation and probing of hypotheses (as explained in Section 2.3.3).

Figure 4.3: Overlapping and complementary methods inquiring cascading changes



## 4.4 SCORING SYSTEM

### 4.4.1 Contribution scoring

Each of the causal links listed in Table 4.3a below has been rated for its relative strength and consistency in each researched village, using the scoring table presented below. The **Total Average Contribution Score (TACS)** for each outcome area was then calculated by taking the average value of all scores.

**Table 4.3a: Contribution scoring of outcome areas and intended contributions/causes**

Score	Outcome	Intended contribution/cause	Causal link
5	Large	Strong, necessary and sufficient	Strong & sufficient
4	Large	Medium and important, but insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>there have been other contributions/causes</i></li> </ul>	Strong but insufficient
	Medium	Strong and necessary, but insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>insufficient to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> <li><i>other is needed to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> </ul>	
3	Medium	Medium and important, but insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>there have been other contributions to the outcome</i></li> <li><i>insufficient to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> <li><i>other is needed to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> </ul>	Medium & insufficient
2	Medium	Weak and important, but largely insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>there have been other contributions/causes</i></li> </ul>	Weak & insufficient
	Weak	Medium and important, but insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>insufficient to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> <li><i>other is needed to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> </ul>	
1	Weak	Weak and insufficient <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>there have been other contributions to the outcome</i></li> <li><i>insufficient to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> <li><i>other is needed to cause sufficient outcome</i></li> </ul>	Very weak & unnecessary

Sufficiency and necessity are defined as follows:

- **Necessary** means that where the outcome occurred, the cause was present. The evidence thus shows that without the cause the outcome would not have appeared, but there may or may not be other contributors as well.
- **Sufficient** means that the outcome consistently appeared wherever the cause was present. The evidence thus shows that the intended cause was the main contributor and no other important causes were needed to generate the outcome.

The evidence to assess necessity and sufficiency was obtained (a) *within each case* from the causal flow mapping with different groups, cross-checking of different methods and sources, and data collation; (b) *across cases* from the comparison of different configurations of outcome and causal attributes (in various gradations) revealed by the evidence.

## 4.4.2 Evidence scoring

Also, the evidence was scored on its reliability and sufficiency in order to provide an indication of the level of confidence in the contribution scores. This was done independently from the scoring of the causal links<sup>61</sup> using the following scoring scale:

**Table 4.3b: Scoring of evidence quality**

Score	Sufficiency of evidence	Reliability of evidence
5	High	High
4	High	Medium
	Medium	High
3	Medium	Medium
2	Medium	Low
	Low	Medium
1	High, medium or low	Very low

Reliability and sufficiency here mean the following:

- **Reliability** refers to the *quality* of evidence and implies that any other independent inquiry using similar methods will generate the same evidence. For evidence to be considered reliable, it needs to be based on multiple independent sources. Evidence is *not* reliable if it's only based on the recall of one source.
- **Sufficiency** refers to the *quantity* of evidence and implies that there is enough evidence for making a judgement about a causal relation. Evidence can be considered sufficient if it provides enough information on the causal relation to make a judgement and it would be very unlikely to obtain this information if the causal relation was not perceived as real. Evidence is *not* sufficient if there is not enough information on the causal relation to make any preliminary judgement, no matter how reliable the obtained information might be.

# 5 FINDINGS

## 5.1 CONTRIBUTION AND MO SCORES

Table 5.1 presents the contribution scores for each outcome area. The findings described in the subsequent subsections explain the scores. Apart from this contribution scoring, MOs were also scored on several dimensions of their performance,<sup>62</sup> resulting in a total MO score for each MO village, and a Total Average MO (TAMO) score for the entire sample.

**Table 5.1: Contribution and MO scores**

Township	Village	4.a. SUSTAINED FUNCTIONAL MOs/MOCs			4.b. SUSTAINED & STRENGTHENED RELATIONSHIPS		3. IMPROVED VULNERABILITY & RISK (V&R) MANAGEMENT		2. INCREASED/ SUSTAINED AND SUFFICIENT ACCESS		1. IMPROVED/ SUSTAINED LIVELIHOODS & RESILIENCE	
		Contribution score	Evidence score	MO score	Contribution score	Evidence score	Contribution score	Evidence score	Contribution score	Evidence score	Contribution score	Evidence score
Minbu	Pauk Pin Htwin	5	4	4,41	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	5
Minbu	Ma Gyi Pin	5	5	4,67	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Thazi	Pauk Taw	4	4	3,90	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4
Minbu	Thin Baw Kyun	5	4	3,89	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	4
Minbu	Pyi Thar Ywar Thit	4	3	3,99	3	5	4	5	4	5	3	5
Thazi	Aung Thar	4	4	3,70	4	4	3	3	4	5	3	4
Thazi	Kyar Pyit Kan	3	4	3,04	3	4	3	4	4	4	3	4
Thazi	Nyan Kan	2	3	2,96	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	4
Thazi	Gway Kone (East)	3	3	2,96	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	3
Thazi	Inn Ganat (South)	3	4	2,61	2	4	2	4	3	4	3	4
Thazi	Ywar Kone Gyi	4	3	2,99	2	4	1	4	2	4	3	4
Thazi	Inn	4	4	3,00	1	4	1	3	2	4	3	4
Thazi	Inn Gone	3	3	3,72	2	3	2	4	3	4	3	4
Minbu	Te Kone Ywar Thit	3	3	3,44	2	5	2	5	3	4	3	5
Minbu	Kan Ni Ywar Thit	3	4	2,45	1	5	1	3	2	3	3	3
Minbu	Ywar Pale Kone Tan	4	3	3,13	2	3	2	3	3	4	3	4
Thazi	Bone Ta Loke	1	2	2,72	1	4	2	4	2	4	2	4
Thazi	Bo Kone	2	3	2,73	3	4	2	4	2	3	2	4
Thazi	Hta Naung Kone	2	3	3,03	2	4	2	3	2	4	2	4
Minbu	Saing Shin	4	4	4,33	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	4
Minbu	Kan Thar Yar	2	4	2,99	1	4	1	5	1	3	1	4
Minbu Average Contribution Score:		3,33	3,46	3,33	2,63	3,92	2,54	3,75	3,08	4,00	3,04	3,88
Thazi Average Contribution Score:		3,28	3,50	3,17	2,39	4,22	2,50	4,00	2,78	3,78	2,83	4,17
Total Average Contribution (TAC) and Total Average MO (TAMO) scores:		3,31	3,48	3,25	2,51	4,07	2,52	3,88	2,93	3,89	2,94	4,02

## 5.2 SUMMARY OF CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

Table 5.2. presents a synthesis of the causal explanations for the Total Average Contribution (TAC) scores for each outcome area and its intended contributions/causes. Detailed findings are presented in the next section. The arrows mirror the causal flow of the project’s Theory of Change (ToC).

**Table 5.2: Causal pathways map**

Effective/sustained MO functioning									
<b>TAC score 3.31 – TAMO score 3.25 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.</b>									
<p>Evidence<sup>63</sup> from 33% of <i>nearly maturing</i> and <i>maturing</i> MOs confirms the proposition that MOs can function as an important local governance mechanism for improving livelihoods and building resilience, but by themselves are insufficient to guarantee sustainable improvements. Evidence from the 38% of struggling MOs provide a <b>counterfactual</b> showing that in the absence of such a governance mechanism, improvements are unlikely to occur. Capacity, ownership and transparency appear to be the essential factors for the mechanism to be successful. MOs in Minbu generally performed better than those in Thazi, which may be to do with more cooperative village leadership and/or a better way of working of NAG in Minbu.</p> <p>The Dry Zone project significantly contributed to enhancing <b>women’s position</b> in the village power structure. Women now take leading roles in the MOC and engage in village decision-making – something that was previously unknown. But they still face challenges: their capacity to lead was openly distrusted in 13% of the villages.</p> <p>Township officials positively valued the MO model and found it most successful in actively engaging the communities in development efforts and <b>fostering collaboration</b> <i>in</i> and <i>between</i> the villages and the line departments. Relationships with line departments and traders, however, have become noticeably less frequent since the project closure. Significant success in terms of building climate resilience has yet to be realised. The officials call for more collaborative effort of government, communities and NGOs (including Oxfam) to build MO capacity and MOC leadership, prepare the next MO generation, and facilitate greater sharing of successes and failures in order to sustain and strengthen the model.</p> <p>Villagers value the MO model for the <b>voice, ownership</b> and <b>opportunity for learning and engaging in development</b>. Constraints are <b>lack of time and finance, dysfunction</b> and <b>poor management, interference of central village leadership</b>, and <b>migration</b>. Generally, MO members feel that the project ended too soon, and more coaching and supervision would be needed to sufficiently strengthen MO capacity and safeguard their sustainability. This is reasonable, given the extremely difficult environment, the limited capacity of stakeholders to deal with the problems, and the political-historical background of the country. A project engagement of three years was insufficient to safeguard the sustainability of new governance models.</p>	<p><b>MO performance (n 21)</b></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>MO Performance Category</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>(Nearly) Maturing Hopeful</td> <td>33%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Struggling</td> <td>38%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(Nearly) Maturing</td> <td>29%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	MO Performance Category	Percentage	(Nearly) Maturing Hopeful	33%	Struggling	38%	(Nearly) Maturing	29%
MO Performance Category	Percentage								
(Nearly) Maturing Hopeful	33%								
Struggling	38%								
(Nearly) Maturing	29%								



Sustained/strengthened relationships


**TAC score 2.51**




Improved risk & vulnerability (R&V) management

**TAC score 2.52**

**Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**



Improvements in relationships and networks were found to be average in 19% and weak in 57% of the villages, while R&V management was found to be average in 29% and weak in 52% of the cases. Thus, only 24% of the villages showed strong performance in terms of



relationships and 19% in R&V management. The evidence<sup>64</sup> suggests that effective relationships mostly depend on MO performance in terms of **coalition-building** (in particular advocacy and networking), and on the **responsiveness of township departments and private actors**. Responsiveness of the departments responsible for water and livestock was reported as generally quite low.


Indeed, the EvalC3 analysis<sup>65</sup> proves that particularly strong MO coalition building and mandate is *sufficient* to generate improvements in relationships with township departments and NGOs/donors/MFIs and in community management of climate-related risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, strong MO coalition building was found *necessary* (though *not sufficient*) for effective relationships to occur, with township departments responsible for developing and maintaining a productive water infrastructure (including the departments of water, irrigation and rural development). Strong MO leadership was found *necessary* (but *not sufficient*) for the improvement or sustainment of relationships with the livestock departments.



Increased/sustained access

**TAC score 2.93 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**


Overall, some improvement in access to inputs, resources, services, markets and NGO/donor support was observed in all villages, yet in 66% of the cases this was found to be mediocre to weak and insufficient. Lack of access to water for production formed the main problem as it caused a decrease in farming that negatively affected relationships, this in its turn negatively affected access to agricultural inputs and services. The lack of access to water is partly attributable to **inadequate drought management**. Township authorities showed limited responsiveness and capacity for developing and maintaining appropriate productive water infrastructure and monitoring of water levels. The decrease in farming is further exaggerated by soil erosion caused by villagers' unsustainable agricultural practices. MO members have been trained in soil conservation. Reported changes in awareness and practice are attributable to the MO's key role in this, thus demonstrating its **added value**.



'Access' appears highly correlated with MO performance. In 33% of the villages 'access' was found to be strong and sufficient, with strong MO performance in terms of **coalition building** (particularly networking and civil society building). In another 33% of the villages 'access' was found to be weak and insufficient, while MO functioning overall was weak and incapable of




mitigating the problems arising from water depletion and soil erosion.<sup>66</sup> Overall, strong MO coalition building seems to result in stronger capacity to address problems related to 'access' and also a stronger influence (and less dependency) on government responsiveness.



Improved/sustained livelihoods and resilience

**TAC score 2.94 – Important, but medium and insufficient contributions.**

In 86% of the villages, improvements were made only with livestock, and in Thazi also with hair sorting for Chinese traders. Although very important to pay off debts and gain income, this proved insufficient to generate the amplifying effects observed in the 14% of villages that performed well as a result of the successful combination of farming and livestock, creating more casual labour, small business and trading opportunities. In most of the villages, this success scenario did not take place because there was a lack of access to water for production. In many of these villages, people turn to migration to strengthen their livelihoods.



A strong correlation appeared between MO/MOC performance and livelihoods and resilience status, **confirming the hypothesis** that capable and well-functioning MOs can make a difference in livelihood conditions.<sup>67</sup> Where improvements in livelihoods and resilience were found to be strong (14% of the villages), MO performance was strong and maturing towards fully effective. Where improvements in livelihoods and resilience were found to be weak (24%), MOs were generally weak and struggling (though mostly still hopeful). One case represented an exception, where the MO performed quite well, but the destructive impact of heavy rains and river flooding washed away all gains and possibilities to build resilience.

The EvalC3 analysis<sup>68</sup> shows that particularly strong **MO mandate/membership** and strong **MO coalition building** are *necessary* (but *not sufficient*) to generate improvements in farming and livestock, creating new labour, business and trading opportunities. These two dimensions of MO performance were also found *sufficient* to generate improvements in relationships with township departments and NGOs/donors/MFIs, as well as the management of climate-related risks. Weak **MO operations**, on the other hand, appear *sufficient* to result in a deterioration of farming, while strong MO operations proved *sufficient* to generate improvements in livestock breeding.


## 5.3 DETAILED FINDINGS

### 5.3.1 MO functioning (ToC link 4a-4b)

As already mentioned earlier, a brief survey was conducted in 62 project villages in December 2015 to score and categorise the MOs according to their relative level of effective/sustained functioning 18–20 months after project completion. Figure 5.1a shows the resulting distribution of the MOs across five categories.<sup>69</sup> The categories were called ‘seemingly’ since the intent was not to produce final figures at that stage but merely an *indicative* distribution for the sampling for the participatory inquiry in the second phase.

The chart shows that 19% of the MOs were found quite effective and sustainable, thus *seemingly maturing*,<sup>70</sup> while 66% seemed to be still functioning well yet not sustainable and therefore *seemingly hopeful*.<sup>71</sup> Worrying are the 11% *seemingly struggling* and 3% *seemingly dysfunctional* MOs.<sup>72</sup>


**Figure 5.1a: Indicative distribution of MOs according to level of functioning (First phase; n 62)**



The participatory inquiry in the second phase produced more in-depth explanatory data that helped verify the results from the first phase survey while also refining the scoring rubrics. The four dimensions included in the Total Average MO (or TAMO) score are: *mandate/membership*, *leadership*, *operations* and *coalition building*. Each dimension consists of multiple criteria for assessing MO performance.<sup>73</sup>

Figure 5.1b shows the distribution for the sample of MOs (n 21) that came out from the second phase participatory inquiry alongside its indicative distribution that was obtained from the first phase survey. Here we see that the proportion of *maturing* MOs is 14%, which is 5% higher than was observed in the first phase. Interestingly, this is attributable to a much higher occurrence of *maturing* MOs in Minbu (10%) that compensates for a lower occurrence in Thazi (-5%), **suggesting that Minbu is doing slightly better than Thazi**. The amount of middle-range *hopeful* MOs is 48%, which is 19% lower than observed in the first phase, attributable to a lower occurrence in Minbu. Of these, 40% perform fairly well and can be considered as *nearly maturing*.<sup>74</sup> Finally, the proportion of *struggling* MOs is 38% – thus 19% higher than the figure the survey came up with (nearly 10% in each township).

**Figure 5.1b: Distributions of sampled MOs according to level of functioning (Second and first phase; n 21)**



Given the relatively high proportion of *struggling* MOs (38%), the question is, what **explains** their limited strength and sustainability 18–20 months after project closure? Equally important is the question of what we can **learn** from the stronger performing MOs, including the *maturing* and the *nearly maturing* ones, which together make up to 33% of all the cases.

### Maturing and nearly maturing MOs

The seven villages with *maturing* and *nearly maturing* MOs (33%) are overall the best performing ones in terms of ‘relationships’, ‘R&V management’, ‘access’ and ‘livelihoods and resilience’. The impact on ‘livelihoods and resilience’ is not as positive as expected in all cases though, confirming that MOs by themselves cannot withstand the extreme climatological and environmental conditions. But overall the cases demonstrate clearly that MOs can form an effective governance mechanism for developing sustainable livelihoods and building resilience.

The three MOs in Minbu that were found quite effective and sustainable (thus *maturing*) are those of **Ma Gyi Pin**, **Pauk Pin Htwin** and **Saing Shin**. As the performance scores in Table 5.3a show, all three are performing relatively strongly in all the four areas of *mandate/membership*, *leadership*, *operations* and *coalition building*. In all three villages, data from both the survey and the participatory research show a high level of trust in the MOC, an increasing membership (up to 20% increase) and high level of gender sensitivity on the part of the MO members and the MOC. Nearly half (40–45%) of the MOC leaders are women. Women actively engage in the meetings that are held regularly (monthly in Sain Sinh and Ma Gyi Pin, and three-monthly in Pauk Pin Htwin). Minutes are kept on every meeting and planning. The communities are involved in developing all objectives and plans. A network has been established with the MOs in 13 villages<sup>75</sup> with nearly monthly interactions to pursue collective interests related to land registration and collective buying and selling and address individual MOs’ needs. The collective buying and selling system saves transportation charges for farmers and provides them with better prices. The system generates tangible profits to the communities. Special support is provided per the agreement of all MO members to vulnerable households by means of a 4-level priority system. The MOCs manage sesame seed banks, collective assets for production<sup>76</sup> and revolving funds for goat breeding. They facilitate training on new technologies, constructing embankments, contour lining and building ponds for livestock. They search for quality breeds and seeds and affordable loans for livestock, and negotiate the prices. In all three villages, all planned activities have been implemented and recorded, while MO funds have increased in the past 18–20 months. Loans are issued systematically, with clear records being kept and expenses regularly cleared. All MO members are allowed to see the accounts

and expenditures of the MOC. MO members are highly satisfied with the performance of the MOC and the various relationships it developed with traders, township departments and inputs suppliers. The only weak point appears to be the membership rules, yet this didn't seem to have affected the engagement and satisfaction of MO members.

The four MOs that were found *nearly maturing* are in the villages of **Pauk Taw** and **Inn Gone** in Thazi, and **Thin Baw Kyun** and **Pyi Thar Ywar Thit** in Minbu. These MOs appear to perform well overall, except on a few points in one or two areas. The MO in Inn Gone, for instance, is rather weak in advocacy and networking, shows insufficient MOC capacity and performance is mediocre in terms of participatory planning and mobilisation. Pauk Taw performance is mediocre on several fronts, including membership, participatory planning, mobilisation, implementation of plans and gender-sensitive action. Pyi Thar Ywar Thit shows medium performance in term of its membership rules and participatory planning, while Thin Baw Kyun performs very weakly in terms of membership and also shows insufficient MOC capacity and medium satisfaction of MO members with MOC performance.

Generally, the MOCs cooperate well with the other village committees and also network with MOCs in other villages<sup>77</sup> for collective buying and selling,<sup>78</sup> which benefits the communities. But meetings are held less frequently (once every 4–6 months) and records are sometimes incomplete. The capacity of the MO members to actively and responsibly engage appears lower, despite the trainings provided by NAG/Oxfam. The development efforts decided by the MO members and the MOC appear to be **less focused on livelihoods and resilience**, and more on social welfare and general village infrastructure. Relationships with departments are generally weaker and less frequent. Funds are insufficient to implement all planned activities. The revolving fund is growing yet remains insufficient to issue the loans and support vulnerable households. Records of the funds and the loans are incomplete. Despite all this, the MOs are still functioning and even growing, and members generally do benefit and are satisfied, which makes them more than hopeful and proves their added value.

**Table 5.3a: Maturing and nearly maturing MOs**

MO assessment criteria		Weight	Inn Gone	Thin Baw Kyun	Pauk Taw	Pyi Thar Ywar Thit	Saing Shin	Pauk Pin Htwin	Ma Gyi Pin
<b>MO Mandate &amp; membership</b>	Mandate / Vision & mission	1	4	4	4	5	4	4	5
	Membership rules	2	4	1	4	3	2	2	3
	Active membership status	2	5	5	3	4	5	5	5
	Member selection & representation of vulnerable groups	1	3	4	3	4	4	5	5
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		4,17	3,33	3,50	3,83	3,67	3,83	4,33
<b>MOC Leadership</b>	Constitution	1	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
	Election & representation (incl. <b>gender</b> )	1	4	5	4	5	4	5	5
	Leadership and clarity of roles	1	4	4	5	5	4	4	5
	Capacity	2	3	3	4	4	4	5	5
	Responsiveness & mobilisation	3	3	4	3	4	4	5	5
	Implementation of plans & <b>gender sensitive</b> actions	3	5	4	3	4	5	3	3
	Members' satisfaction	2	5	3	4	4	5	4	5
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		4,00	3,85	3,69	4,23	4,46	4,31	4,54
<b>MO Operations</b>	Meetings	2	4	4	5	5	5	4	5
	Participatory planning & monitoring	3	3	4	3	3	4	5	5
	Bookkeeping & transparency	2	5	4	4	4	5	5	5
	Sufficient & sustainable funding	3	4	4	5	4	4	4	5
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		3,90	4,00	4,20	3,90	4,40	4,50	5,00
<b>MO Coalition building</b>	Relationships with public & private sector agencies	1	4	4	5	4	4	5	4
	Networking with other MOs	2	3	5	4	4	5	5	5
	MO Advocacy	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	5
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		2,80	4,40	4,20	4,00	4,80	5,00	4,80
<b>TOTAL AVERAGE</b>			<b>3,72</b>	<b>3,89</b>	<b>3,90</b>	<b>3,99</b>	<b>4,33</b>	<b>4,41</b>	<b>4,67</b>

### Struggling MOs

The eight MOs (or 38%) that were found *struggling* are: **Inn Ganat South, Bone Ta Loke, Bo Kone, Nyar Kan, Gway Kone East** and **Ywar Kone Gyi** in Thazi; and **Kan Ni Ywar Thit** and **Kan Thar Yar** in Minbu. In these villages, improvements and even deterioration in 'relationships', 'R&V management', 'access' and 'livelihoods and resilience' occurred in the period after project closure. Table 5.3 b shows that the MOs have several weaknesses in each of the four performance areas (mandate/membership, leadership, operations and coalition building). All are relatively weak in mobilisation of members, participatory planning and monitoring, implementation of plans and gender-sensitive action,<sup>79</sup> and networking and finance. Since project completion, there has been no or very limited planning and accounting, collective marketing<sup>80</sup> and networking with other MO villages<sup>81</sup>.

Members' satisfaction with MOC performance is generally low, and weak relationships are maintained with only a few departments (such as agriculture, mechanic farming, irrigation and electricity).

**Kan Ni Ywar Thit** is the village with the weakest MO performance<sup>82</sup>. MO activity has been largely suspended due to **migration**: '*MOC members migrated to solve their livelihood problems.*' The MOC tried to mobilise the MO members for collective marketing, but members

are unable to engage. MOC members expressed despair: *'We couldn't do anything.'* No records were kept of meetings and revolving fund beneficiaries. There is no connection with government departments other than livestock. However, the revolving fund is still running, with six-monthly meetings for issuing small loans and collecting payback, and also the distribution of sesame seeds has so far been sustained.

**Ywar Kone Gyi** didn't have any revolving fund or planning meeting since the end of the project, and struggles with the lack of capacity among its new MOC members. Collective selling happened a few times, but with only five MO members. In **Bo Kone**, there were no plans, no networking, and no support actions for vulnerable households (*'don't have fund for that'*), and MO activities so far have largely been unsuccessful. In **Bone Ta Loke**, it was reported that the MO has only recently been formed, with few villagers knowing about its existence.<sup>83</sup> Oxfam's exit here was found *'poor'* and *'not responsive'*.

In **Nyar Kan** (score 2.96), meetings have continued after project closure (10 meetings in 18–20 months) and the MOC keeps a positive gender balance and takes into account women's specific views and needs. However, plans are drawn up by village leaders in village meetings, leaving villagers without knowledge of the decisions being made. There are no records of the MO's collective assets and the status of the revolving fund. The financial situation of the MO is reported only in occasional meetings. At present, there are plans for extending water pipelines and connecting village lanes to the main road, but implementation of plans has proved generally weak. According to the MOC, this is due to the lack of time: *'People are struggling with their livelihood: they go out for work so there are not many people in the village. There has been no collective trade in past 18–20 months.'* The MOC members reported that villagers are not interested in the financial aspect of the MO and the revolving fund. In **Gway Kone East** (score 2.96), there was some collective trading of sesame and cotton and collective buying of rice seeds, some networking with other villages for obtaining market information and lobbying for electricity, and also the revolving fund has increased in the past 18–20 months. But apart from the revolving fund and collective trading, there were no other plans since project closure because of insufficient funds. Poor participation of MO members, limited capacity of MOC leaders, and lack of collaboration of village authorities were reported as the causes.

The MO in **Kan Thar Yar** seems more hopeful (score 2.99), with a growing membership, reasonable gender balance, good level of member participation, regular (four-monthly) meetings with well-kept minutes, and a transparent bookkeeping. The MOC works to create new job opportunities and promotes soil conservation, but has limited connections with government line agencies. Until now, there was no collective marketing because of insufficient harvest (sesame). The revolving fund has increased, but is insufficient to cover the growing membership. The MOC struggles with limited capacity, complains about the limited training opportunities for newly elected MOC leaders, and is concerned that the revolving fund will become unmanageable.

**Table 5.3b: Struggling MOs**

Table 5.3b		Weight	Kan Ni Ywar Thit	Inn Ganat South	Bone Ta Loke	Bo Kone	Nyar Kan	Gway Kone East	Ywar Kone Gyi	Kan Thar Yar
MO assessment criteria										
<b>MO Mandate &amp; membership</b>	Mandate / Vision & mission	1	3	4	3	5	4	3	4	4
	Membership rules	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2
	Active membership status	2	2	1	2	2	5	5	5	5
	Member selection & representation of vulnerable groups	1	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	5
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		<b>2,50</b>	<b>2,33</b>	<b>2,33</b>	<b>2,83</b>	<b>3,83</b>	<b>3,50</b>	<b>3,83</b>	<b>3,83</b>
<b>MOC Leadership</b>	Constitution	1	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	4
	Election & representation (incl. <b>gender</b> )	1	3	5	4	5	5	5	3	5
	Leadership and clarity of roles	1	4	5	4	4	4	5	4	4
	Capacity	2	3	4	3	4	4	4	3	3
	Responsiveness & mobilisation	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	3
	Implementation of plans & <b>gender sensitive</b> actions	3	3	4	4	3	2	1	3	3
	Members' satisfaction	2	2	4	3	2	3	3	3	3
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		<b>2,69</b>	<b>3,69</b>	<b>3,15</b>	<b>2,77</b>	<b>2,92</b>	<b>2,85</b>	<b>2,92</b>	<b>3,31</b>
<b>MO Operations</b>	Meetings	2	3	4	3	3	4	3	1	5
	Participatory planning & monitoring	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	4
	Bookkeeping & transparency	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4
	Sufficient & sustainable funding	3	3	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		<b>3,00</b>	<b>2,60</b>	<b>2,40</b>	<b>2,10</b>	<b>2,90</b>	<b>2,90</b>	<b>2,00</b>	<b>3,60</b>
<b>MO Coalition building</b>	Relationships with public & private sector agencies	1	2	3	3	4	3	3	4	2
	Networking with other MOs	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1
	MO Advocacy	2	1	1	4	4	3	3	4	1
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		<b>1,60</b>	<b>1,80</b>	<b>3,00</b>	<b>3,20</b>	<b>2,20</b>	<b>2,60</b>	<b>3,20</b>	<b>1,20</b>
<b>TOTAL AVERAGE</b>			<b>2,45</b>	<b>2,61</b>	<b>2,72</b>	<b>2,73</b>	<b>2,96</b>	<b>2,96</b>	<b>2,99</b>	<b>2,99</b>
<b>MO Benefits &amp; sustainability</b>	Members' livelihood options	1	3	4	3	2	2	3	3	2
	Strength & sustainability	1	1	1	3	3	2	2	1	1
	<b>AVERAGE</b>		<b>2,00</b>	<b>2,50</b>	<b>3,00</b>	<b>2,50</b>	<b>2,00</b>	<b>2,50</b>	<b>2,00</b>	<b>1,50</b>

**MO value and sustainability**

An important indicator of the value of MOs for the villagers is **active membership status**. In the first phase survey, 35 villages (56%) reported an increase in the total active membership (men and women) in the past 18–20 months of which nearly half were in Thazi and over half in Minbu. The other 27 villages (44%) reported a decrease or stagnation, of which 20 were in Thazi. This indicates that **MOs in Minbu are doing better than in Thazi**. The reasons for this are unclear. It may have to do with a more cooperative and supportive central village leadership and/or a better understanding of local political economies and way of working of NAG.

**Table 5.4: Increase or decrease/stagnation in active MO membership**

Township	Increase	%	Decrease/Stagnation	%
Thazi (n 37)	17	46%	20	54%
Minbu (n 25)	18	72%	7	28%
TOTAL (n 62)	35	56%	27	44%



The most important reasons mentioned by the MO members for the **increase** in active membership were:

- Voice, ownership, interest in development work and learning (42%).<sup>84</sup>
- Good MO functioning, strong leadership and trust in the MOC (37%).

The most important reasons mentioned for the **decline** in active membership were:

- Limited time, lack of interest, lack of trust, and disunity (24%).
- Migration (23%).
- Dysfunction and poor management (7%).

Officials interviewed at the township departments of agriculture, livestock, and general administration highly value the MO model and find it most successful in actively engaging the communities in the development efforts and fostering collaboration among its members and among and with the line departments. Mobilisation and networking skills of MOCs have significantly improved. Relationships with line departments and traders are much better, but became noticeably less frequent after project closure. They also appreciate the networking among MO villages and observed a positive influence on non-MO villages (some of whom went to see and learn about the MOs and their ways of working in the MO villages). So there is a real appreciation of the MOs' work and a strong willingness among the officials to collaborate and support them. To sustain, improve and scale up this model and enlarge its influence, they recommend the MO villages share more of their successes and failures with non-MO villages, and that MOC leaders motivate, train and coach the next generations in taking on leadership roles in MO development work: *'The MOs should show to others the sincerity and effectiveness of their work and share their knowledge and experience.'*

But the officials also confirmed that although MOs do their best to network and obtain support, for instance for constructing tube wells and other water sources for domestic and productive use, significant success in terms of building resilience to climate-change-related hazards is yet to be realised. More work is needed both on the part of the government and on the part of the communities and supporting NGOs (including Oxfam and NAG) to build the capacity and ensure the sustainability of the MOs. They identified following key challenges threatening the sustainability of the MOs:

- Climate change
- Unfavourable markets
- Weak MOC leadership capacity
- Insufficient operational funds
- Capacity and budget of township departments to support and fund the MO plans.

Local farmers and MOs cannot significantly influence market prices. Market protection and regulation is needed, according to some officials, to ensure that small and vulnerable farming communities receive fair and reasonable prices. Also, more and regular meetings between the MOCs and line departments (twice a month) were suggested to develop a continuous flow of information exchange and support. Finally, MOCs need to get better at planning and fundraising.

Poor MOC knowledge and performance, inefficient management, weak planning and documentation, and weak leadership were identified by the township officials as the biggest internal weaknesses of the MOs. MOCs tend to 'follow' rather than 'lead', one official stated, which limits their potential to innovate. Importantly the officials also declared that *'no misuse of*

*funds or corruption has been found'* so far (although it was also reported that some MOCs had tried to sell collective assets<sup>85</sup>).

According to one official, communities' patience with the MOC is their biggest asset to overcome its weaknesses. But this patience will not last forever if no real progress is made to address the issues of capacity and funds.

Common concerns related to the **sustainability** of MOs expressed by MO members both in the first phase survey and the second phase participatory research were about the following:

- Weak participation<sup>86</sup> and lack of interest, capacity and responsibility among MO members to engage in the development work (52%).<sup>87</sup>
- Weak MO operations and networking – e.g. no regular meetings, weak prioritisation and review of activities, weak debriefing and member mobilisation, mismanagement of collective assets.<sup>88</sup> Weak connections with other MOs (44%).
- Poor MOC leadership and performance due to lack of unity and capacity and leaders' limited availability (37%).<sup>89</sup>
- Insufficient funds to sustain operations (27%).<sup>90</sup>
- Limited transfer of knowledge/skills due to short project duration and limited follow-up (27%).
- Lack of transparency and trust in the MOC, particularly with regard to the management of the revolving fund (23%).<sup>91</sup>
- Interference and lack of collaboration by village authorities (23%).<sup>92</sup>
- Unsustainability of present activities due to the lack of opportunities and migration (23%).
- Distrust in women's leadership capacity (13%).
- Management of growing revolving fund with increasing membership (10%).

#### **Text box 4: MO members' concerns**

*'Women leaders have challenge to attend meetings at night, and to meet alone with line departments'*

*'Too many women in leadership positions'*

*'Beneficiaries do not follow the rules, which threatens the distribution of quality sesame seeds'*

*'MO may collapse due to the lack of understanding and responsibility among its members'*

*'Next generation not ready to take over the development work'*

*'Fund will fade out due to mismanagement by next generation'*

*'Quality sesame seeds distribution will not be sustained due to bad weather'*

*'MOC leaders cannot be dismissed if they breach the rules'*

*'Poor exit strategy of Oxfam (not responsive)'*

*'Transfer of knowledge and techniques very limited because project too short'*

The Dry Zone project seem to have had a significant influence on the enhancement of women's positions in the power structure of the village through their participation in the MO and MOC. Women are generally not yet seen as leaders in the rural area of the Dry Zone in Myanmar. In the project villages, however, women now take leading roles in the MOC and engage in the MO's decision making. Although not yet heading the MOC, and mostly taking positions such as accountant or treasurer, they now do take their place at the table together with the male leadership and take part in the decision-making regarding development-related issues for the village as a whole, which was unthinkable five years ago. However, women still face challenges in the present social and cultural structures in their villages, which is also shown in the 13% of occasions where distrust in women's leadership capacity was expressed as an important concern. Some comments in Text box 4 illustrate this distrust. This appears an important and sufficient reason for organisations such as Oxfam to remain engaged.

Generally, the villagers and MOC leaders feel that the project has ended too soon, and more coaching and supervision is needed to sufficiently strengthen MO capacity and safeguard the sustainability of its operations and impacts. This seems quite a reasonable argument, given the extremely difficult environment, the limited capacity on the part of all the stakeholders to deal with the problems, and the political-historical background of these villages and the country as a whole. Arguably a project engagement of merely three years, without a decent follow-up, is too limited to safeguard sustainability of new democratic governance models and build sufficient resilience.

Finally, none of the MOs have been able to officially register with township and regional authorities and gain legal recognition. Obviously this limits MOs' ability to enter into formal negotiations and business arrangements and makes them vulnerable to local power dynamics. According to the township officials, MOs can register if they have clear objectives and plans. Hence it is unclear why well performing MOs have not yet registered. This may need further investigation, since registration might be the best way forward and the next step to safeguard positive project outcomes, enhance the impact and sustainability of the MO, and create possibilities to access bigger finance channels, such as for climate adaptation. The strongest performing MOs may become fully effective only if they are registered and legally recognised by authorities and private business partners.

### **Oxfam/NAG contributions**

The evidence shows that Oxfam and NAG provided the basic materials (including stationery), advisory and technical inputs, some machines (e.g. sewing and weaving), and coaching and training to establish the MO and form the MOC. They helped establish the revolving fund and provided direct grants to the MO members to get them started with livestock breeding and seed production (e.g. goats, sesame). NAG helped in constructing the river embankments to prevent flooding and soil erosion. Oxfam provided direct financial support to the elderly, and organised the MO conference (in Bagan) and a few excursions (e.g. around cotton to Shwe Taung farm and to Pwe Bwe township).

The various training included: leadership, counselling, organisational development, women's empowerment, social accountability, financial management/accounting,<sup>93</sup> proposal writing, value chain analysis, agricultural technology, seed multiplication, livestock raising, veterinary, soil protection, post harvesting, marketing and collective trading, disaster preparedness and risk management, and livelihood diversification (including mechanics, sewing, weaving, baking, mushroom cultivation and hair sorting<sup>94</sup>).

It remains unclear why Minbu scored better than Thazi. Perhaps the central village leadership structure made the difference, or perhaps it was down to *more field engagement and better understanding of local political economies* on the part of NAG. Oxfam had a local office in Thazi that was staffed with local people. Yet did it have sufficient field engagement and presence in the villages to coach the MOCs in mobilising the communities and prioritising and implementing

the activities? Should Oxfam have such a field presence or would it be better to hand this over to local implementing NGOs such as NAG?’

### 5.3.2 ‘Access’ due to ‘relationships’ and ‘R&V management’ (ToC link 3+4b-2)

#### Strong versus weak ‘access’

In 33% of the villages, increased/sustained access to inputs, markets and services was found to be relatively strong because of important improvements in relationships and R&V management.<sup>95</sup> Only in one of these it was reported that the MOC and village leaders rely on the USDP<sup>96</sup> for support for infrastructure works. In nearly all, the MOC networks with other MO villages to build civil society. The MOC in Pauk Pin Htwin, for instance, actively networks with 12–13 other MOs to lobby for land registration (which is quite a big issue in Minbu, see further) and negotiate with township departments and private suppliers for obtaining reasonably priced quality breeds, seeds and inputs for the MO members. In Ma Gyi Pin, the MOC takes up a strong coordinating role and negotiates the conditions of development interventions with donors and local NGOs.

In 33% of the villages, increased/sustained access was found to be weak as a result of insufficient improvement in relationships and R&V management.<sup>97</sup> Here, access to productive water deteriorated because of persistent and severe drought, while MO functioning overall remained weak<sup>98</sup> and incapable of generating the necessary improvements in relationships to avert the problem. In about half of these villages, the MOC did not engage in networking and civil society building. In about half, there was also greater reliance on USDP support.

In 86% of the villages with strong improvements in ‘access’, the MOC and village leaders maintained positive relationships after project completion with township departments responsible for water infrastructure (including irrigation, water resource management, and rural development), veterinary services, agriculture and mechanical farming, NGOs, other donors and micro-credit institutions. In the weak performing villages, this was less than 57% for the relationship with departments of agriculture and mechanical farming, and less than 43% for all the other relationships.

The EvalC3 analysis<sup>99</sup> shows that improved MO performance in terms of **coalition building** and **mandate** combined with strong **leadership** and/or strong **operations** is *sufficient* for generating improvements in relationships with township departments and NGOs/donors/MFIs and in community management of climate-related risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, strong **coalition building** was found *necessary* (though *not sufficient*) for improved and more effective relationships to occur with the township departments responsible for developing and maintaining a productive water infrastructure (including the departments of water, irrigation and rural development).

#### Medium ‘access’

In the remaining 33% of the villages that showed mediocre results in terms of access, MO performance varied greatly.<sup>100</sup> In most of these villages, the MOC established and maintained positive and regular relationships with the agricultural and veterinary departments as well as with NGOs/donors and micro-credit institutions. Men and women reported increased and sufficient access to inputs,<sup>101</sup> seeds and breeds, extension services, credit and savings, and NGO/donor support. A significant **decrease in agricultural activity** as a result of persistent drought in the past few years, however, affected the relationships with the various township departments and private suppliers, which in turn negatively affected ‘access’ to their services and supplies.

Agricultural activity decreased due to the lack of access to water, which is partly attributable to inadequate water resource management or risk management of drought resulting in depletion of underground water and soil erosion/degradation. Both the villagers and the authorities bear a responsibility in this. Local authorities (in particular the departments of irrigation and rural development) have shown limited responsiveness and capacity for developing and maintaining an appropriate **productive water infrastructure** (including dams, ponds, and other water harvesting systems and irrigation schemes)<sup>102</sup> and for carefully **monitoring of water levels/availability**. Villagers, in their turn, have contributed to the erosion and depletion of the soil by cutting trees and deploying **unsustainable agricultural practices**. In several villages, research participants explicitly mentioned this problem and showed awareness of their responsibility. In some villages, particularly in Minbu, people have been trained by local NGOs in applying soil conservation techniques to maintain moister soil and prevent further soil erosion. The trainings and reported changes in awareness and practice are not exclusively attributable to NAG or Oxfam. In most of these cases, however, the MO has played a key role and demonstrated its added value.

An issue that was reported in Ma Gyi Pin, Saing Sinh and Pauk Pin Htwin (Minbu) is the recently **changed policy on land registration** affecting farmers' options to obtain low-interest agricultural loans. To obtain a loan from the Agricultural Bank, farmers now must have land registration form 7, which can only be obtained from the land registration department in the township.<sup>103</sup> Most of the MO villages in Minbu are located in Oil and Gas area, which is the reason why farmers are refused land registration. In all villages in Minbu, the MOCs with support from NAG and other local NGOs, such as Shwe Nyar Than, have attempted to organise and lobby for land registration. But these attempts have so far been unsuccessful. MO members reported unfair land measurements and registration practices.

Loans from the Agricultural Bank however are very small,<sup>104</sup> and villages seem to be better served by the Cooperative Bank, micro-credit institutions (such as Pact Myanmar in Minbu), or other lenders contacted through the MO.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, households (particularly those most vulnerable) can also obtain small loans from the MO revolving fund. Access to feasible and low-risk loans, however, remains *unequal* and *insufficient*, while the revolving fund appears to be sufficient and work well only in villages with relatively strong performing MOs.<sup>106</sup>

### 5.3.3 'Livelihoods and resilience' due to 'access' (ToC link 2-1)

#### Strong livelihood improvements

Outcomes in terms of improved and sustained livelihoods and resilience in the 18–20 months after project completion were found to be relatively strong in 14% of the villages.<sup>107</sup> Both women and men in these villages reported a significant increase in income and in the amount of women and men involved in agriculture, livestock breeding, casual labour (particularly agriculture-related) and small businesses.

The main explanations for these positive outcomes are:

- Farmers were able to maintain and even improve their agricultural activities, despite extreme drought and flooding in the past two years. There is evidence of farmers experimenting with a greater variety of seasonal crops to avoid dependency on a single crop or source of income.<sup>108</sup>
- In the two strongest performing villages –Pauk Pin Htwin and Pauk Taw–, access to services, inputs and markets was found necessary and sufficient to cause the positive outcomes in livelihoods and resilience. In Ma Gyi Pin, the loss of jobs due to the closing down of the nearby petroleum company Man Tha Payar had caused an influx into farming.

- Most apparent are the **reinforcing and amplifying effects** of improvements in different types of livelihoods. Improvements in agriculture created more casual labour opportunities, while improvements in livestock created sufficient revenue (particularly for landless households and vulnerable groups) for people to take better loans and reinvest in small businesses.
- Livestock is reported to be the most important activity that enabled villagers to improve their livelihood and build resilience. Many landless people now engage in livestock breeding, sell the excrement from their cattle as organic fertiliser, and as a result now are able to send their children to school. Livestock breeding has significantly improved because of better access to veterinary extension services and vaccination created by the training that was organised by Oxfam/NAG for villagers who volunteered to become the local veterinary officers.
- Soil conservation techniques, such as the use of natural fertilisers, and prevention of soil erosion by river embankment<sup>109</sup> helped building resilience against drought and flooding while creating work for the landless. NAG and other local NGOs provided training in these techniques. The MOs played a key role in following up on this training.

MO and MOC functioning scored among the highest in these villages. All are maturing and have the potential to become fully effective.<sup>110</sup> MOs' contribution to establishing the relationships necessary for creating access to services and markets affecting livelihood outcomes was found to be relatively strong in all three cases, **thus confirming the hypothesis that capable and well-functioning MOs can make a difference in the livelihood conditions in the DZ villages**. The EvalC3 analysis indicates that particularly strong **MO mandate/membership** and strong **MO coalition building** are *necessary* (but *not sufficient*) to generate improvements in farming and livestock breeding creating new casual labour, and small business and trading opportunities. Moreover, strong **MO operations** proved *sufficient* to generate an improvement in livestock breeding.

The MOs played a pivotal role in promoting livestock breeding and helping the villagers to manage risks of drought and flooding. They supervised how villagers practised what they learned from training organised by NAG/Oxfam in moister soil maintenance and contour lining. They requested support and wrote proposals for the development of sesame seed banks and the construction of river embankments and wells, thus creating work and income for landless households. In Ma Gyi Pin, for instance, a village in the drought prone area of Minbu, where soil is rapidly degrading and damaged by Irrawaddy river erosion, soil conservation was mentioned by both women and men as a means to reduce and manage risks and vulnerabilities. Silt embankment and contour lining is done regularly to maintain soil moisture and enable absorption of organic fertilisers (from cattle), which prevents soil degradation. The MOC played a pivotal role in all this. It submitted a proposal for drought and soil management to NAG, who then hired the technicians to help develop soil preserving draught management techniques. Community members were then trained in these techniques. After training, the MOC supervised the construction of an organic fertiliser well in the community.<sup>111</sup>

### **Weak livelihood improvements**

In 24% of the villages, outcomes in terms of improved and sustained livelihoods and resilience in the 18–20 months after project completion were rather weak.<sup>112</sup> With the exception of one, all the villages have MOs that are relatively weak and struggling (although most can still be considered hopeful).<sup>113</sup> The EvalC3 analysis indicates that weak<sup>114</sup> MO operations are *nearly sufficient*<sup>115</sup> to result in a deterioration of farming. Weak MO operations together with weak MO mandate/membership aided by unfavourable conditions *necessarily* generate deterioration in livestock breeding.

In **Bo Kone**, women and men in the different focus groups reported a high percentage of civil servant workers in their village, which has significantly increased in the past two years (from 20–

30% up to 40%) as a result of higher education levels and a growing amount of government positions, which seems to have affected active membership and the representation of vulnerable groups. People who don't work as civil servants are mostly involved in trading and migrant jobs, as both agriculture and livestock breeding have become difficult because of persistent drought. The women reported severe loss of livestock due to foot rot and bluetongue diseases (infecting cows) and diarrhoea (infecting pigs), which also occurred in the other villages. Free six-monthly vaccinations are provided by the Township Veterinary Department, yet its responsiveness in emergencies was found to be low and slow because of its limited capacity. Some improvements in infrastructure and livelihoods were reported, but these appeared to depend more on external aid and less on the MOs. The MOC's role seemed to be rather limited and subservient to village leadership.

In **Bone Ta Loke**, the only livelihood activities are agriculture, livestock breeding and hair sorting for Chinese hair traders (see Text box 5a). Both women and men in the different focus groups reported a significant decrease in agricultural and livestock breeding activities and income, and the amount of people involved in these activities, due to severe and continuous drought and the lack of access to water. People mainly depend on hair sorting as a steady source of income in this village. They don't run their own hair sorting businesses, but as daily workers in those of others in neighbouring villages, thus are dependent on the availability or uptake of the work. A similar situation occurs in **Hta Naung Kone**, where people turn to contractual labour (including hair sorting) and migration in the absence of sufficient water and fodder to maintain their farming and livestock.

**Saing Sing** forms an exceptional case, as all livelihood opportunities seem to have deteriorated, while MO functioning was found quite strong and maturing.<sup>116</sup> The MOC maintains strong relationships with various departments and private suppliers and quite vigorously mobilises the community and funders to implement activities that help manage the severe risks and effects of increasing pests and diseases, of flooding and soil erosion caused by the Ayerwaryade river, and of severe drought affecting the sesame yields. The MOC asked NAG to train the farmers on how to use different cultivation techniques to prevent soil erosion and cope with drought, facilitated the cash-for-work system that employed 32 landless farmers in the construction of the embankment and contour lining, and established relationships with agricultural input companies and the Department of Agriculture for inputs, information and support services. Yet improvements in livelihoods remained limited due to the heavily destructive impact of the rains and the river. Livestock and migration have become the main sources of income, but even livestock breeding is threatened by the lack of access to sufficient fodder due to the river's damage to the low land (Kai Myay). Women and men migrate to work in hospitality business, construction, metal industry and fisheries: *'We face food shortage for animals because of low land damage. This is caused by the changing Ayerwaryade river. The alluvial land surface has decreased from 130 acres five years ago to only 25 acres in the past 18–20 months. This mostly affected poor and landless households. These households cannot do subsistent agriculture and casual labour in agriculture. Their income has decreased because of limited job opportunities. So they migrate to other places in order to find work and support their family health, living expenses and children's education.'*<sup>117</sup>



### Text box 5a: Human-hair trade

Hair sorting has emerged as a new livelihood in more than 83% of the villages in Thazi, providing nearly all households with a regular income and enabling them to reinvest in livestock. However, in several cases it is mentioned that hair sorting has negative effects on health and runs the risk of dependency on Chinese prices and exchange rates. Also little is known about the origin of the human hair and the fairness or ethics of this growing industry, which might be an additional concern for Oxfam.

Exports of human hair have rocketed in popularity. It is now being sold in countries all over the world. China is the world's biggest exporter of human hair, and according to the World Trade Organisation's International Trade Centre, exported nearly 75% of the world's '*bird skin, feathers and human hair*' products in 2012. It is one of many 'industrial clusters' – areas that specialise in a single product – that have emerged in recent decades as a result of the booming Chinese economy. See also: Mail Online (30 May 2016); The Guardian (24 July 2008); The Spectator 25 April 2015).

### Average livelihood improvements

In 62% of the villages, improvement and sustaining of livelihood opportunities and resilience was found to be average, with important but insufficient improvements in access to markets and services being the cause.<sup>118</sup> These villages have not been very successful in coping with the consequences of changing weather patterns and environmental conditions. All have reported a decrease in farming activity and income together with an increase of risk due to extreme drought and flooding in past two years, but saw a significant increase in livestock breeding due to people's enhanced capacity and access to veterinary extension services, quality breeds and vaccinations. Livestock in these villages serves as a risk-transfer or insurance mechanism: '*Livestock can pay back the loan and support for health and education and agriculture. Livelihood becomes better. The house can be repaired.*'<sup>119</sup> Livestock breeding is generally combined with casual labour and small trading. In villages where there are no lucrative casual labour opportunities, migration occurs as the alternative.

MOs' functioning was found mediocre in most of these villages.<sup>120</sup> In three villages, MO functioning was found to be stronger and nearly maturing, but in and by itself could not address the lack of access to sufficient water for farming.<sup>121</sup> Livestock breeding has been a great help for the villagers to obtain an alternative source of income and pay off their debts from the losses in agriculture, but on its own is insufficient to generate the kind of reinforcing and amplifying effects of improvements in livelihoods observed in the best-performing villages. Hence villagers see no other option than to migrate to gain more income. Migration threatens the sustainability of effective MO functioning, since it affects the membership status and the MO mandate to undertake initiatives and lead on local development.

### Text box 5b: Migration

There appears a strong correlation between migration and limited access to productive water. In 52% of the researched villages (33% in Thazi and 78% in Minbu) migration was mentioned as an important livelihood and coping mechanism. In 91% of these (100% in Thazi and 86% in Minbu) there is insufficient access to productive water. However, in 38% of the villages (all in Thazi), migration does not occur while there is insufficient access to productive water. Here, casual labour, mostly in hair sorting businesses (75%), combined with livestock breeding, halted migration.

Drought affects the livelihoods and resilience of households (in particular those that are resource-poor) in all the villages in Minbu and Thazi. In more than 92% of all the researched villages, farmers presently suffer insufficient access to water for production. Particularly in Thazi, underground water reservoirs are shrinking and wells, ponds and lakes have dried up due to persistent drought. More than 88% of the Thazi villages with average livelihood

improvements (and 92% of all the Thazi villages) reported a decreased access to water for production in the past 18–20 months. In Minbu, this amounts to 60% of the average performing villages (and 56% of all villages). In Thazi, most people turned to livestock combined with small businesses and casual labour in hair production for Chinese traders in order to obtain secure income and cope with risk and loss in agriculture. Both livelihood options are also accessible to the more vulnerable (including female-headed and landless) households. Hair sorting<sup>122</sup> has emerged as a new livelihood in more than 83% of the villages in Thazi, providing nearly all households with a regular income and enabling them to reinvest in livestock. However, in several cases, it is mentioned that hair sorting has negative effects on health and runs the risk of dependency on Chinese prices and exchange rates. Hence villagers seek more diversification in casual labour or migration to mitigate this risk.

In Minbu, people don't do hair sorting, but combine livestock raising (particularly goats and pigs) with small trade, casual labour in the surrounding MSEs, and migration. Migration mostly occurs in Minbu, where other livelihood opportunities (including casual labour) remain limited. Minbu is part of the watershed of the Ayerwaryade river and thus some parts have larger underwater reservoirs. Although extreme drought also occurs here, water seems to be less of a problem. However, drought here combines with heavy rainfall causing flooding and soil damage. When it rains, it rains continuously, and when it stops, the soil entirely dries up, making crop cultivation extremely difficult. The heavy rains also cause the river to expand quickly. Contour lining, embankments and drainage canals are essential to prevent land erosion and the destruction of people's farms by floods. In **Ywar Pale Kone Tan**, recent flooding required an entire evacuation of the village and destroyed many of the improvements created by the project. *'In 2011–2015 because of Ayerwaryade floods, the farms suffer damage annually (...) and impact on those who rely on agriculture. (...) Farmers had to move with their livestock to higher places where it is more difficult to earn a living. (...) Many had to find other temporary jobs such as in jade mining and masonry where there are lots of occupational hazards. After the flooding, the village was covered by a two feet layer of mud. Many farms were lost because the embankment collapsed. It may happen again so it's a thread for the whole village in the coming year.'* (from the data collation on Ywar Pale Kone Tan).

Farmers (both women and men) in this area also observed an increase in crop diseases in the past few years that appears significantly higher than in Thazi (80% of the cases compared to 40% in Thazi). Farmers increasingly need pesticides to prevent total crop loss, which they purchase on credit from a private company in the region contacted by the MOCs. Yet the **excessive use of uncontrolled and harmful pesticides** also creates negative effects. The quality of the pesticides is generally quite low. It degrades the soil while pests quickly grow resistant. Farmers (particularly women) report a growing concern about **negative health effects**. NAG and Oxfam seem to have given insufficient thought to addressing these rising sustainability and health issues.

### 5.3.4 Best performing MO configurations

The tables below provide an overview of the best performing MO configurations or causal models generated by the EvalC3 analysis and discussed in the course of this section. These can be used to inform interventions for improving and scaling up the MO model or designing and testing new local inclusive governance models (see Section 2.3.4).

The symbol '<=' in the tables indicates a *necessary* correlation (i.e. where the outcome occurs, the cause will be present). The symbol '>=' shows a *sufficient* correlation (i.e. where the cause occurs, the outcome will be achieved). The symbol '=' means there is an important<sup>123</sup> correlation but it is neither necessary nor sufficient.

**Table 5.5a: Correlations between MO functioning and livelihoods**

Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building	<=	Improvement in farming
Weak MO operations	=>	Deterioration in farming
Strong MO operations	=>	Improvement in livestock
Weak MO mandate/membership + Weak MO operations	<=	Deterioration in livestock
Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building	<=	Improvement in farming + livestock
Weak MO mandate/membership + Weak MO operations	<=	Deterioration in farming + livestock
Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building + Strong MO leadership	<=	Improvement in farming + livestock + casual labour + trading
Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building + Strong MO operations	<=	Improvement in farming + livestock + casual labour + trading

**Table 5.5b: Correlations between MO functioning and relationships**

Strong MO coalition building	<=	Effective relationships with water departments
Strong MO leadership	<=	Effective relationships with livestock & veterinary departments
Strong MO leadership + Strong MO operations	=	Effective relationships with NGOs/donors/MFIs

**Table 5.5c: Correlations between MO functioning and R&V management**

Strong MO operations + Strong MOC leadership	=>	Effective revolving fund
Weak MO mandate/membership	<=	Ineffective revolving fund
Strong MO leadership + Strong MO coalition building	<=	Effective pest management
Weak MO leadership	=	Ineffective pest management
Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO operations + Strong MO coalition building	=	Effective drought management
Strong MO coalition building	=	Effective flood management
Strong MO coalition building + MO mandate/membership + MO leadership	=	Effective flood management

**Table 5.5d: Correlations between MO functioning and combined relationships and R&V management**

Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building + MO leadership	<=	Effective relationships + R&V management
Strong MO mandate/membership + Strong MO coalition building + MO operations	<=	Effective relationships + R&V management

# 6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 6.1 VALUE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MO MODEL

To fully appreciate the present status and influence of MO functioning, it is essential to understand the novelty of the MO model to the Burmese institutional landscape. The MO is fundamentally different from other village institutions<sup>124</sup> or traditional farmer organisations in its role of **facilitator of people's participation in local governance** and its **wider scope of development efforts and community-level action focused on improving livelihoods and resilience**. As a result, MOs have generally gained much **wider community participation** compared to other local development institutions, which in itself is an important indication of their relevance and importance. Figure 6.1 illustrates this distinct and novel role.<sup>125</sup>

**Figure 6.1: Dry Zone inclusive governance triangle**



Given its novelty and the extremely difficult context and conditions, it appears that the one-third of MOs (33%) that are presently still functioning reasonably well, must be viewed as quite an achievement. Factual evidence showing strong improvements in livelihoods and resilience where MOs performed strongly (14% of the MOs), and counterfactual evidence confirming that improvements remain weak or turn negative where MOs are very weak (38%), shows the importance and necessity of the MO as a *distinct* institutional mechanism for leveraging inclusive governance and building community-level capacity for climate adaptation. This validates the Dry Zone project's ToC, and thus proves that, indeed, developing MOs **was the right thing to do**. The value attributed to the MO model by both villagers and township officials stresses this. Both have requested a continuation of these efforts and further support from Oxfam and its partners to help strengthen MOC capacity, prepare for the next generation, and build greater movement. MOs have generally proved successful in creating new livelihood opportunities and enhancing women's positions and influence in village decision-making.

Yet, nearly half (48%) of the MOs were found to be hopeful, but still far from effective, and livelihood improvements were found to be mediocre and insufficient in 62% of the villages. Hence the question remains whether **the right thing was done in the right way**, and the answer to this must be: **not enough**. What can be learned and what is left to be done to ensure the impact of the DZ project can be enlarged and sustained?

For the MO to be successful in its facilitative and mobilising role participation in new governance spaces must be felt to be safe by the villagers and offer scope for real change. This greatly depends on the local power structure and political economy. Village administrations are structured differently in Minbu and Thazi, which affects the interactions and relationships between the MOC and the village administration in different ways.<sup>126</sup> The MO's ability to demonstrate its added value to the villagers and grow more effective depends on how the village's central leadership and administration views the MO and engages with the MOC.

MOC leaders experience greater difficulty in being accepted and sustaining the functioning of the MO if they are overruled or dominated by central village leadership. This was reported to be the case in 23% of the surveyed villages and also confirmed by township officials. As we may assume that in many cases it is even not reported, this raises an important red flag. On the other hand, in villages where central leadership is more appreciative and supportive of the MO's *distinct* role and lets the MOC run the development activities independently, the MOC appears to gain more credibility and trust among the villagers. The latter was the case in the 33% of the villages where MO performance was found to be fairly strong and maturing (or nearly maturing). In these villages, there was also a better collaboration between the MOC and the other village committees.

Another essential issue is the lack of responsiveness on the part of township officials. MOs' relationships with officials have proved insufficient (or medium to weak) in 76% of the villages to obtain the resources and services they need to address the problems caused by drought and flooding. Performance does not merely depend on MOCs' capacity to build these relationships, but also on the officials' capacities to respond in a timely fashion. Township officials also confirmed this. Lack of access to water for agricultural production constitutes the main problem, which is partly attributable to the township authorities' limited responsiveness and capacity for developing and maintaining appropriate productive water infrastructure and monitoring of water levels/availability. The successful combination of farming and livestock and other livelihood activities did not occur in 86% of the villages because of the lack of access to water for production. In many of these villages, people turn to migration, which forms a major threat to the survival of the MOs. Newly created livelihood opportunities, such as hair sorting, combined with livestock in Thazi, have to some extent halted migration, yet still proved unsustainable and insufficient to build resilience.

Hence the **assumption** that building MO and MOC capacity would be sufficient to trigger the changes in key stakeholder relationships and mechanisms needed for generating sustainable livelihood opportunities and building resilience, clearly did not hold true in all villages. The evidence shows convincingly that MOs by themselves cannot make relationships effective or overcome the extreme climatological and environmental conditions. But the evidence also proves that MOs *can* form an effective governance mechanism and such mechanism (distinct from existing institutions and traditional farmer organisations) is *necessary* to realise sustainable livelihood improvements. However, more is needed than the merely technical inputs and training so far provided by Oxfam/NAG to make this happen. The Dry Zone project has focused *too narrowly* on building capacity of MOs and MOCs.

And yet, capacity, particularly on the part of the MOC, does appear quite an important issue affecting villagers' and officials' confidence and willingness to invest their time and engage with the MO. Township officials raised this issue explicitly, referring to the limited knowledge, performance and leadership of some of the MOCs. Also, villagers overwhelmingly pointed to the weakness of MOC leadership and performance and the lack of funds. Generally, the 29% of mediocre performing *hopeful* MOs have mediocre scores for MOC capacity, mobilisation of MO members, participatory planning and monitoring, and satisfaction of MO members with MOC performance. The 38% weak performing or *struggling* MOs generally score very low on MOC capacity and members' satisfaction with MOC performance, and are generally very weak in member mobilisation, participatory planning and monitoring, implementation of plans and gender-sensitive action, collective marketing and networking, and finance. In the villages where MOs struggle to survive, there was little or no improvement after project closure in the

relationships, the management of risks and vulnerabilities, villagers' access to resources, services and markets, and their livelihood opportunities and resilience.

## 6.2 A RENEWED STRATEGY FOR STRENGTHENING THE MO MODEL

The MO model has proved a potentially powerful mechanism for building adaptive capacity and resilience at the community level and developing local participatory democracy. No cost-benefit or value-for-money analysis can accurately calculate all possible short and long-term implications of NOT sufficiently investing in the sustainability and scaling up of such a mechanism. As the architect of the MO, Oxfam and NAG essentially bear the responsibility for the implications of phasing out too early before MOs could reach sufficient maturity and have the necessary conditions in place to enable them to grow and survive.

More investment is needed to reach the tipping point where villages move beyond merely adoption towards adaptation and aggregation of the MO model. Resources need to be invested carefully to foster the kind of collaboration and cross-fertilisation that helps in the gaining of influence and building capacity and movement. We strongly recommend that Oxfam and NAG take a lead in this and mobilise other partners and stakeholders to leverage greater influence and resources.

Figure 6.2 may serve as a source of inspiration. It summarises the performance and effects of the MOs in relation to the reported intensification of climate hazards.<sup>127</sup> Even though climate-related hazards have substantially intensified in the past two years, relatively strong improvements in people's livelihoods were reported in 14% of the cases that have reached the stage of 'adaptation' (cf. upper right cell), while relatively weak improvements with important deteriorations in agriculture were observed in 62% of the cases indicating 'increased resilience' but still too weak to be sustainable (cf. centre right cell), and deteriorations in 24% of the cases showing 'no adaptation' and no improvement in resilience (cf. lower right cell). A renewed follow-up strategy could help in moving up the 24% to the level of 'increased resilience' and the 62% to the level of full 'adaptation', while making the best performing 14% strong enough to teach the others and build movement.

**Figure 6.2: Climate resilience and adaptation performance matrix**

<i>Improved livelihoods</i>	LUCK	INCREASED RESILIENCE	<b>ADAPTATION</b> 14% of the MO villages (all maturing MOs)
<i>Little change</i>	<b>INCREASED VULNERABILITY</b>	VULNERABILITY UNCHANGED	INCREASED RESILIENCE 62% of the MO villages (mixed MO performance)
<i>Deteriorated livelihoods</i>	<b>MALADAPTATION</b>	<b>INCREASED VULNERABILITY</b>	<b>NO ADAPTATION</b> 24% of the MO villages (mostly weak MO performance)
	<i>Reduced hazards</i>	<i>Little change</i>	<i>Intensified hazards</i>

As part of a renewed strategy for further developing, strengthening, sustaining and aggregating the MO model, we recommend the following:

1. Work is undoubtedly needed to help **create the conditions** for MOs to succeed, in particular by **building the capacity of village leadership and township-level and regional government** to engage with the MOs and take up their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the communities in the Dry Zone to build their adaptive capacity and resilience. Important responsibilities of the township and regional government include: (a) the provision of appropriate and sustainable agricultural and veterinary extension services; and (b) the construction and maintenance of appropriate and sustainable productive water infrastructure and the monitoring of water levels.

Responsible local township departments need the support from the national government and international agencies to obtain **sufficient budget** and **access to climate funding** for delivering on these responsibilities and supporting the MO-led livelihood improvement and adaptation plans.

Arguably, Oxfam and NAG alone do not have sufficient influence and resources to make this happen. Yet, they do have the power and capacity to build coalition and strategic partnerships with other international, national and local organisations to work on this together.

2. More coaching and supervision is also needed to sufficiently **strengthen MOC leadership and capacity** to mobilise the villagers and develop positive relationships with village administration and township officials, as well as other MOs. The EvalC3 analysis suggests that **MO coalition building** and **mandate/membership** are the two most important dimensions to work on in order to generate amplifying improvements in relationships, livelihoods and resilience, and the management of climate-related risks. Without strong MOC leadership, however, this is unlikely to happen. Hence the focus should be on developing second generation MOCs that can operate at a higher strategic and more independent level and are able to prepare the subsequent generation(s).

It is crucial is to move beyond merely technical training towards a **systemic learning approach** that builds on:

- a) collaborative learning and movement building – e.g. by engaging all key stakeholders in regular impact reflections and sense-making; and
  - c) ‘learning by teaching and doing’ – e.g. by developing methods and approaches for *collective* impact monitoring and creating spaces for MOCs to train each other (in place of individual ‘learning by being taught’).
3. A diversified strategy for strengthening MOC leadership and capacity that is **adaptive to the different levels and conditions of MO performance** would help save valuable resources and make investments more focused and cost-effective. Helpful to this end would be to build a typology that links performance to, for instance, climate adaptation and resilience outcomes (as illustrated Figure 6.2). Objectives and investments can then be tailored to the level of performance (e.g. from weak performance with ‘no adaptation’ up to hopefully functioning with ‘increased resilience’ and further up to maturing performance showing ‘adaptation’) and the context and conditions (e.g. local power structure and type of central village leadership, impact of climate hazards, hydro- and ecological conditions) of the different types or categories of MOs. Most important is to sufficiently invest in the 33% of MOs that were found to be maturing (14%)<sup>128</sup> or nearly maturing (19%)<sup>129</sup> and make them strong enough to **grow and become sustainable**.



4. Investment in the strongest MOs must aim at building capacity to **lead bigger networks, coordinate peer learning, and create greater visibility** of successes to inspire other communities and leverage more funding and support. An essential step forward for these MOs to become fully effective and gain influence might be official registration. According to the township officials, MOs can register if they have clear objectives and plans. It is unclear why well-performing MOs have not yet registered. This requires further investigation.

It is also important to appoint a local support NGO (for instance NAG) that has sufficient capacity to take a lead in developing the backbone structure for **collective impact M&E** and support its activities.<sup>130</sup> A framework for this is best developed at the design stage and as an integral part of a renewed strategy.

5. Last, but not least, more and continuous work is needed to develop an environment that enables both men and women to rethink their respective roles and responsibilities and engage in local participatory governance. Women still face considerable challenges in gaining credibility and trust in their ability to take up leadership roles and balance these with household and social duties. The MO can offer the space for women and men to address these gender issues and learn about the advantages of greater **gender equality** in both household and community activities.

Strategically the focus might best be on helping the maturing and nearly maturing MOs to develop a role model that demonstrates the benefits, and ways to achieve these benefits, to other MO villages. As part of the collective impact M&E and peer learning agenda, for instance, they could lead on the piloting of a participatory gender and adaptation analysis approach.

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Following project documents were made available for the Effectiveness Review and included in the secondary data review:

- DZ Project Aide-Mémoire
- Oxfam DZ Description of the Action for LIFT
- DZ Project M&E Framework
- DZ Project Logframe (amended)
- Scorecard data 2012–2014 on the functioning of MOs and MOCs in Thazi
- DZ Project final narrative report (2011–2014)
- Mini monitoring review of MOs in Thazi (2012)
- Oxfam DZ annual narrative report (2011–2012)
- Oxfam DZ annual narrative report (2012–2013)
- Oxfam DZ annual narrative report (2013–2014)
- Oxfam DZ mid-term evaluation report – Power shift and social change assessment (2013)
- Oxfam DZ end evaluation report (Sept 2014)
- Annex to the Oxfam DZ end evaluation report – Quantitative household survey (Sept 2014)
- LIFT Comparative study of approaches to farmer organisations and cooperatives in LIFT partner projects (March 2016)

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Guijt, I., Thein, W.P., Khine, S.T., Shein W.W. & Pratihari, S. (September 2015). *Evaluation Design of the Myanmar Dry Zone Effectiveness Review*. Yangon: Oxfam Myanmar.

Van Hemelrijck, A., Guijt, I., Thein, W.P., Khine, S.T., Kyaw, W.W., Win, Y.N. & Pratihari, S. (February 2016). *Field Research Manual for the Participatory Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone Project in Myanmar*. Yangon: Oxfam Myanmar.

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
# APPENDIX 1 – MAPPING OF CAUSAL PATHWAYS & INTERACTIONS

The picture presented in Figure A1.1 below shows the map of the assumed causal pathways and interactions between MO and MOC members and external actors that was put together by a core team of Oxfam staff guided by the first consultant Irene Guijt during her first planning and design trip to Myanmar in August 2015. The diagram presented in Figure A1.2 shows the first draft Theory of Change that came out of this processes. These are taken for the original design report produced by the team in September 2015.<sup>131</sup>

**Figure A1.1: Causal pathways map**



**Figure A1.2: First draft Theory of Change of the Dry Zone project**



## APPENDIX 2 – SAMPLE FRAME AND DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPANTS

Table A2.1 presents the proportional sample frame for the second phase participatory inquiry. The sampling was done based on the results from a survey of all MOs on their effectiveness status<sup>132</sup> with a total of 413 respondents (36% women and 64% men). The survey made it possible to categorise the MOs and proportionally sample 21 MO villages (12 in Thazi and 9 in Minbu) across the different categories, covering the variability in MO performance and capturing the special combinations/cases of particular interest for learning. Data was then collected in these 21 villages using a standard set of six participatory methods in (mostly gender-specific) focus groups that engaged a total of about<sup>133</sup> 1,302 quasi-random selected people (44% women and 56% men). The distribution of the participants in the various participatory methods and the survey is presented in Table A2.2.

**Table A2.1: Proportional sample of MOs for the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase participatory inquiry**

Category	Tot # MO	Prop size	Sample size	Thazi	Minbu
Seemingly Effective	0	0	0	0	0
Seemingly Maturing	13	4	2	1	1
Seemingly Hopeful	42	14	14	6	8
Seemingly Struggling	5	2	4	4	0
Seemingly Dysfunctional	2	1	1	1	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>

**Table A2.2: Distribution of participants in the MO survey and the participatory methods**

Township	Gender	MO Survey	Social Mapping	Livelihood Analysis	V&R Mgt & Relationship Analysis	MO assessment	TOTAL
Minbu	Women	75	9	81	108	45	318
	Men	96	63	81	126	45	411
Thazi	Women	75	12	108	144	60	399
	men	167	84	108	168	60	587
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>413</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>1715</b>

# APPENDIX 3 – FIRST PHASE INDICATIVE MO SCORES AND DISTRIBUTION

Table A3.1 presents the indicative scores obtained from the first phase survey (n 62). The scoring was done partly by the respondents and partly by the consultant based on the qualitative explanations obtained from the survey. Subsequent Table A3.2 shows the distribution of MOs according level of functioning based on the indicative scores from the first phase survey.

**Table A3.1: Indicative scores from the first phase survey (n 62)**

Township	Village	Category	Average	Dim 1 (consti- tution)	Dim 2 (rules)	Dim 3 (mem- bers)	Dim 4 (mis- sion)	Dim 5 (plans exists)	Dim 6 (MOC gender)	Dim 7 (MOC exists)	Dim 8 (mee- tings)	Dim 9 (parti- PM&E)	Dim 10 (book keeping)	Dim 11 (transpa- rency)	Dim 12 (rela- tions)	Dim 13 (funds)	Dim 14 (impact)
Thazi	InnKone	SeeminglyMaturing	4,69	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	4	5	
Thazi	OkehitKone	SeeminglyMaturing	4,31	5	3	4	4	5	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	
Minbu	SaingShin	SeeminglyMaturing	4,31	5	2	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	4	3	
Minbu	ZeeAing	SeeminglyMaturing	4,23	4	4	5	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	3	4	3	
Minbu	PauPinHtwin	SeeminglyMaturing	4,15	5	2	5	4	3	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	
Thazi	KyaukPonKone	SeeminglyMaturing	4,15	4	3	4	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	2	5	4	
Minbu	ChaungKauk	SeeminglyMaturing	4,08	4	3	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	5	3	4	3	
Thazi	ThaManKyar	SeeminglyMaturing	4,08	4	2	5	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	3	4	3	
Thazi	AungThar	SeeminglyMaturing	4,00	4	4	3	5	5	5	3	3	4	4	5	4	3	
Thazi	NyaungKan	SeeminglyMaturing	4,00	4	3	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	2	5	3	
Thazi	BulYon	SeeminglyMaturing	4,00	4	3	5	4	4	5	4	4	3	5	4	3	4	
Minbu	MaSiYiPin	SeeminglyMaturing	4,00	4	3	5	5	3	5	5	4	4	4	3	4	3	
Minbu	YaePawLay	SeeminglyHopeful	3,92	5	3	5	4	3	5	4	5	3	4	3	4	3	
Thazi	KyarHitKan	SeeminglyHopeful	3,92	4	2	4	4	5	5	4	3	4	5	4	3	4	
Thazi	SeGyi(North)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,85	4	4	3	3	5	5	2	3	4	4	5	4	4	
Minbu	PyiTharHwarHit	SeeminglyHopeful	3,85	4	3	4	5	3	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	
Minbu	ChaungPyu	SeeminglyHopeful	3,85	4	2	5	5	3	5	5	4	4	5	2	3	3	
Minbu	HteinTaw	SeeminglyHopeful	3,85	4	2	5	5	3	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	
Thazi	YwarKoneSi	SeeminglyHopeful	3,85	3	4	5	5	5	5	3	4	4	5	3	1	3	
Thazi	PauKChaung	SeeminglyHopeful	3,77	4	3	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	2	3	2	
Thazi	HpaKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,77	3	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	4	5	3	3	3	
Minbu	PakPin	SeeminglyHopeful	3,77	3	2	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	
Minbu	ThinBawKyun	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	5	1	5	4	3	5	4	3	3	5	3	4	3	
Thazi	KanSiLauKuk	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	4	3	3	4	4	5	3	3	3	5	3	4	4	
Minbu	YaeNgan	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	4	2	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	
Minbu	ZeeHpyuKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	4	2	4	4	3	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	
Minbu	PetPel	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	4	1	5	4	4	5	3	5	5	5	3	3	3	
Thazi	OkehitKone(OkehitKone)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	3	4	3	4	5	5	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	
Minbu	TeKoneHwarHit	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	3	3	2	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	3	3	3	
Minbu	NewHinhBawKyun	SeeminglyHopeful	3,69	3	3	5	5	4	5	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	
Thazi	HpaYarKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,62	3	3	5	3	3	5	3	3	4	5	3	3	4	
Thazi	MaYway	SeeminglyHopeful	3,62	3	3	5	4	3	5	3	3	5	3	3	3	4	
Minbu	KanTharYar(KhaYurKan)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,62	3	2	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	5	1	3	3	
Minbu	YaeYwinKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,62	3	2	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	
Thazi	KanHey(KanSiWei)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,54	3	3	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	4	3	3	4	
Minbu	YwarPalaKoneTan	SeeminglyHopeful	3,54	3	1	4	4	3	5	5	3	4	4	4	3	3	
Thazi	PaulTaw	SeeminglyHopeful	3,46	4	3	2	3	3	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	5	
Minbu	YaePawSi	SeeminglyHopeful	3,46	4	1	4	4	3	5	4	3	4	5	2	3	3	
Thazi	NyanKan(NanKan)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,54	3	3	5	4	2	5	5	4	5	5	1	2	2	
Thazi	ChaulKhe	SeeminglyHopeful	3,38	4	4	5	3	3	5	2	2	3	5	2	2	4	
Minbu	MaSiYi	SeeminglyHopeful	3,38	4	2	4	4	3	5	3	3	3	5	2	3	3	
Minbu	MaSiYiPin	SeeminglyHopeful	3,38	4	2	3	4	3	5	4	3	2	5	3	3	3	
Thazi	innSaiNet(North)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,38	3	3	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	4	3	1	4	
Minbu	SinLanSi	SeeminglyHopeful	3,38	3	2	4	5	3	5	4	3	4	3	2	3	3	
Thazi	KanHitKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,31	4	3	3	4	4	5	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	
Minbu	KanNiywarHit	SeeminglyHopeful	3,31	4	3	2	4	3	5	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	
Thazi	GwayKone(West)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,23	4	3	2	5	4	1	2	2	3	5	3	4	4	
Thazi	ThonePatLel	SeeminglyHopeful	3,15	3	3	4	4	3	5	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	
Thazi	KyiAingKone(SiYi)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,08	4	3	2	4	4	5	4	3	2	2	2	2	3	
Thazi	TaungKone(North)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,08	3	3	2	4	4	5	3	3	4	4	1	1	3	
Thazi	PoneMeZarKone	SeeminglyHopeful	3,08	3	3	2	5	3	5	3	3	3	3	2	1	4	
Thazi	HngatHpyinKone(HngatMinKone)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,08	3	3	2	3	4	5	3	3	2	4	3	2	3	
Thazi	BoneaLoke	SeeminglyHopeful	3,08	3	3	2	3	4	5	3	3	2	4	3	2	3	
Thazi	InnSaiNet(South)	SeeminglyHopeful	3,00	3	3	1	4	3	1	4	3	3	3	3	3	5	
Thazi	HtaNaungKone	SeeminglyStruggling	2,85	4	2	2	3	2	5	2	3	4	3	4	1	2	
Thazi	MaungAing	SeeminglyStruggling	2,85	3	3	1	3	3	5	5	3	3	3	1	1	3	
Thazi	KatKyayAnn	SeeminglyStruggling	2,85	2	2	5	4	1	5	2	3	4	3	1	1	4	
Thazi	Inn	SeeminglyStruggling	2,77	3	3	2	3	2	5	3	3	2	5	1	2	2	
Thazi	BoKone	SeeminglyStruggling	2,69	3	3	2	3	4	5	2	3	3	3	1	1	2	
Thazi	GwayKone(East)	SeeminglyStruggling	2,00	3	3	5	3	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	
Minbu	WetMyayKan	SeeminglyStruggling	2,00	3	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	3	3	1	3	2	
Thazi	ThanPwayt	SeeminglyDysfunctional	1,54	3	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Thazi	Kyaung	SeeminglyDysfunctional	1,38	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	



**Table A3.2: Indicative distribution of MOs according to level of functioning (first phase; n 62)**

Categories	Total	%	Thazi	%	Minbu	%
Seemingly Effective	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Seemingly Maturing	12	19%	7	19%	5	20%
Seemingly Hopeful	41	66%	22	59%	19	76%
Seemingly Struggling	7	11%	6	16%	1	4%
Seemingly Dysfunctional	2	3%	2	5%	0	0%
TOTAL	62	100%	37	100%	25	100%

## APPENDIX 4 – SECOND PHASE MO SCORES AND DISTRIBUTIONS

Table A4.1 presents the final scores for effective/sustained MO functioning obtained from the second phase participatory inquiry (n=21). The scoring was done based on the cross-checking of scores and qualitative evidence obtained from the second phase participatory inquiry with scores obtained from the first phase survey. Subsequently Table A4.2 shows the distribution for the sample of MOs (n 21) that came out from the second phase participatory inquiry alongside its indicative distribution that was obtained from the first phase survey.

Table A4.1: Final scores for effective/sustained MO functioning (n 21)				Bone Ta Loke	Bo Kone	Aung Thar	Kyar Pyit Kan	Nyar Kan	Hta Naung Kone	Gway Kone East	Inn Ganat South	Pauk Taw	Ywar Kone Gyi	Inn	Inn Gone	Thin Baw Kyun	Pauk Pin Htwin	Kan Thar Yar	Te Kone Ywar Thit	Pyi Thar Ywar Thit	Kan Ni Ywar Thit	Ywar Pale Kone Tan	Ma Gyi Pin	Saing Shin	
MO assessment criteria	Scorecard	Survey	Weight																						
<b>1 MO Mandate &amp; membership</b>	Mandate / Vision & mission	2	B1-3 + Ann2	1	3	5	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	3	4	5	4	
	Membership rules		A3	2	3	3	4	2	3	2	3	4	4	3	4	1	2	2	3	3	3	1	3	2	
	Active membership status		A6	2	2	2	3	4	5	2	5	1	3	5	3	5	5	5	5	2	4	2	4	5	
	Member selection & representation of vulnerable groups	9		1	1	2	3	1	3	3	2	2	3	1	3	3	4	5	5	4	4	2	2	5	
	AVERAGE				2,33	2,83	3,50	2,83	3,83	2,50	3,50	2,33	3,50	3,83	3,17	4,17	3,33	3,83	3,83	3,00	3,83	2,50	2,67	4,33	3,67
<b>2 MOC Leadership</b>	Constitution	1	A2	1	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	4	5	4	3	4	5	5	4	4	5	3	4	5	
	Election & representation (incl. gender)	3		1	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	3	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	3	5	4	
	Leadership and clarity of roles	4		1	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	
	Capacity	6		2	3	4	5	3	4	5	4	4	4	3	4	3	3	5	3	4	4	3	4	5	
	Responsiveness & mobilisation	8		3	2	1	4	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	4	5	3	4	4	2	3	5	
	Implementation of plans & gender sensitive actions		D1 + Ann2	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	1	4	3	2	2	5	4	3	3	4	4	3	3	5	
	Members' satisfaction	14		2	3	2	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	5	3	4	3	2	4	2	3	5	
AVERAGE				3,15	2,77	4,00	2,92	2,92	3,23	2,85	3,69	3,69	2,92	2,92	4,00	3,85	4,31	3,31	3,77	4,23	2,69	3,46	4,54	4,46	
<b>3 MO Operations</b>	Meetings	5	D3-D5 + Ann3	2	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	5	1	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	3	4	5	
	Participatory planning & monitoring	7	Ann3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	5	4	5	3	3	3	4	
	Bookkeeping & transparency	10	D8-D9	2	3	3	4	5	3	4	4	3	4	3	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	3	4	5	
	Sufficient & sustainable funding		F1 + Ann2	3	2	1	3	3	2	2	2	5	1	2	4	4	4	2	3	4	3	3	3	5	
	AVERAGE				2,40	2,10	3,10	3,40	2,90	2,60	2,90	2,60	4,20	2,00	2,90	3,90	4,00	4,50	3,60	4,20	3,90	3,00	3,40	5,00	4,40
<b>4 MO Coalition building</b>	Relationships with public & private sector agencies	11	E1	1	3	4	5	1	3	5	3	3	5	4	3	4	4	5	2	4	4	2	3	4	
	Networking with other MOs	12	E2	2	2	2	4	3	1	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	5	5	1	3	4	2	3	5	
	MO Advocacy	13		2	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	1	4	4	4	2	4	5	1	2	4	1	3	5	
	AVERAGE				3,00	3,20	4,20	3,00	2,20	3,80	2,60	1,80	4,20	3,20	3,00	2,80	4,40	5,00	1,20	2,80	4,00	1,60	3,00	4,80	4,80
<b>TOTAL AVERAGE</b>					2,72	2,73	3,70	3,04	2,96	3,03	2,96	2,61	3,90	2,99	3,00	3,72	3,89	4,41	2,99	3,44	3,99	2,45	3,13	4,67	4,33

**Table A4.2: Distributions of sampled MOs according to level of functioning (second & first phase; n 21)**

Category	2nd Phase distribution				1st Phase distribution				Difference in distribution		
	Total	%	Thazi	Minbu	Total	%	Thazi	Minbu	Total in/decrease	Thazi in/decrease	Minbu in/decrease
Effective	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maturing	3	14%	0	3	2	10%	1	1	+5%	-5%	+10%
Hopeful	10	48%	6	4	14	67%	6	8	-19%	0	-19%
Struggling	8	38%	6	2	4	19%	4	0	+19%	+10%	+10%
Dysfunctional	0	0	0	0	1	5%	1	0	-5%	-5%	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

## APPENDIX 5 – MO MEMBERSHIP

**Table A5.1: Membership in/decrease in Thazi (n 37) since project closure**

Village	Women	Explanations	Men	Explanations
Inn Ga Net (South)	-	Interested in leading	-	More aware of technologies, more transparency
Inn Kone	30	More interested, willing to participate and more space for women	15	More enthusiasm in technology, knowledge and experience
Chauk Khwe	30	More trust, change behaviour	20	More organised, more ownership
Kan Shey (Kan Swei)	30	Like working with other members, more opportunities for women	10	Right leadership, like working together with other members
Hpa Yar Kone	25	More experience, freedom to speak out, interested in development work	35	More experience, transparency and knowledge
Nyaung Kan	20	Knowledge is improved	20	More interested in development works
Gway Kone (East)	20	More ownership	10	Good mobilisation and more interested
Ma Yway	15	More unity and interested in village development works	30	More experience and knowledge
Ywar Kone Gyi	15	Increased ownership, more space	20	Concept is changed
Bu Yon	15	More interested, obtain more knowledge	10	More trust on organisation
Nyan Kan (Nan Kan)	10	Willing to cooperate more	10	More interested, more transparency
Hpyauk Seik Kone	15	Good leadership	8	Good leadership
Pauk Chaung	8	More trust on organisation, more willingness to community development	15	More knowledge and experience, more trust on organisation, more transparency
Tha Man Kyar	5	Strong mobilisation of leaders, more interested in village development	25	Aware of collective works, mindset is changed because village is being developed
Kyar Thit Kan	10	More chances for women	0	More interested in own business but will participate if needed
Kat Kyay Inn	3	More interested	30	Admire development of other villages
Thone Pat Lel	10	Increased interest level, more available than men	-5	Decreased interest level, time constraint
Kyauk Pon Kone	4	Interested, time availability	-6	Time constraint
Inn Ga Net (North)	0	-	0	-
Bo Kone	0	N/A	-20	Migration
Oke Shit Kone (Oke Sit Kone)	-23	Migration	10	More interested in development works
Oke Shit Kone	-30	Migration	20	More interested in development works
Kan Gyi Auk	-5	Decreased interest level	0	N/A
Se Gyi (North)	-10	Time constraint and decreased interest level	0	N/A
Aung Thar	-15	Migration	0	N/A
Hta Naung Kone	-20	Migration	0	Interest level is same as before
Pone Me Zar Kone	-20	Migration and disunity	0	N/A
Kan Thit Kone	-25	Decrease interest level and business is not running well	0	N/A

Pauk Taw	-50	Decreased interest level	0	N/A
Bone Ta Loke	-15	Less incentive, poor management	-25	Less incentive, poor management, low trust of leaders
Hnget Hpyin Kone (Hnget Min Kone)	-15	Decreased interest level because MOC could not implement effectively	-10	Decreased interest level because MOC could not implement effectively
Kyaung	-15	No MO exists	-20	No MO exists
Maung Taing	-20	Decreased interest level, Business issue	-20	Decrease interest level, difficulties for living
Than Pwayt	-25	No MO exists	-15	No MO exists
Kyi Taing Kone / Gyi Taung Kone (North)	-30	Migration	-5	Migration
Inn	-30	Own business issues	-30	Decreased unity and trust
Gway Kone (West)	-35	Decreased interest level	-10	Age and business issue

**Table A5.2: Membership in/decrease in Minbu (n 25) since project closure**

Village	Women	Explanations	Men	Explanations
Chaung Hpyu	100	More trust of MOC and higher interest level	0	More busy and time constraint
Kan Thar Yar (Kha Yu Kan)	70	Availability, higher interest level	20	More trust of MOC and higher interesting level
Pet Pel	40	Interested in revolving fund and activities, trust of MO and transparency	10	Satisfied with MO works
Pauk Pin Htwin	40	Love to work together and interested in revolving fund	20	Like MO works and will to discuss and participate in activities
New – Thin Baw Kyun	40	More interested in development works, enhanced knowledge and more trust	20	More trust in MOC
Htein Taw	30	Have space for participation, access to revolving fund	20	More trust in MO, village developments are visible
Saing Shin	25	Interested in activities, availability	0	N/A
Chaung Kauk	20	More interested in development works and trust in MOC	15	More knowledge and experience
Zee Aing	15	More trust in MOC and higher interest level in development works	10	More interesting level, more cooperative with MOC
Paik Pin	10	Interested in achievement of livestock breeding (goat)	20	More interested in development works and trust on MOC
Ma Gyi Su	13	Interested in MO works and benefits	0	Time constraint
Thin Baw Kyun	10	Interested in revolving fund, more trust on MOC	0	Time constraint
Yae Ngan	4	More interested in development works and interesting level on MOC	0	Time constraint
Ma Gyi Pin	2	Higher interest level and availability	8	More trust in MOC and interested in development works
Yae Paw Lay	0	N/A	75	More knowledge and experience, and satisfaction with MO's works
Zee Hpyu Kone	25	More trust in MOC and interested in development works	0	Migration
Yae Twin Kone	31	More interested in development works and availability	-25	Decreased interest level and time constraint
Pyi Thar Ywar Thit	25	Interested in collective works and revolving fund	-30	Migration
Sin Lan Gyi	5	More interested in develop-	0	N/A

		ment works		
Kan Ni Ywar Thit	0	Migration	-5	Busy with their business
Yae Paw Gyi	0	Migration	0	Time constraint
Ywar Pale Kone Tan	0	Time constraint and decreased interest level	0	Time constraint
Ma Gyi Pin	-5	Migration	0	Time constraint
Te Kone Ywar Thit	-20	Migration	0	Time constraint
Wet Myay Kan	0	N/A	0	N/A

## APPENDIX 6 – RUBRICS FOR MO SCORING (FIRST & SECOND PHASE)

**Table A6.1: Synthesis of MO Performance Rubrics from First phase survey and second phase MO self-assessment**

Dimensions	Effective MO (score 5)	Maturing MO (score 4-4.9)	Hopeful MO (score 3-3.9)	Struggling MO (score 2-2.9)	Dysfunctional MO (score 1-1.9)
<b>1. MO Mandate &amp; Membership</b>					
<b>Mandate and Vision/Mission</b> <i>MO has a clear and defined mandate, and a strong vision and mission, developed in participation with and agreed by all MO members and interest groups.</i> (WEIGHT 1)	The mandate and vision/mission is strong and formulated with the active inputs of the members and well understood and agreed by all the members.	There is a strong mandate and vision/mission, but it is not well understood and agreed by all the members.	There is a mandate and vision/mission, but it is not strong and lacks clarity and/or relevance. Engagement of the members is limited.	There is a mandate and vision/mission, but it's very weak and unclear, not established with the participation of the members, and not well known or understood and agreed by most of the members.	There is no written mandate and vision/mission that was shared or discussed with the members.
<b>Membership rules</b> <i>MO has adequate and up-to-date membership rules that enable the organisation to function well.</i> (WEIGHT 2)	There are adequate and up-to-date membership rules that are relevant and known and respected by the members and enable the MO to function well.	There are membership rules that are known and respected by the members and enable the MO to function, but they are not up-to-date and should be improved to make the MO more effective.	Membership rules exist, but they are not well known and/or not well followed, and are insufficient to make the MO function well.	Some membership rules exist but these are largely inadequate and unknown.	There are no membership rules.
<b>Active membership status</b> <i>The amount of <u>active members</u> (both female and male) has not decreased or has grown.</i>	Active membership has grown substantially for both women and men.	Active membership has slightly grown for both women and men, or grown substantially but only for one particular group (e.g. women or	The amount of active members has decreased for one group but remained steady for a core group of interested producers and landless-	The amount of active members has decreased for both women and men.	The amount of active members has drastically dropped for both women and men.



(WEIGHT 2)		men).	poor.		
<b>Member selection and representation of vulnerable groups</b> <i>The MO has an accountable and fair procedure of selecting members according to agreed criteria that are fair and inclusive and ensure special support is provided to the most vulnerable.</i> (WEIGHT 1)	Clear and fair criteria for membership and beneficiary selection are established and agreed in open forums and well documented, allowing non-selected people to lodge appeals. The selection process is always fair, according to the agreed rules, and transparent.	Criteria for membership and beneficiary selection are agreed and documented, but they are not entirely clear. They allow non-beneficiaries to lodge appeals, but can create confusion in the decisions. Yet overall the selection process is fair and transparent.	Criteria for membership and beneficiary selection are established, but they are not well documented and not understood by everybody in the same way. The selection process, therefore, is susceptible to bias, yet reasonable appeal is always possible and the decisions are generally fair and transparent.	Criteria for membership and beneficiary selection are established, but they are unfair, unclear and don't allow any appeal. The selection process is biased and driven by favouritism that benefits better-off and more powerful villagers.	There are no clear criteria for membership and beneficiary selection. The selection process is entirely ad-hoc and opaque and mostly unfair.
<b>2. MOC leadership</b>					
<b>Constitution</b> <i>The MOC has a constitution describing the different roles and responsibilities of its members and its decision-making power. The MO members and community at large know about the constitution and the roles and responsibilities of the MOC members.</i> (WEIGHT 1)	The MOC has a clear constitution describing the different roles and responsibilities of its members, and its decision-making power. Everybody in the community understands what the MOC is for, how it functions and what are the respective roles and responsibilities of the MOC members.	The MOC has a constitution that is well understood by its members, but not very well known by the community members.	The MOC has a constitution, but it lacks clarity and is not well understood by its members and leaves room for interpretation. It's also not known in the community.	The MOC has no clear constitution or description of its roles and responsibilities, which leaves room for manipulation.	MOC roles and responsibilities don't exist and thus are entirely unknown.
<b>Election &amp; representation</b> <i>MOC members are fairly elected for agreed and fixed terms, and are truly and equitably representative of the interests of dif-</i>	There is a secret ballot or voting system that is open and fair and equitable in terms of access to stand for election. MO members perceive the	There is a ballot or voting system that is considered reasonable, fair and inclusive, but new elections have not always been held strictly according to	There is a ballot or voting system but it's not really secret and susceptible to influence. Also, the term of office is not fixed so it is unclear to the MO	There is a ballot or voting system but it's not secret and not considered fair or inclusive. Elections are flawed or fraud. There	There is ballot or voting. The MOC members are not fairly or representatively selected and are not accountable to the MO

<p><i>ferent socioeconomic groups in the community.</i> (WEIGHT 1)</p>	<p>system as entirely fair, inclusive and transparent. New elections are held systematically at the end of the agreed fixed term.</p>	<p>the agreed rules.</p>	<p>members when new elections should be held.</p>	<p>is are no terms of office.</p>	<p>members.</p>
<p><b>Leadership and clarity of roles</b> <i>The MOC leaders are clear on their role and motivated to perform them. Leadership roles are clearly defined and include women and marginalised economic groups.</i> (WEIGHT 1)</p>	<p>MOC leadership roles are discussed with the members and defined and written down for each MOC member. The MOC members are motivated to perform their leadership roles well. There is an equal gender balance both in terms of representation and decision-making.</p>	<p>MOC leadership roles are known by the MOC members, and 80% or more perform these roles well and attend the meetings. At least 40% of the MOC members are women, with one or more actively involved in decision-making.</p>	<p>There exists some confusion regarding the MOC leadership roles among the MOC members, and they generally show low motivation to attend the meetings. The decision-making is dominated by a core group. Women are represented in the MOC, but don't have an active voice or vote in the decision-making.</p>	<p>MOC members are generally confused or even don't know about their leadership roles. They are poorly motivated and barely attend any meeting. The decision-making is dominated by one or a few individuals. Women are not much present in the MOC and don't take part in any decision-making.</p>	<p>There is no real MOC leadership. Women are totally excluded. Decision-making is opaque.</p>
<p><b>MOC capacity</b> <i>The MOC members are sufficiently equipped with technical, social and organisational skills to take up their roles and fulfil their tasks.</i> (WEIGHT 2)</p>	<p>The MOC members have all the knowledge and skills they need to perform well, and their performance is in accordance.</p>	<p>The MOC members have been trained in all the knowledge and skills they need to perform well, yet they face some challenges in applying them.</p>	<p>A minority of MOC members does not have the knowledge and skills to perform well, and accordingly the MOC is not performing well.</p>	<p>A majority of MOC members do not have the knowledge and skills to perform well, and accordingly the MOC is not performing well.</p>	<p>The MOC is dysfunctional because its members don't have the minimum capacity.</p>
<p><b>Responsiveness &amp; mobilisation</b> <i>The MOC is responsive and able to take forward the implementation of the action plan and organise</i></p>	<p>The MOC is responsive and able to organise and mobilise the majority of community members in implementing the plan and consequently gener-</p>	<p>The MOC is responsive and able to organise and mobilise many community members for implementing the plan, but insufficient to capitalise on</p>	<p>The MOC reaches and mobilises only a minority of the community members to implement plans that benefit only a few and mostly exclude</p>	<p>The MOC is not responsive and often does not act in a timely fashion on seasonal issues. It therefore fails to organise</p>	<p>The MOC does not exist any more or is inactive.</p>

<i>and mobilise the community members.</i> (WEIGHT 3)	ates significant benefits in terms of increased livelihood options and resilience due to the scale.	the potential of scale. Particularly women and vulnerable groups are not well reached.	women and vulnerable groups.	and mobilise the villagers and to generate tangible benefits.	
<b>Implementation of plans &amp; gender-sensitive actions</b> <i>The MOC made regular and gender-sensitive plans and implemented these plans consistently.</i> (WEIGHT 3)	The MO has made regular and gender-sensitive plans and updated and implemented these plans consistently, involving all the MO members and addressing priorities, in particular of women and vulnerable groups.	The MO has made regular plans and updated and implemented these plans consistently, but gender is not always evident in these plans and women's priorities are not always heard.	Some plans have been made and implemented, a number of which addressed specific gender issues and women's priorities. It is clear that more attention is needed to be given to these issues and priorities to ensure plans are benefiting women equally.	A few small collective activities have been planned and implemented, and vulnerable households' needs have been included in these, but these are more the exception than the rule and gender is never really considered.	Almost no plans or were made and activities were implemented with no attention to gender or vulnerable groups.
<b>Member satisfaction</b> <i>MO members are satisfied with MOC performance. Surrounding villages are attracted by the role model of the MOC and the effectiveness of its approach.</i> (WEIGHT 2)	At least 80% of the MO members have confidence that the MOC is accountable and serving their interests and are highly satisfied with MOC performance and results. A number of villages have noticed the effectiveness of the MO and approached the MOC.	The majority of MO members are confident and satisfied, but some feel there is room for improvement. A number of villages have noticed the effectiveness of the MO and approached the MOC.	The majority of MO members feel there is room for improvement. Few villages show interest in the MO model.	The majority of MO members are concerned about MOC performance and are sighting accountability or suspect dishonest practice. Other villages show no interest.	The MOC is deeply distrusted and people are highly dissatisfied with its performance. Other villages shy away.
<b>3. MO operations</b>					
<b>Meetings</b> <i>MOC meets regularly to assess progress and (re)plan actions, and efficiently adjusts plans when needed.</i>	The MOC meets at least once every two months with a clear agenda and keeps a records of all the minutes. The meetings	The MOC meets regularly with some sort of agenda and minutes are shared with all the members. The meetings have a medium	The MOC meets on a semi-regular basis and more reactively. The discussions and decisions are not well documented.	The MOC meets irregularly and reactively. There is no record-keeping of the meetings, and the at-	The MOC barely meets, doesn't keep records, doesn't share decisions, and doesn't invite MO members.

<p><i>Minutes are kept on every meeting.</i> (WEIGHT 2)</p>	<p>have a high rate of attendance of both women and men, and everybody can access the minutes.</p>	<p>to high rate of attendance.</p>	<p>Yet the attendance rate is medium to high.</p>	<p>tendance rate is relatively low.</p>	
<p><b>Participatory planning &amp; monitoring</b> <i>Community members are actively engaged in analysing the problems, planning strategically, identifying and prioritising action, and monitoring implementation of MO activities.</i> (WEIGHT 3)</p>	<p>Community members are always actively engaged in all short- and long-term planning, in analyses informing planning, and in monitoring implementation of planned activities. Plans are shared with everyone.</p>	<p>MO plans are developed with substantial participation of community members, but often based on partial analyses, and are short-term, fragmented and taking insufficient account of the priorities of less powerful and more vulnerable groups.</p>	<p>MO plans relate only to the Dry Zone project and are input driven and donor dependent. They are developed with community participation, but they are short-term and reactive, lack analysis, gender sensitivity and ownership, and don't take into account the needs of vulnerable groups.</p>	<p>MO plans developed without any analysis or participation. Only a few members know about the plans. Women are mostly not involved in the discussions.</p>	<p>Community members are never involved in MO planning. They are not asked about their problems and needs. No analysis is conducted of their situation. No attention is paid to the priorities and needs of women and vulnerable groups.</p>
<p><b>Bookkeeping &amp; transparency</b> <i>MOC demonstrates effective and transparent financial management and management of collective assets (e.g. machines and infrastructure). The MOC does comprehensive and systematic bookkeeping. The bookkeeping accounts are shared with the MO members.</i> (WEIGHT 2)</p>	<p>The MOC keeps a detailed cashbook and records of signed-off expenditure and revenues. The cashbooks are consistent with the records. All is publically available for scrutiny. Accounts can be inspected or audited at any time. There is a decent system for the maintenance of collective assets.</p>	<p>The MOC keeps a detailed cash book and records of signed-off transactions. The cashbooks are consistent with the records. But the records are partly or not publically available or cannot be viewed by everyone. A system for maintenance of collective assets is in place, but not functioning well.</p>	<p>A cashbook and some records are kept, but not systematically. Discrepancies can be observed in the books and records. The records are not publically available. The system for maintenance of collective assets is dysfunctional.</p>	<p>There is an attempt to keep some records, but not proper bookkeeping. Collective assets are not managed.</p>	<p>The MOC does not perform any financial management and/or management of collective assets.</p>
<p><b>Sufficient and sustainable funds</b> <i>The MO has sufficient operational funds from reliable</i></p>	<p>The MO has sufficient operational funds from reliable and secured sources to sustain its op-</p>	<p>The MO has secured a few reliable revenue or funding sources, which have been sufficient so</p>	<p>The MO so far had sufficient funds for its operations, but the sources of revenue and funding are</p>	<p>The MO has some funds, but these are not sufficient to sustain the operations</p>	<p>The MO has no revenue or funding and no new sources.</p>

<p><i>able and secured sources to sustain its operations and ensure plans are implemented effectively.</i> (WEIGHT 3)</p>	<p>erations and ensure plans are implemented effectively.</p>	<p>far for sustaining the operations. But funds are not sufficient to implement all plans and achieve the MO's goals.</p>	<p>temporary and not reliable or secured.</p>	<p>and implement the plans, and sources are very insecure.</p>	
<p><b>4. MO coalition building</b></p>					
<p><b>Relationships with public &amp; private sector</b> <i>The MO has the capacity to engage with government and private sector actors to obtain support, inputs and better deals. Relationships with line agency officials and traders have grown strong(er) over the past years,</i> (WEIGHT 1)</p>	<p>Plans and priorities for obtaining support and inputs are clear and acted upon. Relationships are established successfully because of this clarity of purpose and priority. The resultant delivery of services, inputs and support meets the expectations and priorities of the MO members. Relationships have grown strong over the years and reached a satisfactory level of mutual trust.</p>	<p>Plans and priorities for obtaining support and inputs are clear and acted upon. Relationships are established, but are not entirely effective in obtaining the requested services, inputs and support in accordance with the expectations and priorities of the MO members.</p>	<p>Plans and priorities for obtaining support and inputs are clear, but not efficiently acted upon. Relationships are not well established, resulting in insufficient delivery and low levels of trust.</p>	<p>Plans and priorities for obtaining support and inputs are unclear. Limited action is undertaken to develop relationships with external stakeholders. The relationships are weak and delivery of support, services and inputs is low.</p>	<p>Plans and priorities for obtaining support and inputs are not developed. No action is undertaken to develop relationships with external stakeholders.</p>
<p><b>Networking with other MOs</b> <i>The MO is able to coordinate and network with other MOs in the locality to share lessons and good practices, develop and implement collective plans and strategies, and collaborate to maximise production and marketing benefits.</i></p>	<p>The MO is an active member in a formal network with other MOs in the area. The network meets regularly to plan collectively and share lessons and benefits. This has generated tangible benefits for the MO members. Members are highly satisfied and recognise the importance of networking and</p>	<p>The MO is part of a network with other MOs in the area, and incorporates some of the collective actions in its plans. The network meets quasi-regularly and lessons and benefits are shared and tangible. MO members value networking and collec-</p>	<p>The MO is part of a network with other MOs in the area, and incorporates some of the collective actions in its plans. However, the network does not meet regularly and sharing of lessons is ad hoc. But there are some benefits and MO members do see the value of networking and collective action.</p>	<p>The MO is part of a network with other MOs in the area, but the motivation of the MOC to engage is low and benefits for the MO members have not really materialised. The value of networking and collective action is not recognised.</p>	<p>The MO is not part of an MO network and the MOC is unable or unwilling to plan or reach out for collective action.</p>

(WEIGHT 2)	collective actions.	tive action.			
<b>MO advocacy</b> <i>MO networking and relationships are used effectively to explore and identify common issues, formulate joint positions, build coalitions to gain influence, and advocate jointly for appropriate solutions and responses</i> (WEIGHT 2)	Strong positions have been formulated and coalitions built by the MO together with other MOs around collective issues, resulting effective negotiations with government and market actors, delivering satisfactory solutions and responses.	Strong positions have been formulated and coalitions built by the MO together with other MOs around collective issues. But so far this position has not been taken forward effectively and thus not resulted in the desired outcomes. Yet, the coalition is growing stronger and a positive outcome may be expected.	Common issues have been identified for advocacy, but so far no clear common positions have been formulated around these issues, and no coalition-building or advocacy has taken place yet. But the network is working on it and is confident to arrive at a common position.	Common issues have been identified for advocacy, but so far no clear common positions have been formulated around these issues, due to a lack of understanding of the linkages between the issues, the possible solutions and the plausible collective positions. It is unclear whether the MOs will obtain more clarity any time soon.	No common issues have been identified. There is no understanding among the MOC and MO members of the potential of collective action and advocacy. There is no motivation to work on this.



# APPENDIX 7 – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (FIRST PHASE)

The members of the MOC should be convened as a group to fill in the questionnaire together. There is a total of 29 questions. No longer than 5 minutes should be spent per question. The entire survey should take no longer than 2.5 hours. It is important to record carefully the agreed responses from the MOC to each question, and to collect the documents (statements, participant lists, etc.) that support the responses. Since the survey will be conducted in all project communities, it cannot be field-tested and necessary adjustments will have to be made on the spot. It is important that any adjustments are instantly communicated with the other teams and that they are clearly explained to every researcher/enumerator to ensure consistency in the data gathering.

## A. Structure and functioning

1. *Is the MO a formally registered organisation?*  
YES/NO
2. *Has the MO a constitution<sup>134</sup> that is known and shared by the its members*  
SCORE 1–5 (5 yes / 3 & 4 yes but not known / 1 & 2 no)
3. *Has the MO adequate and up-to-date membership rules that enable the organisation to function well?*  
SCORE 1–5 (5 yes / 4 yes but not up-to-date and optimal / 3 yes but not adequate to enable good functioning / 1 & 2 no)
4. *List and describe the main activities of the MO.*  
List/description: ...
5. *Describe and list the characteristics of an ‘active member’<sup>135</sup> of the MO.*  
List/description: ...
6. *Has the amount of active members (female/male) decreased in the past year?*  
- How many women now? ... 1 year ago? ... Explain why:  
...  
- How many men now? ... 1 year ago? ... Explain why:  
...

## B. Vision, Mission, Goal

1. *Does the MO have a stated vision and mission/goal?*  
YES/NO
2. *What is the vision and mission/goal?*  
Description (ask for statements on paper): ...
3. *Do the members know this vision and mission/goal?*  
YES/NO

## C. Planning & implementation

1. *How many plans have been made and of what type in the last 12 months, and how many of these have been implemented?*



	Description	Amount in past 12 months:	Amount fully implemented:	Amount partially implemented:
Type 1:				
Type 2:				
Type 3:				

2. *Did these plans contain activities specifically addressing the priorities and needs of women in mixed households and female-headed households?*  
always / not always / never
3. *Have these activities addressing women's needs and priorities been implemented?*  
YES, all / SOME / ALMOST NONE

#### **D. Transparency, decision-making and participation**

1. *Does the MOC still exist?*  
YES/NO
2. *What is the function of the MOC? What is it doing?*  
Description...
3. *How were the MOC members elected?*  
Description...
4. *How many times did the MOC meet, who participated, and what came out of these meetings in terms of decisions? (ask for minutes)*  
Amount of meetings in past 12 months: ...

	Amount of participants	List of participants available (YES/NO)	Decisions made:	Minutes available (YES/NO)
1 <sup>st</sup> meeting:				
2 <sup>nd</sup> meeting:				
3 <sup>rd</sup> meeting:				
4 <sup>th</sup> meeting:				

5. *Have the decisions made by the MOC in these meetings been executed?*  
YES, all / YES MOSTLY / ONLY A FEW / NONE
6. *Who makes or endorses the decisions, and how many women are involved?*  
MOC / MO members / Village leader / Line officials: ... / Other: ....  
List women involved in decision-making bodies: ...
7. *Are MO members actively engaged in the planning and monitoring of MO activities?*  
SCORE 1–5      5 yes / 4 yes but not actively, and only few women / 3 yes

some in planning, but not in monitoring / 2 no but members would like to engage / 1 no and members are actively excluded

8. *Is bookkeeping still done systematically and comprehensively?*  
SCORE 1–5      5 yes / 4 yes but not comprehensively / 3 yes but not systematically and comprehensively / 2 some records but no real bookkeeping / 1 no
9. *Are the bookkeeping accounts shared with the MO members?*  
YES, all / SOME / NONE

**E. Networking and collaboration**

1. *Have plans been shared and discussed with line agencies, township authorities, sellers/buyers, vocational training providers, and others who are essential to realise them?*

	Description of plan	Shared and discussed with:
1 <sup>st</sup> plan		
2 <sup>nd</sup> plan		
3 <sup>rd</sup> plan		

2. *What concrete actions or forms of support have come out of these discussions with line agencies, township authorities, sellers/buyers, vocational training providers, and others who are essential to realise the plans?*  
Describe: ...
3. *Does the MO collaborate with other MOs, and for what purposes?*  
YES/NO      How many: ...      Describe purposes: ...
4. *Is there any contact or collaboration with neighbouring villages on issues related to livelihoods?*  
YES/NO      Describe: ...

**F. Impact & sustainability**

1. *Has the MO secured sufficient funds in the past 12–18 months to sustain its operations and implement its plans?*  
YES/NO
2. *Where is the funding coming from?*  
List funding sources/agencies: ...
3. *Have livelihood options and incomes improved for MO members?*  
SCORE 1–5      5 yes for all / 4 yes for most members, but only for some women / 3 yes for some members, but only for few women and few vulnerable HHs / 2 only a little and not for women and vulnerable HHs / 1 not for anybody
4. *Thinking back over the past 12 months [when the project input stopped], share one story about a specific experience with/by the MO that makes you proud.*  
Write down the story: ...

*Thinking back over the past 12 months [when the project input stopped], share one story about a specific experience with/by the MO that makes you concerned about its future.*  
Write down the story: ...

# APPENDIX 8 – OVERVIEW OF PARTICIPATORY METHODS (SECOND PHASE)

**Table A8.1: Overview of participatory methods used in the second phase**

ToC areas of inquiry	Methods	Participants
(1) Sustained <b>LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENTS</b> through enhanced production quality and quantity	<b>Village entry and social mapping</b> with village leaders	One meeting with <b>5-7 village leaders</b>
	2 focus groups conducting a <b>livelihood analysis</b> (using a livelihood matrix and a livelihood causal flow mapping)	One group with 8-10 female, and one with 8-10 male MO members (each with min. 50% farmers)
(2) MO members have <b>ACCESS</b> to resources, services, technologies, inputs, post-harvesting facilities and markets	<i>This is already partly covered by the methods for area (1) and area (4).</i> <b>3 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)</b> (using a semi-structured questionnaire)	Township government departments of agriculture, cooperatives, planning & rural development.
(3) Communities manage <b>RISKS &amp; VULNERABILITIES</b> and support and protect vulnerable groups	2 focus groups conducting a <b>Vulnerability &amp; Risk Management scoring</b> (doing a pocket scoring of community management of vulnerabilities & risks)	One group with 8-10 female, and one with 8-10 male MO members (each with min. 50% vulnerable households)
(4) <b>FUNCTIONAL</b> MOs with capable and active MOC leaders and MO members, and strong relationships with local government agencies, traders, suppliers and service providers	2 focus groups conducting a <b>relationships analysis</b> with MO members (using a linkage diagram and ladder scoring of benefits & impact)	<i>Same groups as for area (3).</i>
	A focus group with MOC leaders conducting a <b>MOC self-assessment</b> , (using the MOC scorecard, a linkage diagram, and ladder scoring)	1 meeting with all members of the MOC in the village
(5) <b>INFLUENCE</b> of MOs on other communities	<b>Key Informant Interview (KII)</b> using a semi-structured questionnaire.	Township General Administration Department (supervising village authorities)

# APPENDIX 9 – RESULTS FROM THE EVALC3 ANALYSIS<sup>136</sup>

## DESIGN

For each outcome area, the occurrence of *improvement/sustainment* of attributes of its outcome and its causes in the evidence was inputted into the software in the form of a binary code (*improvement/sustainment* code 1; absence of *improvement/sustainment* code 0). Equally, the occurrence of *deterioration* of attributes of outcomes and causes shown by the evidence was inputted separately in the form of a binary code (*deterioration* code -1; absence of *deterioration* code 0). The four dimensions of MO functioning were inputted into the software as follows:

- Code 1 indicating ‘strong’ performance (or *improvement/sustainment*) in this analysis, if the average score for the dimension is 3 or more;
- Code 0 indicating ‘weak’ performance (or *deterioration*) in this analysis, if the average score for the dimension is less than 3.

Correlations of *improvement/sustainment* and of *deterioration* were analysed in parallel, and its best predictive models compared.

## PROCEDURE FOLLOWED

- Use of EvalC3 software to search for then best predictive model for causal relationships.
- Manual search using the software, followed by an exhaustive search using the software, for models with the best configuration of attributes, optimised for ‘Average Accuracy’.
- Models with the highest ‘Average Accuracy’ were selected as the best-fitting model.
- Where multiple models had the same ‘Average Accuracy’ the model with a higher ‘F-Score’ and/or lower score for ‘Simplicity’ was selected.
- Models were not generated when the number of Outcome cases was less than 3, unless based on knowledge from previous analysis there was an interest in those particular cases.
- The resulting best models were interpreted using the following scheme:

If Outcome of Interest is ..	And Confusion Table Parameters are	Then Configuration of attribute is .
Present	TP > 0; FN = 0; FP > 0	Necessary but Not Sufficient
	TP > 0; FN > 0; FP = 0	Not Necessary, but Sufficient
	TP > 0; FN = 0; FP = 0	Necessary and Sufficient
	TP > 0; FP > 0; TN > 0; FN > 0	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient

# RESULTS

## 1. MO Functioning and Livelihoods and Resilience

A total of 10 models were developed for configurations describing correlations between MO Functioning and Livelihoods and Resilience. Of these, 7 models described correlations between strong MO Functioning and improvements in Livelihoods and Resilience, while 3 models described correlations between weak MO Functioning and deterioration in Livelihoods and Resilience.

### 1A. Correlation between MO Functioning and Farming

	Outcome Improved						Outcome Deteriorated		
# of Models from Manual/ Exhaustive Search	3						2		
Best Model #	1.A.1			1.A.2			1.A.3		
Outcome/Status	Farming/Present			Farming/Present			Farming Deteriorated		
IF	IF			IF			IF		
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate (+) = 1			MO Mandate (+) = 1			MO Mandate (-) = n/a		
	MO Leadership (+) = 1			MO Leadership (+) = n/a			MO Leadership (-) = n/a		
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			MO Operations(+) = 1			MO Operations(-) = 1		
	MO Coalition (+) = 1			MO Coalition (+) = 1			MO Coalition (-) = n/a		
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 6	FP = 8	33%	TP = 6	FP = 8	33%	TP = 15	FP = 1	38%
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 14	TN = 12	62%
	14%	86%		14%	86%		69%	31%	
Simplicity	75%			75%			25%		
Support	33%			33%			38%		
Average Accuracy	89%			89%			64%		
F-Score	60%			60%			72%		
Coverage	100%			100%			52%		
Consistency	43%			43%			94%		
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Not Necessary, Not Sufficient for Outcome to be Present		

### Best Fitting Model:

- **Model 1.A.1.** MO mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming
- **Model 1.A.2.** MO mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming
- **Model 1.A.3.** MO mandate(-) = [n/a] + MO Leadership(-) = [n/a] + MO Operations(-) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(-) = [n/a] => Deterioration in Farming

### Interpretation:

Models 1.A.1 and 1.A.2. suggest that strong MO Mandate/Membership and MO Coalition Building are important for improvements in Farming, compared to MO Leadership and MO Operations. This is because omitting either MO Leadership or MO Operations from the model does not make a difference to the model Averaged Accuracy. They also suggest that where MO Operations are weak, MO Leadership should be strong in order for Farming improvements to be achieved. Where MO Leadership is weak, MO Operations should be strong in order for Farming to improve.

Overall, the models indicate that strong MO performance (especially MO Mandate/Membership and MO Coalition Building) is Necessary, but not Sufficient for there to be improvements in Farming.

Model 1A.3. shows that weak MO Operations is linked to deterioration in Farming. However, it is neither Necessary, nor Sufficient for there to be Farming deterioration. Some other conditions must be at play. There are 29 cases<sup>137</sup> where Farming showed deterioration, however in 14 (48%) of these cases MO Operations was not weak. Of the 16 cases where MO Operations was weak, there was 1 case (7%) where Farming had not deteriorated as predicted by the model.

Comparing the predictive models for improvement and deterioration in Farming it appears that the status of MO Operations is important for both improvement and deterioration of Farming. Where there is strong MO Operations there is improvement in Farming; where there is weak MO Operations there is deterioration in Farming. The status of MO Mandate/Membership and MO Coalition Building, though important for improvement in Farming, is not relevant for deterioration in Farming.

### 1B. Correlation between MO Functioning and Livestock Breeding

	Outcome Improved	Outcome Deteriorated
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	2	2
Best Model #	1.B.1	1.B.2
Outcome/Status	Livestock Breeding/Improved	Livestock Breeding/Deteriorated
IF	IF	IF
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate (+) = n/a	MO Mandate (-) = 1
	MO Leadership (+) = n/a	MO Leadership (-) = n/a
	MO Operations(+) = 1	MO Operations(-) = 1
	MO Coalition (+) = n/a	MO Coalition (-) = n/a

Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 25	FP = 1	62%	TP = 4	FP = 6	24%
Attributes Absent	FN = 8	TN = 8	38%	FN = 0	TN = 32	76%
	79%	21%		10%	90%	
Simplicity	25%			50%		
Support	62%			24%		
Averaged Accuracy	82%			92%		
F-Score	85%			57%		
Coverage	76%			100%		
Consistency	96%			40%		
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		

### Best Fitting Model

- **Model 1.B.1.** MO mandate(+) = [n/a] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [n/a] => Improvement in Livestock Breeding
- **Model 1.B.2.** MO mandate(-) = [1] + MO Leadership(-) = [n/a] + MO Operations(-) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(-) = [n/a] => Deterioration in Livestock Breeding

### Interpretation

Model 1.B.1 indicates that where MO Operations is strong, there is improvement in Livestock Breeding. However, strong MO Operations is neither necessary nor sufficient for improvement in Livestock Breeding. There are 8 cases where MO Operations is weak but there was improvement in Livestock Breeding, indicating that even in the absence of strong MO Operations there can be improvement in Livestock Breeding. Similarly, there is 1 case where MO Operations is strong but Livestock Breeding did not improve, indicating that some other condition was needed for Livestock Breeding improvement to occur. Model 1.B.2. on the other hand, indicates that where there is weak MO Mandate/Membership and weak MO Operations, Livestock Breeding deteriorates. Weak MO Mandate/Membership and weak MO Operations is a necessary condition for Livestock Breeding to deteriorate. However, it is not sufficient: there are 6 (60%) out of 10 cases where MO Mandate/Membership and MO Operations are weak, but Livestock Breeding did not show deterioration.

Comparing the predictive models for improvement and deterioration in Livestock Breeding respectively it appears that the status of MO Operations is important. Strong MO Operations is correlated with improvement in Livestock Breeding while weak MO Operations is correlated with deterioration in Livestock Breeding. Strong MO Mandate/Membership is not an important attribute for improvement in Livestock Breeding. However weak MO Mandate/Membership is important. It suggests that the weakness of MO Mandate/Membership has a much stronger link with deterioration in Livestock Breeding than does the strength of MO Mandate/Membership with improvement in Livestock Breeding.

### 1C. Correlation between MO Functioning and (Farming + Livestock Breeding)

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated					
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	3			2					
Best Model #	1.C.1		1.C.2	1.C.3					
Outcome/Status	Farming+Livestock/Improved		Farming+Livestock/Improved	Farming+Livestock/Deteriorated					
IF	IF		IF	IF					
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = 1		MO Mandate(+) = 1	MO Mandate(-) = 1					
	MO Leadership(+) = 1		MO Leadership(+) = n/a	MO Leadership(-) = n/a					
	MO Operations(+) = n/a		MO Operations(+) = 1	MO Operations(-) = 1					
	MO Coalition(+) = 1		MO Coalition(+) = 1	MO Coalition(-) = n/a					
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 6	FP = 8	33%	TP = 6	FP = 8	33%	TP = 4	FP = 6	24%
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 0	TN = 32	76%
	14%	86%		14%	86%		10%	90%	
Simplicity	75%			75%			50%		
Support	33%			33%			24%		
Average Accuracy	89%			89%			92%		
F-Score	60%			60%			57%		
Coverage	100%			100%			100%		
Consistency	43%			43%			40%		
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		

#### Best Fitting Model

- **Model 1.C.1.** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming and Livestock Breeding
- **Model 1.C.2.** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming and Livestock Breeding
- **Model 1.C.3.** MO Mandate(-) = [1] + MO Leadership(-) = [n/a] + MO Operations(-) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(-) = [n/a] => Deterioration in Farming and Livestock Breeding



## Interpretation

Strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building together with either strong MO Leadership or strong MO Operations are necessary for improved Farming and Livestock Breeding. They are however not sufficient conditions, as out of 14 cases where these attributes were present 8 cases (57%) did not have improvements in Farming and Livestock Breeding. Other conditions must be necessary in addition for the improvements to occur. Strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building are relatively more important for improvements in Farming and Livestock Breeding than are MO Leadership and MO Operations.

Where there is no strong MO Leadership, however, MO Operations has to be strong for improvements in Farming and Livestock Breeding. Where there is no strong MO Operations then there should be strong MO Leadership for improvements in Farming and Livestock Breeding.

Weak MO Mandate/Membership and weak MO Operations are necessary conditions for deterioration in Farming and Livestock Breeding. They are not sufficient for deterioration to occur as out of 10 cases in which MO Mandate and MO Operations were weak, 6 cases (60%) did not have deterioration in Farming and Livestock Breeding.

Comparing the predictive models for improvement and deterioration in Farming and Livestock Breeding, it appears that the status of MO Mandate/Membership and MO Operations is important for Farming and Livestock Breeding. Models 1.C.2 and 1.C.3 indicate that where MO Mandate/Membership and MO Operations are strong, Farming and Livestock Breeding is improved. On the other hand, where these attributes are weak, Farming and Livestock Breeding show deterioration.

### 1D. Correlation between MO Functioning and (Farming + Livestock + Casual Labour + Trading)

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated					
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	3			0 CASES (No models developed)					
Best Model #	1.D.1		1.D.2						
Outcome/Status	Farming+Livestock+Casual Labour+Trading/Improved		Farming+Livestock+Casual Labour+Trading/Improved						
IF	IF		IF						
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = 1		MO Mandate(+) = 1						
	MO Leadership(+) = 1		MO Leadership(+) = n/a						
	MO Operations(+) = n/a		MO Operations(+) = 1						
	MO Coalition(+) = 1		MO Coalition(+) = 1						
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....						Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent					Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 3	FP = 11	33%	TP = 3	FP = 11	33%			
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%			

	7%	93%		7%	93%	
Simplicity	75%			75%		
Support	33%			33%		
Average Accuracy	86%			86%		
F-Score	35%			35%		
Coverage	100%			100%		
Consistency	21%			21%		
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		

### Best Fitting Model

- **Model 1.D.1.** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming and Livestock Breeding and Casual Labour and Trading
- **Model 1.D.2.** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Farming and Livestock Breeding and Casual Labour and Trading

### Interpretation

Strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building together with either strong MO Leadership or strong MO Operations is a necessary condition for simultaneous improvements in Farming, Livestock Breeding, Casual Labour and Trading. They are, however, not sufficient for the said improvements to be present: Out of 14 cases in which MO Mandate/Membership and MO Coalition Building and MO Leadership/MO Operations were strong, 11 cases (79%) did not show the improvements described.

Strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building are relatively more important conditions for improvements in Farming, Livestock Breeding, Casual Labour and Trading, than strong MO Leadership and strong MO Operations.

## 2. MO Functioning and Relationships/R&V Management

A total of 14 models were developed for configurations describing correlations between MO Functioning and Relationships/R&V Management. Of these, 11 models described correlations between strong MO Functioning and improvements in Relationships/R&V Management, while 3 models described correlations between weak MO Functioning and deterioration in Relationships/R&V Management.

Of the 11 models of strong MO Function and improved Relationships/R&V Management, 3 models described correlation between strong MO Function and improved Relationships; 7 described correlation between strong MO Function and improved Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction, and 1 model described correlation between strong MO Function and improvements in both Relationships and Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction.

## 2A. Correlation between MO Functioning and Relationship with Water/Irrig/Rural Dev Depts

	Outcome Improved		Outcome Deteriorated	
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1		0 CASES (No Models Developed)	
Best Model #	2.A.1			
Outcome/Status	Water/Irrigatr/Rural Development Department Relationship/Improved			
IF	IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a			
	MO Leadership(+) = n/a			
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			
	MO Coalition(+) =1			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			
	Present	Absent		
Attributes Present	TP = 8	FP = 20		67%
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 14		33%
	19%	81%		
Simplicity	25%			
Support	67%			
Averaged Accuracy	71%			
F-Score	44%			
Coverage	100%			
Consistency	29%			
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			

### Best Fitting Model

**Model 2.A.1** MO Mandate(+) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(+) =[n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[1] => Improvement in Relationship with Water/Irrigatr/Rural Development Department

### Interpretation

Strong MO Coalition Building is important for improved relationship with the Water/Irrigation/Rural Development Department. It is a necessary condition, but is not sufficient for the improved relationship. Of 28 cases where MO Coalition Building was strong, there were

20 cases (71%) for which the relationship with the Water/Irrigation/Rural Development Department has not improved. This suggests that other conditions are at play in addition to strong MO Coalition Building.

**2B. Correlation between MO Functioning and Relationship with Livestock and Veterinary Dept**

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	5			1 CASE (Case # 15.1)  (No Models Developed)
Best Model #	2.B.1			
Outcome/Status	Livestock and Veterinary Department Relationship/Improved			
IF	IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a			
	MO Leadership(+) = 1			
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			
	MO Coalition(+) = n/a			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			
	Present	Absent		
Attributes Present	TP = 20	FP = 8	67%	
Attributes Absent	FN = 1	TN = 13	33%	
	50%	50%		
Simplicity	25%			
Support	67%			
Averaged Accuracy	79%			
F-Score	82%			
Coverage	95%			
Consistency	71%			
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			

**Best Fitting Model**

**Model 2.B.1** MO Mandate(+) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(+) =[1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[n/a] => Improvement in Relationship with Livestock and Veterinary Department

## Interpretation

There is a correlation between strong MO Leadership and improved relationship with the Livestock and Veterinary Department. It is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for the improved relationship. Of 21 cases where there was improved relationship with the Veterinary Department, there was 1 case (5%) in which MO Leadership was not strong. Of 28 cases where MO Leadership was strong, there were 8 cases (29%) for which the relationship with the Livestock and Veterinary Department had not improved. This suggests that other conditions are at play in addition to strong MO Leadership.

### 2C. Correlation between MO Functioning and Relationship with NGOs/Donors/MFIs

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1			1 CASE (Case # 11.2) (No Models Developed)
Best Model #	2.C.1			
Outcome/Status	NGOs/Donors/MFIs Relationship/Improved			
IF	IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a			
	MO Leadership(+) = 1			
	MO Operations(+) = 1			
	MO Coalition(+) = n/a			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			
	Present	Absent		
Attributes Present	TP = 20	FP = 2	52%	
Attributes Absent	FN = 6	TN = 14	48%	
	62%	38%		
Simplicity	50%			
Support	52%			
Average Accuracy	82%			
F-Score	83%			
Coverage	77%			
Consistency	91%			
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			

## Best Fitting Model

**Model 2.C.1** MO Mandate(+) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(+) =[1] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[n/a] => Improvement in Relationship with NGOs/Donors/MFIs

### Interpretation

While there is a correlation between strong MO Leadership and strong MO Operations and improved relationship with NGOs/Donors/MFIs, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for the described outcome. Of 26 cases in which there was improvement in relationship with NGOs/Donors/MFIs, there were 6 cases (23%) for which MO Leadership and MO Operations was not strong. Of 22 cases in which MO Leadership and MO Operations was strong, there were 2 cases (9%) for which relationship with NGOs/Donors/MFIs had not improved.

## 2D. Correlation between MO Functioning and R&V Management through Revolving Fund

	Outcome Improved						Outcome Deteriorated		
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	2						1		
Best Model #	2.D.1		2.D.2			2.D.3			
Outcome/Status	Revolving Fund/Improved		Revolving Fund/Improved			Revolving Fund/Deteriorated			
IF	IF		IF			IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a		MO Mandate(+) = n/a			MO Mandate(-) = 1			
	MO Leadership(+) = 1		MO Leadership(+) = n/a			MO Leadership(-) = n/a			
	MO Operations(+) = 1		MO Operations(+) = 1			MO Operations(-) = n/a			
	MO Coalition(+) = n/a		MO Coalition(+) = n/a			MO Coalition(-) = n/a			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP =22	FP = 0	52%	TP = 24	FP = 2	62%	TP = 6	FP = 10	38%
Attributes Absent	FN = 9	TN =11	48%	FN = 7	TN = 9	38%	FN = 0	TN =26	62%
	74%	26%		74%	26%		14%	86%	
Simplicity	50%			25%			25%		
Support	52%			62%			38%		
Average Accuracy	85%			80%			86%		
F-Score	83%			84%			55%		
Coverage	71%			77%			100%		
Consistency	100%			92%			38%		

Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present
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### Best Fitting Model

There were 2 possible best models (Model 2.D.1 and Model 2.D.2) for the link between strong MO Function and improvements R&V Management through Revolving Fund. Based on Averaged Accuracy, Model 2.D.1 would be the better model. However, based on F-Score, Model 2.D.2 would be the better model. Model 2.D.2 also had a higher coverage. In light of the fact that Model 2.D.2 performed better at accurately identifying cases where both the corresponding attributes and outcome were present, it was selected as the best model.

- **Model 2.D.2** MO Mandate(+) = [n/a] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [n/a] => Improvement in Revolving Fund
- **Model 2.D.3** MO Mandate(-) = [1] + MO Leadership(-) = [n/a] + MO Operations(-) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(-) = [n/a] => Deterioration in Revolving Fund

### Interpretation

Where MO Operations and MOC Leadership is strong, there is improvement in R&V Management through Revolving Fund. Strong MO Operations and MOC Leadership is sufficient, but not necessary for this improvement to occur, meaning that if there is no such strong operations and leadership present, there is no such outcome.

Where MO Mandate/Membership is weak, there is a deterioration in R&V Management through Revolving Fund. A weak MO Mandate/Membership is necessary, but not sufficient for deterioration in R&V Management through Revolving Fund to occur. Of 16 cases in which MO Mandate/Membership was weak, 10 cases (63%) did not have deterioration in R&V Management through Revolving Fund, indicating that other factors additional to weak MO Mandate/Membership are at play.

Comparing the predictive models for improvement and deterioration in R&V Management through Revolving Fund, it shows that while strong MO Mandate/Membership is not important for improvement in R&V Management through Revolving Fund, weak MO Mandate/Membership is important.

## 2E. Correlation between MO Functioning and Pest Management

	Outcome Improved	Outcome Deteriorated
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1	1
Best Model #	2.E.1	2.E.2
Outcome/Status	Crop Diseases and Pest Management/Improved	Crop Diseases and Pest Management/Deteriorated
IF	IF	IF
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a	MO Mandate(-) = n/a
	MO Leadership(+) = 1	MO Leadership(-) = 1
	MO Operations(+) = n/a	MO Operations(-) = n/a



	MO Coalition(+) = 1			MO Coalition(-) = n/a		
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....					
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 6	FP = 14	48%	TP = 7	FP = 7	33%
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 22	52%	FN = 3	TN = 25	67%
	14%	86%		24%	76%	
Simplicity	50%			25%		
Support	48%			33%		
Average Accuracy	81%			74%		
F-Score	46%			58%		
Coverage	100%			70%		
Consistency	30%			50%		
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		

### Best Fitting Model

- **Model 2.E.1** MO Mandate(+) = [n/a] + MO Leadership(+) = [1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Crop Diseases and Pests Management
- **Model 2.E.2** MO Mandate(-) = [n/a] + MO Leadership(-) = [1] + MO Operations(-) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(-) = [n/a] => Deterioration in Crop Diseases and Pests Management

### Interpretation

Strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building are necessary for improvement in Pest Management. They are, however, not sufficient for improvements to occur, as out of 20 cases where MO Leadership and MO Coalition Building were strong 14 cases (70%) did not have improvements in Pest Management. Additional conditions need to be in play for the improvements to be present.

Where MO Leadership is weak, there is deterioration in Pest Management. However, this condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient for the deterioration to be present. Of 10 cases where deterioration occurred, 3 cases (30%) did not have weak MO Leadership. Similarly, out of 14 cases where there was weak MO Leadership 7 cases (50%) did not have deterioration in Pest Management.

Comparing the predictive models for improvement and deterioration in Pest Management it appears that the status of MO Leadership is important for the condition of Pest Management. Where MO Leadership is strong, there is improvement in Pest Management; where MO Leadership is weak, there is deterioration in Pest Management. Though Strong MO Coalition Building is a necessary condition for improvement in Pest Management, the status of this attribute is not relevant for deterioration in the said outcome.

## 2F. Correlation between MO Functioning and Drought Management by Tube Wells

	Outcome Improved		Outcome Deteriorated	
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1		0 CASES (No models developed)	
Best Model #	2.F.1			
Outcome/Status	Drought Management(Tube Wells)/Improved			
IF	IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = 1			
	MO Leadership(+) = n/a			
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			
	MO Coalition(+) = n/a			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			
	Present	Absent		
Attributes Present	TP = 16	FP = 10	62%	
Attributes Absent	FN = 4	TN = 12	38%	
	48%	52%		
Simplicity	25%			
Support	62%			
Average Accuracy	67%			
F-Score	70%			
Coverage	80%			
Consistency	62%			
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			

### Best Fitting Model

**Model 2.F.1** MO Mandate(+) =[1] + MO Leadership(+) =[n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[n/a] => Improvement in Drought Management by Tube Wells

### Interpretation

Where there is strong MO Mandate/Membership there is improvement in Drought Management by Tube Wells. However, strong MO Mandate/Membership is neither necessary, nor sufficient for the presence of an improvement in Drought Management by Tube Wells. Of 20 cases where Drought Management by Tube Wells had improved 4 cases (20%) did not have strong MO Mandate/Membership. Of 26 cases where there was strong MO Mandate/Membership 10 cases

(38%) did not have improved Drought Management by Tube Wells. There must be factors other than strong MO Mandate/Membership that also correlate with improved Drought Management by Tube Wells. Similarly, there must be other factors that should be present in addition to strong MO Mandate/Membership for improved Drought Management by Tube Wells.

## 2G. Correlation between MO Functioning and Drought Management by Ponds

	Outcome Improved		Outcome Deteriorated
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1		2 CASES  (Case # 2.1 and Case #2.2)  (No models developed)
Best Model #	2.G.1		
Outcome/Status	Drought Management(Ponds)/Improved		
IF	IF		
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a		
	MO Leadership(+) = n/a		
	MO Operations(+) = 1		
	MO Coalition(+) = 1		
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 6	FP = 12	43%
Attributes Absent	FN = 4	TN = 20	57%
	24%	76%	
Simplicity	50%		
Support	43%		
Average Accuracy	61%		
F-Score	43%		
Coverage	60%		
Consistency	33%		
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		

## Best Fitting Model

**Model 2.G.1** MO Mandate(+) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(+) =[n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[1] => Improvement in Drought Management by Ponds

### Interpretation

Strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Leadership are not correlated with improved Drought Management by Ponds. On the other hand, where there is strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building there is improvement in Drought Management by Ponds. Strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building are, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for the improvement to be present. Of 10 cases in which Drought Management by Ponds was improved, 4 cases (40%) did not have strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building. Out of 18 cases where MO Operations and MO Coalition Building was strong, 12 cases (67%) did not have improvement in Drought Management by Ponds. There must be factors other than strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building that also correlate with improved Drought Management by Ponds. Similarly, there must be other factors that should be present in addition to strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building for improved Drought Management by Ponds.

## 2H. Correlation between MO Functioning and Flood Management by Embankment and Canals

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated		
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1			1		
Best Model #	2.H.1			2.H.2		
Outcome/Status	Flood Management(Embankment/ Canals)/Improved			Flood Management(Embankment/ Canals)/Deteriorated		
IF	IF			IF		
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = 1			MO Mandate(-) = n/a		
	MO Leadership(+) = n/a			MO Leadership(-) = 0		
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			MO Operations(-) = 0		
	MO Coalition(+) = 1			MO Coalition(-) = n/a		
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....					
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 9	FP = 7	38%	TP = 6	FP = 16	52%
Attributes Absent	FN = 4	TN = 22	62%	FN = 0	TN = 20	48%
	31%	69%		14%	86%	
Simplicity	50%			50%		
Support	38%			52%		
Average Accuracy	73%			78%		

F-Score	62%	43%
Coverage	69%	100%
Consistency	56%	27%
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present

### Best Fitting Model

- **Model 2.H.1** MO Mandate(+) =[1] + MO Leadership(+) =[n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[1] => Improvement in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals
- **Model 2.H.2** MO Mandate(-) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(-) =[0] + MO Operations(-) = [0] + MO Coalition Building(-) =[n/a] => Deterioration in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals

### Interpretation

Strong MO Leadership and strong MO Operations are not correlated with improved Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. On the other hand, where there is strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building there is improvement in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. This condition is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for improved Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. Out of 13 cases where the said improvement was present, 4 cases (31%) did not have strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building of 16 cases where MO Mandate/Membership and MO Coalition Building was strong, 7 cases (44%) did not have the said improvement. Other factors, apart from strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building, must also be correlated with improved drought management by ponds. Similarly, there must be other factors that should be present in addition to strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building for improved Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals.

The model for deterioration in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals throws up an unexpected interpretation. The models indicate that weak MO Mandate/Membership and weak MO Coalition Building are not correlated with deterioration in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. This is surprising since strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building were correlated with improvements in the said outcome. Even more surprising is the implication by the model that where weak MO Leadership and weak MO Operations are absent, there is deterioration in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. In other words, where there is strong MO Leadership and strong MO Operations, there is deterioration in Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals. This observation merits further investigation to understand why this appears to be the case. The model also indicates that this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the said outcome to be present. Out of 26 cases with the said attributes, 16 (62%) did not have deteriorated Flood Management by Embankment/Irrigation Canals.

## 2I. Correlation between MO Functioning and Flood Management by Drainage Canals

	Outcome Improved		Outcome Deteriorated	
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	1		2 CASES (Case # 19.1 and Case # 19.2)  (No models developed)	
Best Model #	2.I.1			
Outcome/Status	Flood Management(Drainage Canals)/Improved			
IF	IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = n/a			
	MO Leadership(+) = 1			
	MO Operations(+) = n/a			
	MO Coalition(+) = 1			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			
	Present	Absent		
Attributes Present	TP = 9	FP = 11	48%	
Attributes Absent	FN = 3	TN = 19	52%	
	29%	71%		
Simplicity	50%			
Support	48%			
Average Accuracy	69%			
F-Score	56%			
Coverage	75%			
Consistency	45%			
Set of Attributes is	Not Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			

### Best Fitting Model

**Model 2.I.1** MO Mandate(+) =[n/a] + MO Leadership(+) =[1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) =[1] => Improvement in Flood Management by Drainage Canals

### Interpretation

Where there is strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building there is improved Flood Management by Drainage Canals. This is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for the said improvement. Of 12 cases in which there was improved Flood Management by Drainage Canals, 3 cases (25%) did not have strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building. Out of 20 cases where there was strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building 11

cases (55%) did not have improved Flood Management by Drainage Canals. This implies that factors other than strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building also correlate with improved Flood Management by Drainage Canals. Similarly, there are other factors that should be present in addition to strong MO Leadership and strong MO Coalition Building for improved Flood Management by Drainage Canals.

**2J. Correlation between MO Functioning and (Relationship with Veterinary Department + Drought Management + R&V Management through Revolving Fund)**

	Outcome Improved			Outcome Deteriorated		
# of Models from Manual/Exhaustive Search	3			0 CASES		
Best Model #	2.J.1		2.J.2		(No models developed)	
Outcome/Status	Vet/Drought/RevFund/Improved		Vet/Drought/RevFund/Improved			
IF	IF		IF			
Attribute(s)/Status	MO Mandate(+) = 1		MO Mandate(+) = 1			
	MO Leadership(+) = 1		MO Leadership(+) = n/a			
	MO Operations(+) = n/a		MO Operations(+) = 1			
	MO Coalition(+) = 1		MO Coalition(+) = 1			
Confusion Table	Outcome is .....			Outcome is .....		
	Present	Absent		Present	Absent	
Attributes Present	TP = 2	FP = 12	33%	TP = 2	FP = 12	33%
Attributes Absent	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%	FN = 0	TN = 28	67%
	5%	95%		5%	95%	
Simplicity	75%		75%			
Support	33%		33%			
Average Accuracy	85%		85%			
F-Score	25%		25%			
Coverage	100%		100%			
Consistency	14%		14%			
Set of Attributes is	Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present		Necessary, Not Sufficient, for Outcome to be Present			



## Best Fitting Model

- **Model 2.J.1** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [1] + MO Operations(+) = [n/a] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Relationship with Veterinary Department + Drought Management + Revolving Fund
- **Model 2.J.2** MO Mandate(+) = [1] + MO Leadership(+) = [n/a] + MO Operations(+) = [1] + MO Coalition Building(+) = [1] => Improvement in Relationship with Veterinary Department + Drought Management + Revolving Fund

## Interpretation

Where there is strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building together with either strong MO Leadership or strong MO Operations there is improvement in Relationship with the Veterinary Department, improvement in Drought Management and improvement in the Revolving Fund. The said attributes are necessary, but not sufficient for the described outcome. Out of 14 cases where was strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building together with either strong MO Leadership or strong MO Operations, 12 cases (86%) did not have improvements in Relationship with the Veterinary Department, improvement in Drought Management and improvement in the Revolving Fund. This suggests that other conditions were needed in addition, for the said improvements to occur. The model also suggests that while strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building are necessary conditions, where MO Leadership is strong, MO Operations is not a necessary component of the model and where MO Operations is strong, MO Leadership is not necessary in the model.

## SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

### Correlation between MO Functioning and Livelihoods and Resilience

- Strong MO Operations was associated with improved Livelihoods and Resilience in 4 out of 7 (57%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Livelihoods and Resilience (*Model 1.A.2; Model 1.B.1; Model 1.C.2; Model 1.D.2*). Weak MO Operations was associated with deteriorated Livelihoods and Resilience in all 3 (100%) best-fitting models of weak MO Function and Livelihood and Resilience deterioration (*Model 1.A.3; Model 1.B.2; Model 1.C.3*).
- Strong MO Mandate/Membership was associated with improved Livelihoods and Resilience in 6 out of 7 (86%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Livelihoods and Resilience (*Model 1.A.1; Model 1.A.2; Model 1.C.1; Model 1.C.2; Model 1.D.1; Model 1.D.2*). Weak MO Mandate/Membership was associated with deteriorated Livelihoods and Resilience in 2 out of 3 (67%) best-fitting models of weak MO Function and Livelihood and Resilience deterioration (*Model 1.B.2; Model 1.C.3*).
- Strong MO Coalition Building was associated with improved Livelihoods and Resilience in 6 out of 7 (86%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Livelihoods and Resilience (*Model 1.A.1; Model 1.A.2; Model 1.C.1; Model 1.C.2; Model 1.D.1; Model 1.D.2*). Weak MO Coalition Building was associated with deteriorated Livelihoods and Resilience in none (0%) of the best-fitting models of weak MO Function and Livelihood and Resilience deterioration.
- Strong MO Leadership was associated with improved Livelihoods and Resilience in 3 out of 7 (43%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Livelihoods and Resilience (*Model 1.A.1; Model 1.C.1; Model 1.D.1*). Weak MO Leadership was associated with deteriorated Livelihoods and Resilience in none (0%) of the best-fitting models of weak MO Function and Livelihood and Resilience deterioration.

It appears that strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Coalition Building are most important for improved Livelihoods and Resilience, followed by strong MO Operations and strong MO Leadership for Livelihood and Resilience deterioration. However, weak MO Operations appears to be the most important followed by weak MO Mandate/Membership while weak MO Leadership and weak MO Coalition Building do not appear to be relevant.

### **Correlation between MO Functioning and Relationships + R&V Management**

Correlation between MO Functioning and Relationships:

- Strong MO Leadership was associated with improved Relationships in 2 out of 3 (67%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Relationships. (*Model 2.B.1; Model 2.C.1*)
- Strong MO Operations was associated with improved Relationships in 1 out of 3 (33%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Relationships. (*Model 2.C.1*)
- Strong MO Coalition Building was associated with improved Relationships in 1 out of 3 (33%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Relationships. (*Model 2.A.1*)
- Strong MO Mandate/Membership was associated with improved Relationships in none (0%) of the best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved Relationships.

*It appears that strong MO Leadership is the most important for improved Relationships, followed by strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building. Strong MO Mandate/Membership does not appear to be relevant for improved Relationships.*

Correlation between MO Functioning and Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction

- Strong MO Mandate/Membership was associated with improved R&V Management in 2 out of 7 (29%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved R&V Management (*Model 2.F.1; Model 2.H.1*). Weak MO Mandate/Membership was associated with deteriorated R&V Management in 1 out of 3 (33%) best-fitting models of weak MO Function and deteriorated R&V Management (*Model 2.D.3*).
- Strong MO Leadership was associated with improved R&V Management in 2 out of 7 (29%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved R&V Management (*Model 2.D.1; Model 2.E.1*). Weak MO Leadership was associated with deteriorated R&V Management in 1 out of 3 (33%) best-fitting models of weak MO Function and deteriorated R&V Management (*Model 2.E.2*)
- Strong MO Operations was associated with improved R&V Management in 3 out of 7 (43%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved R&V Management (*Model 2.D.1; Model 2.D.2; Model 2.G.1*). Weak MO Operations was associated with deteriorated R&V Management in none (0%) of the best-fitting models of weak MO Function and deteriorated Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction.
- Strong MO Coalition Building was associated with improved R&V Management in 3 out of 7 (43%) best-fitting models of strong MO Function and improved R&V Management (*Model 2.E.1; Model 2.G.1; Model 2.H.1*). Weak MO Coalition Building was associated with deteriorated R&V Management in none (0%) of the best-fitting models of weak MO Function and deteriorated Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction.

*It appears that strong MO Operations and strong MO Coalition Building are the most important for improved Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction, followed by strong MO Mandate/Membership and strong MO Leadership. For deterioration in Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction, weak MO Mandate/Membership and weak MO*

Leadership appear to be important. Weak MO Operations and weak MO Coalition Building do not appear to be relevant for deterioration in Risk Management/Vulnerability Reduction.

## APPENDIX 10 – EVALUATION COSTS

Table A10.1 below provides an distribution of the evaluation costs across the four stages (design, survey, participatory inquiry, and analysis and reporting). The original budget was GBP28,000, so the evaluation was GBP6,300.72 over budget.

**Table A10.1: Distribution of evaluation costs**

<b>Evaluation phases</b>	<b>International (GBP)</b>	<b>Local (GBP)</b>	<b>Total (GBP)</b>
<i>Design</i>	5,559.36	0.00	5,559.36
<i>Survey</i>	1,200.00	2,559.14	3,759.14
<i>Participatory inquiry</i>	7,027.71	7,954.01	14,981.72
<i>Analysis &amp; reporting</i>	10,000.00	0.00	10,000.00
<b>TOTAL (GBP):</b>	<b>23,787.07</b>	<b>10,513.15</b>	<b>34,300.22</b>
<b>GRANT TOTAL (GBP):</b>	<b>34,300.22</b>		

The total cost includes the transition from the first to the second international consultant, but not the originally planned reflections and sense-making. At the time of writing this had not yet taken place. The minimum cost for this is estimated at GBP15,000 (including the international consultant's fees and travel, the participants' travel and allowances, the venue and logistics, etc.).

# NOTES

- 1 Guijt et al., 2015.
- 2 Cf. <https://www.ifad.org/topic/overview/tags/piala>
- 3 In two villages it was impossible to conduct the survey due to conflict.
- 4 The exact numbers in Thazi are unknown, but are estimated on the basis of the numbers from Minbu (cf. Appendix 2).
- 5 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.1.
- 6 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.2.
- 7 The synthesis of the EvalC3 analysis is presented in Section 5.3.4, while the full analysis is attached in Appendix 9.
- 8 The evidence for this is presented in Section 5.3.2.
- 9 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.3.
- 10 A synthesis can be found in Section 5.3.4. The full analysis is attached in Appendix 9.
- 11 The village is an arena of various formal and informal institutions (between 7 and 11) – including central village administration, traditional institutions (comprised of elders and religious leaders), political institutions, village-initiated development institutions and development institutions externally initiated by aid agencies (such as Pact Myanmar, Save the Children and NAG in Minbu and Oxfam in Thazi). Generally, the role of these various institutions is rather limited. Committees established by Pact Myanmar and Save the Children, for instance, are focused on micro-finance. Also village-initiated development committees generally focus on one particular activity, such as getting access to electricity, constructing a school, etc. (cf. Oxfam DZ mid-term evaluation report: Power shift and social change assessment, 2013)
- 12 The triangle is drawn from a PowerPoint presentation of the Department of Rural Development on the 'Road to sustainable rural development in Myanmar' (Zarni, 2014). Cf. [http://www.lift-fund.org/sites/ift-fund.org/files/uploads/documents/Zarni\\_English.pdf](http://www.lift-fund.org/sites/ift-fund.org/files/uploads/documents/Zarni_English.pdf)
- 13 The matrix is drawn from the report on the workshop organised by International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in Addis Ababa in February 2015 around 'Tracking Adaptation and Measuring Development' (TAMD). (Steinbach, 2015: 19). Cf. <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10132IIED.pdf>.
- 14 These are located in the upper right corner of the matrix in Figure 4.
- 15 These are located in the centre right side of the matrix in Figure 4.
- 16 Cf. <http://www.collaborationforimpact.com/collective-impact>.
- 17 Last signed revision (cf. Final narrative report 2011–2014, p. 2).
- 18 The Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) is a multi-donor fund established in 2009 to improve the lives and prospects of smallholder farmers and landless people in rural Myanmar. LIFT is working to ensure that Myanmar's rural economic transformation is inclusive. Donors include the EU, the bilateral agencies of Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, and Mitsubishi Corporation from the private sector. LIFT is managed by UNOPS, who administers the funds and provides oversight and monitoring. See also: <http://www.lift-fund.org>.
- 19 Network Activities Group (NAG) is a local NGO that works to improve rural livelihoods in Myanmar's delta area, Dry Zone and hilly regions. NAG is committed to enhancing local people's voice and communities' empowerment based a holistic understanding of context and creating an enabling environment. See also: <http://www.nagmyanmar.org>.
- 20 Cf. <https://www.ifad.org/topic/overview/tags/piala>. PIALA was developed and piloting in the 2012-2015 by the author of this report and three other consultants, including Irene Guijt, who was involved in the design of the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project.
- 21 Cf. [http://betterevaluation.org/start\\_here/plan\\_manage\\_evaluation](http://betterevaluation.org/start_here/plan_manage_evaluation).
- 22 Oxfam, 2013 revised.
- 23 One of the four was Oxfam's Dry Zone project, with MOs being evaluated and compared as 'farmer organisations', which is a reduced (and therefore inadequate) conception of its wider role and function (as described in Text box 1).
- 24 For Oxfam's Dry Zone project, for instance, the LIFT study covered less than 10% of the Effectiveness Review. Its methodology involved interviews and focus group discussions, yet methods and tools used in these focus groups were not specified and thus standardised in ways that permit generalisation.
- 25 Oxfam, 2013: 68–71.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Cf. <https://www.ifad.org/topic/overview/tags/piala>. PIALA was developed and piloted in 2012–2015 by the author of this report and three other consultants, including Irene Guijt who was involved in the design of the Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone project.

- 28 IFAD & BMGF, 2015.
- 29 Van Hemelrijck & Guijt, 2016.
- 30 In two villages, it was impossible to conduct the survey due to conflict.
- 31 The survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix 7.
- 32 Thus proportionally representing the distribution of MOs across the five categories generated by the survey.
- 33 The indicative scores obtained from the first phase are presented in Appendix 3. The purposive sample taken from these for the second phase are included in Appendix 2. The final MO performance scores for the sampled villages obtained from the second phase are presented in Appendix 4.
- 34 The consultant was not able to obtain the actual numbers of participants in Thazi. Therefore she used the average numbers of participants in each method per village in Minbu (cf. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2) as the basis for estimating the participants in Thazi. These were: 8 for the social mapping (mostly male village leaders), 9 for the livelihood analysis (9 with men and 9 with women), 13 for the risk & vulnerability management and relationship analysis (14 with women and 12 with men) and 10 for the MO assessment (of which half women and half men). The average per method in Minbu comes to 8.75, which is similar to the amount prescribed in the field manual.
- 35 See Section 4.3 and Appendix 8 for an overview of the participatory methods.
- 36 MOFA/GOG, IFAD, & BMGF, 2015; Van Hemelrijck & Guijt, 2016.
- 37 Cf. <https://evalc3.net/download-ec3>.
- 38 Aus, 2005; Ragin, 2013.
- 39 The use of sensing tools, such as causal flow mapping, as part of the participatory methods in the Effectiveness Review ensured that evidence was collected on both intended and unintended causal attributes, thus covering not only the project, but also the context and conditions and other influences affecting the outcomes.
- 40 Guijt, 2008; Van Hemelrijck, 2013.
- 41 Guijt, I., Thein, W.P., Khine, S.T., Shein W.W. & Pratihari, S. (September 2015). Evaluation Design of the Myanmar Dry Zone Effectiveness Review. Yangon: Oxfam Myanmar.
- 42 For an overview of the distribution of evaluation costs, see Appendix 10.
- 43 The first consultant, Irene Guijt, had accepted the position of research manager at Oxfam GB in Oxford.
- 44 In particular, Wai Phyo Thein (OPAL Administrator) and Khine Shwe Tun (Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning Coordinator).
- 45 In particular, Wai Phyo Thein (OPAL Administrator) and Wint War Kyaw (M&E officer), assisted by Yan Naing Win and Mya Sandhi Win (both ex-Oxfam staff and CS leaders).
- 46 Van Hemelrijck, A., Guijt, I., Thein, W.P., Khine, S.T., Kyaw, W.W., Win, Y.N. & Pratihari, S. (February 2016). Field Research Manual for the Participatory Effectiveness Review of the Dry Zone Project in Myanmar. Yangon: Oxfam Myanmar.
- 47 Fieldwork started on 9–10 February and was scheduled to end on 22 February. Data collation and translation was expected to be completed 2–3 days after ending fieldwork. In reality fieldwork lasted until March, and data collation and translation was completed at the end of March. The reasons for this are explained in Section 3.2.
- 48 Cf. Section 2.1.
- 49 Normally, it takes about three weeks to complete data collation and translation and prepare the synthesis for the sense-making workshop.
- 50 Chambers, 2015; Van Hemelrijck & Guijt, 2016.
- 51 Cf. Section 2.2.2.
- 52 As described in Section 2.3.
- 53 Cf. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball\\_sampling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling) and <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systematic-sampling.asp> or <http://www.wilderdom.com/OEcourses/PROFLIT/Class5QuantitativeResearchDesignSamplingMeasurement.htm>.
- 54 Copestake, 2013; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Mosse, 2001.
- 55 Gaventa, 2004; Green, 2008; Mohan & Hickey, 2004.
- 56 See also the project's 'Description of Action' for the LIFT.
- 57 Oxfam's assessment estimated average landlessness rates at 40–60% and average migration rates at 20–45% (of which 30% women) at the start of the project. In some villages the migration rate even reached 70%. Migrants generally move into low paid jobs and poor living conditions.
- 58 The mapping was done by a core team of Oxfam staff guided by the first consultant, Irene Guijt, during her first planning and design trip to Myanmar in August 2015. The map and first diagram that came out of this are attached in Appendix 1 (see also Guijt et al., 2015).
- 59 Performance targets in the project M&E framework were 63 functional independent MOs (36 in Thazi; 27 in Minbu) with: (a) a clear mandate and vision/mission with 4,500 active members in Thazi and 3,377 in Minbu (50% women, 40% landless); (b) min. 3 successful interactions per year with min. 2

different input/service providers; (c) sufficient revenue generation (e.g. through collection, storage, value addition and collective sale); and (d) enhanced livelihood opportunities for poor landless and vulnerable households.

- 60 Guijt et al., 2015.
- 61 E.g. a link can have a high score while the evidence is scored low.
- 62 See Section 5.3.1.
- 63 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.1.
- 64 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.2.
- 65 The synthesis of the EvalC3 analysis is presented in Section 5.3.4, while the full analysis is attached in Appendix 9.
- 66 The evidence for this is presented in Section 5.3.2.
- 67 The evidence is presented in Section 5.3.3.
- 68 A synthesis can be found in Section 5.3.4. The full analysis is attached in Appendix 9.
- 69 Table A3.1 attached in Appendix 3 presents the indicative scores and distribution figures obtained from the first phase survey.
- 70 Total average score 4–4.9.
- 71 Total average score 3–3.9.
- 72 Total average score < 3.
- 73 Table A4.1 attached in Appendix 4 presents the MO performance scores and rubrics that resulted from the second phase inquiry.
- 74 Total average score > 3.7.
- 75 Including following researched villages: Ma Gyi Pin, Ywar Pale Kone Tan, Te Kone Ywar Thit, Kan Ni Ywar Thit, Saing Shin, Pauk Pin Htwin and Tinbaw Kyun
- 76 E.g. a bulldozer for embankment (in Saing Sinh), farming machines, a pesticide sprinkler bucket, sesame seed filters, containers and machines for sewing and waving, etc.
- 77 In Thazi, these include the following researched villages: Pauk Taw, Inn Gone, Inn and Nyar Kan.
- 78 Although part of the Thazi network, Inn Gone has not been involved in collective trading and advocacy, and hasn't implemented new activities in the past 18–20 months.
- 79 Except in Inn Ganat South that has 70% female MOC leaders and 60% female MO members.
- 80 Only collective buying of rice and inputs was reported.
- 81 A network was formed by the MOCs of Ywar Kone Gyi, Kyar Pyit Kan, Hta Naung Kone, Nyar Kan and Bone Ta Loke for exchanging experiences, collectively solving difficulties in implementation, and connecting with government departments. Also a collaboration was reported between Inn Ganat South and Bone Ta Loke (Thazi) for the collective purchase of rice.
- 82 MO score 2.45.
- 83 The MOC office apparently is based in Nyaung Yann Town, thus not in the village itself.
- 84 The percentage here refers to the % of the villages (n 62) where this was mentioned.
- 85 Also confirmed by MO members.
- 86 In a few cases, it was reported that weak MO member participation is due to the disengagement of household heads. Gender issues may have played a role and affected MO mandate. More attention needs to be paid in future governance initiatives to gender issues (e.g. by conducting participatory gender analysis).
- 87 The percentage refers to the % of the villages (n 62) where this was mentioned.
- 88 In several cases it was mentioned that machines couldn't be rented due to dysfunction and ill maintenance.
- 89 E.g. due to migration, transfer to public servant positions, occupation with own livelihoods.
- 90 Confirmed by township officials.
- 91 In many cases the fund was not properly and fairly revolved. In one case, the fund for goat breeding was used for the construction of a religious building.
- 92 Confirmed by township officials. The mid-tem evaluation found that in half of the villages it investigated, strong central leadership of the village administration dominated and interfered with the functioning of the MO. Villagers tend to have limited time to engage with the MOs as they are preoccupied with the agenda of central leadership (e.g. construction of roads, schools and religious buildings). MOC leaders experience greater difficulty to be accepted and sustain the functioning of the MO in these villages. In other villages, central leadership is more appreciative and supportive of the MOs' distinct role and let them run more independently.
- 93 In Inn Ganat South, it was reported that the financial management methods taught by Oxfam are still used in other projects.
- 94 Hair sorting only occurred in Thazi, not in Minbu.

- 95 This concerns 7 out of 21 sampled villages that received a TAC score 4–5 for ‘access’ – namely: Namely: Ma Gyi Pin (TAMO score 4.67), Pauk Pin Htwin (TAMO score 4.41), Aung Thar (TAMO score 4.20), Pyi Thar Ywar Thit (TAMO score 3.99), Pauk Taw (TAMO score 3.90), Thin Baw Kyun (TAMO score 3.89), and Kyar Pyit Kan (TAMO score 3.04).
- 96 The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is the military party in power in Myanmar.
- 97 This concerns 7 out of 21 sampled villages that received a TAC score 1–2 for ‘access’ –namely: Hta Naung Kone (TAMO score 3.03), Inn (TAMO score 3.00), Ywar Kone Gyi (TAMO score 2.99), Bo Kone (MO score 2.73), Bone Ta Loke (TAMO score 2.72), Kan Ni Ywar Thit (TAMO score 2.45), and Kan Thar Yar (TAMO score 2.99)
- 98 TAMO score 2–3.
- 99 The EvalC3 software was used to conduct a search for the best predictive models of MO (in)effectiveness relative to ‘strengthened/sustained relationships’, ‘improved R&V management’ and ‘improved/sustained livelihoods and resilience’. A total of fourteen best predictive models were identified for configurations of observed changes in MO functioning and observed changes in relationships and R&V management. Of these, eleven models describe correlations between strong MO functioning (from hopeful to fully effective) and sustained improvement in relationships and/or R&V management, while three models describe correlations between weak MO functioning (from dysfunctional to hopeful) and deterioration in relationships and/or R&V management. Of the eleven models, three are about relationships, seven about R&V management, and one about both. A synthesis of the EvalC3 analysis is attached in Appendix 9.
- 100 This concerns 7 out of 21 sampled villages with a TAC score between 2.6 and 4.3 for ‘access’ – namely: Saing Shin (MO score 4.33), Inn Gone (MO score 3.72), Te Kone Ywar Thit (MO score 3.44), Ywar pale Kone Tan (MO score 3.13), Nyar Kan (MO score 2.96), Gway Kone (MO score 2.96), and Inn Ganat South (MO score 2.60).
- 101 Inputs generally can be obtained on credit (with pay back at harvest time) from private suppliers contacted by the MOC, some of whom also come to the villages to provide training.
- 102 Limited maintenance capacity and responsiveness on the part of the departments responsible for water and irrigation was reported frequently in the relationship analysis conducted with women and men in separate and mixed groups in the villages. The recently published IWMI report ‘Improving water management in Myanmar’s Dry Zone’ (2015) confirms this finding.
- 103 Confirmed by several township officials (including Agri Bank).
- 104 See also Section 4.1.1. for the amounts.
- 105 Confirmed by township bank officers.
- 106 E.g. the maturing or nearly maturing MOs, which are 33% of the cases (see Section 5.3.1).
- 107 This concerns 3 out of 21 sampled villages that received a TAC score 4–5 – namely: Ma Gyi Pin and Pauk Pin Htwin in Minbu, and Pauk Taw in Thazi.
- 108 In Pauk Taw, farmers grow watermelon, cotton and beans and use improved technologies. In Pauk Pin Htwin, apart from sesame, farmers also grow chilli, tomatoes and flowers. In Ma Gyi Pin, the MO collects quality seeds for watermelon, sunflower and chickpeas from neighbouring villages.
- 109 This is done with a bulldozer collectively owned by the community and managed by the MO.
- 110 Ma Gyi Pin had a TAMO score of 4.67; Pauk Pin Htwin 4.41; and Pauk Taw 3.90. Evidence of the strength and effectiveness of the MO, with the MOC playing a leading role in all interventions, is strong and consistent (independently confirmed by every focus group in each of these villages).
- 111 In other villages in Minbu, such as Saing Shin, similar problems occur, but much worse and transcending the capacity of an equally strong performing MOC to address the problem (see Section 5.2.2).
- 112 This concerns 5 out of 21 sampled villages that received a TAC score 1–2 – namely: Bone Ta Loke, Bo Kone and Hta Naung Kone in Thazi, and Saing Shin and Kan Thar Yar in Minbu.
- 113 TAMO scores between 2.7 and 3.1.
- 114 Note that the data entries of ‘weak’ performance concerned TAMO scores < 3 (thus really weak).
- 115 Consistency 94%.
- 116 TAC score 4.33.
- 117 From the social mapping with village leaders in Saing Sing.
- 118 This concerns 13 out of 21 sampled villages that received a TAC score 3 – namely: Thin Baw Kyun, Pyi Thar Ywar Thit, Te Kone Ywar Thit, Kan Ni Ywar Thit and Ywar Pale Kone Tan in Minbu, and Aung Thar, Kyar Pyit Kan, Nyar Kan, Gway Kone (East), Inn Ganat (South), Ywar Gone Gyi, Inn, and Inn Gone in Thazi.
- 119 Quotation from Inn Gone (Thazi).
- 120 TAMO score between 2.9 and 3.7. This validated the project proposition regarding their influence on livelihoods (see Section 4.1.2).
- 121 Thin Baw Kyun and Pyi Thar Ywar Thit in Minbu; and Inn Gone in Thazi (TAC score almost 4).
- 122 See also Text box 5a for more about human hair trade.
- 123 The importance is indicated by a high consistency rate (i.e. outcome-sensitivity) and/or a high coverage rate (i.e. cause-sensitivity). See Appendix 9 for a synthesis of the EvalC3 analysis.

- 124 The village is an arena of various formal and informal institutions (between 7 and 11) – including central village administration, traditional institutions (comprised of elders and religious leaders), political institutions, village-initiated development institutions and development institutions externally initiated by aid agencies (such as Pact Myanmar, Save the Children and NAG in Minbu and Oxfam in Thazi). Generally, the role of these various institutions is rather limited. Committees established by Pact Myanmar and Save the Children, for instance, are focused on micro-finance. Also village-initiated development committees are generally formed to carry out one particular activity (such as getting access to electricity, constructing a school, etc.).
- 125 The triangle is drawn from a PowerPoint presentation of the Department of Rural Development on the 'Road to sustainable rural development in Myanmar' (Zarni, 2014). Cf. [http://www.lift-fund.org/sites/lift-fund.org/files/uploads/documents/Zarni\\_English.pdf](http://www.lift-fund.org/sites/lift-fund.org/files/uploads/documents/Zarni_English.pdf)
- 126 For instance in Thazi, where it's headed by a governing body of ten household leaders, compared to Minbu, where a central leader is elected by the elders and religious leaders (cf. Oxfam DZ mid-term evaluation report – Power shift and social change assessment, 2013).
- 127 The matrix is drawn from the report on the workshop organised by International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in Addis Ababa in February 2015 around 'Tracking Adaptation and Measuring Development' (TAMD). (Steinbach, 2015: 19). Cf. <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10132IIED.pdf>.
- 128 These are located in the upper right corner of the matrix in Figure 6.2.
- 129 These are located in the centre right side of the matrix in Figure 6.2.
- 130 Cf. <http://www.collaborationforimpact.com/collective-impact>.
- 131 Guijt et al., 2015.
- 132 In two villages it was impossible to conduct the survey due to conflict.
- 133 The consultant was not able to obtain the actual numbers of participants in Thazi. Therefore she used the average numbers of participants in each method per village in Minbu (cf. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2) as the basis for estimating the participants in Thazi. These were: 8 for the social mapping (mostly male village leaders), 9 for the livelihood analysis (9 with men and 9 with women), 13 for the risk & vulnerability management and relationship analysis (14 with women and 12 with men) and 10 for the MO assessment (of which half women and half men). The average per method in Minbu comes to 8.75, which is similar to the amount prescribed in the field manual.
- 134 By 'constitution' we mean: a body of agreed principles and rules according to which the MO is governed. It includes a clear definition of the role of the MOC and the way decisions are made.
- 135 By active member we mean a member who still participates in the MO activities. This question asks about what this participation implies. For instance: an active member is someone who (a) is registered as a member; (b) takes part in more than 50% of the planning and other meetings; and (c) takes part in more than 50% of the main activities of the MO.
- 136 The EvalC3 sub-report was produced by Aba Sey.
- 137 Note that 'cases' here refers to the populations of women respectively men in the villages. Data were entered into the software in a gender-disaggregated manner. Each village had two separate data entries: one for the women and one for the men (data were obtained from gender-specific focus groups). Consequently there are 42 cases (21 sampled villages, each with 2 separate entries).



## Oxfam Effectiveness Reviews

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